CyberThreatIntel/Unknown/APT-C-37/26-08-19/APT-C-37 analysis.md

APT-C-37 campaign in the Middle East

Table of Contents

• Malware analysis
  • Initial vector
  • Loader
  • JS Backdoor
• Cyber Threat Intel
  • Origin of the method for the JS Backdoor
  • APT-C-37 Campaign
  • A army in perdition, an difficult situation
  • A war of misinformation
  • The drone attack, a result of the information campaign ?
  • Finally ?
• Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
• References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
• Links
  • Original Tweet
  • Link Anyrun
  • Documents

Malware analysis

Initial vector

The initial vector use an SFX executable, who drop a lnk file for the persistence, a vbs file and the docx file for decoys the victim.

We can note that the topic of the document only for decoy the victims is about a scandal in the Hamas leaders.

Here the translation in english of the content of the document.

A new scandal for a Hamas leader
In the difficult circumstances of our people in the Gaza Strip, and what the head of the family suffers in order to earn a living, but financial and moral corruption does not end in this stray rogue in the name of religion.
We received leaked news that RA, a Hamas leader in the northern Gaza Strip, was interrogated on charges of financial embezzlement. Investigations show that he has an affair with a girl. As the private source said to us, he was stopped from practicing any political or movement activity after this incident.
Question how long ?????????????????
For more details please email us at the following email.
palemptn@yahoo[.]com

We can note too that the email address is valid and invite to send a mail about this event.

We can also note the multiples possibilities for push the persistence and options.

This execute the vbs file for push the persistence in the startup menu, hide it in changing these attributes and launch the persistence (lnk file)

This download the VB script and execute it by mshta call.

On the VB code, we can observed that use BITS functionality for download by a job the JS script to execute on the victim. Secondly, this checks the architecture of the system and executes the correct path of wscript and push the windows out the screen.

Loader

We can see that use function for decode the commands with an array of bytes.

For decode the string, we use the next function used by the backdoor for decode the commands.

You can now change the encoded commands.

Once the encoded strings removed, we have the following code :

As anti-forensic method, a method which can know if determiner if a debugger is present.

Finally, we can observe a Wscript execution with a function splter which split for getting an array of bytes, convert to ASCII and after execute the script with execute call.

By the following PowerShell script, we can get the second layer that is the JS Backdoor.

JS Backdoor

Firstly, the script get the system informations about the system of the victim and send to one the list of C2 in the logical sense (not random call on the list of C2) with the suffix "/is-ready". The backdoor uses a while loop for rest in communication with C2 by sending a pulse with the system information of the victim.

This send the data with the following structure to the C2 (Here from the Anyrun sandbox) :

C4BA3647<|>USER-PC<|>admin<|>Microsoft Windows 7 Professional <|>plus<|>nan-av<|>

We can note that the USB spread option isn't used on this sample. The structure of the reply to the C2 is the next :

[volumeserialnumber]<|>[computername]<|>[username]<|>plus<|>[AV product (yes -> name or no ->nan-av)]<|>[usbspreading option (= "")]<|>

In a second time, when a response of the C2 was given and use a switch structure for execute the command.

Now, we analyse all functions used by this switch. As first function, we can see a function used by others functions of the script and used for sending the data to the C2.

We can observe after a group of functions who use the WQL queries by the WMI for getting the system informations, this is used by the attacker as profiling the victim.

After, a function is used by the attacker for download an executable file.

In the same idea for the attacker, a function which give the possibility to read the bytes of files in a buffer and send it to the C2 is present.

The next function give to the attacker to have the list drives on the computer.

Another function can enumerate the paths of folders, files and to give in more the attributes of them.

And third function is used for getting the list of the process running in the computer.

The last function exit the process with a kill signal by taskkill call.

We can resume the list of commands of the backdoor :

Command	Description
execute	execute a command DOS/Powershell
send	Download a file to execute
site-send	Function don't exist but have the same arg that send command, seems be an edited function of site-send and not deleted ?
recv	Read a file, put in a buffer and send to the C2
enum-driver	Send the list of drives to the C2
enum-faf	Get list of the folders, files and attributes and send it to the C2
enum-process	Get list of the process (name, id, path of the executable) and send it on the C2
delete	Function don't exist but by the params seems give to the attacker to delete folders or files
exit-process	Kill the backdoor process but can't remove the persistence, an "execute" command must be performed before for delete it in the registry

All the IP are hosted on differents cloud provider.

IP	Route	ASN	Organization	Country	City	Region	Coordinates
66.154.103.156	66.154.102.0/23	AS8100	QuadraNet Enterprises LLC	United States	Secaucus	New Jersey	40.7895,-74.0565
37.48.111.5	37.48.64.0/18	AS60781	LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.	Netherlands	Noord-Holland	Amsterdam	52.3824,4.8995
85.17.26.65	85.17.0.0/16	AS60781	LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.	Netherlands	Noord-Holland	Amsterdam	52.3824,4.8995

Cyber kill chain

The process graph resume the cyber kill chain used by the attacker.

Cyber Threat Intel

Origin of the method for the JS Backdoor

Firstly, the method for load the JS Backdoor is edited from a post published in 2015 on a forum for show a method for the both architecture for the development of a worm.

We can see that the name of the instance is changed and the html tags are removed. If we add the notes from the malware analysis, we can conclude that the malware has been edited in emergency.

APT-C-37 Campaign

In March 2019, a new campaign analysed by 360 Core Security in March 2019 of APT-C-37 show the analysis of the H-worm.We can note that as obfuscation is based on the utilisation of the functions Mid for extract the characters and some replace for change the characters for getting the script to execute. We can note too that the level of complexity of the obfuscation is very low and can be easily analysed and detected.

In the same forum, we can found on a mega link the source code of the VB RAT Fkn0wned in April 2018 used by the same campaign on of the APT. With the code of H-worm like the analysis of 2013, we can show that APT-C-37 have probably get the resources from this forum for launches their operations.

The recent sample of H-worm have many removed and edited functions compared at the original version like remove the persistence, the function Sleep ...

On the IOC, we can recognize the structure used by the H-worm with "is-ready".

The goals of this campaign and since the detection in 2015 is to use RAT for android and windows systems for spying. The last operation attacks Amaq media and Al Swarm News Agency websites which are used for the propaganda of ISIS (Salafism). The group have used a group of words for pick, the interest of the victims, for example, the app is named "زوجات الرسول" (in english "The Wives of the Prophet").

If this time, APT-C-37 attack the Hamas (Sunnite) for spying, we can adding on the profile that the group target all the Muslim religions and that a future operation against Hezbollah (Shiite) will be coming one day ? Or this APT is based Shiite and target all the others armed organizations with the different Muslim religions are targetted?

In addition of this and the date of submission, this sample has been used in a campaign of profiling. In the submissions, we can observe some samples matching this own sample.

The informations of the sandbox show the similarities in the structure of the URL and C2 and the aba, dyndns domains.

On the matching YARA rule, we can conclude that the campaign since at least May 2019.

The fact that the month is May is interesting.The 3 May 2019, after two Israeli soldiers were injured by sniper fire in the Gaza Strip during the weekly protests at the Gaza–Israel border. In response, the Israeli Air Force carried out an airstrike an Hamas post, killing two Palestinians that have provoke the military response by a hundred rockets. On 5 May 2019, Israel by the help of the Unit 8200 of Military Intelligence (have done Stuxnet and Duqu) have suspected Hamas cyber-attack and reply by immediate air strike (this rest still suspected, no report analyzing the exploiting tools, technologies and objectives targeted).

A army in perdition, an difficult situation

Since the last decade, the inexperience of the army on military issues, rigid doctrine, misunderstanding of the adversary, over-reliance on air and all-technological operations, loss of skills in the IDF, hesitations of unit commanders, the belief - erroneous - that the Israeli population would not accept the possible losses, a reorganized but deficient logistics, the non-mastery of communication. If we add the Syria situation and the result of the confrontation in 2006 who have add new enemies against Israel, this creates a difficult situation for these leaders.

We can recall the manifestations against Netanyahu immunity between February at May 2019 who have weakened the popularity rating. Recently, during the election period, each action or precious opportunity can be used for that purpose or to develop a doctrine such as the creation of housing in the colonies.

A war of misinformation

Like all recent conflicts, communication networks are used to send false news and propaganda or to create it because people can not understand the situation. For example, recently, we could hear that a false evacuation of wounded was launched against Hezbollah for pushing to stop firing, but that is to ignore, guerrilla warfare and the outcome of recent conflicts where it isn't about rockets that destroyed military equipment, but Israeli forces that sabotaged their own equipment by the fear of new recruits and lack of experience. In the same vein, fear of rocket fire on a city can't be realistic, Hezbollah given the priority to garrisons of the border army, infrastructure that a better choice due this have the capacities to destroying the guerilla, this argument is only valid in Israel to prepare the people for the possibilities of declaring war.

In this way, some images were sent in both sides to use this factor as propaganda vector. For example, an image taken with a drone from the netanyahu window was published on social media at for purposes of spreading retaliatory capabilities. If we see the picture with the naked eye, we can see that the shadow of the drone is not indicated in the wall inside the room, the facade is a decoration, false coordinates and the blur apply to the entire photo.

With the ELA algorithm, we can see the last modifications on the pictures. In using this it, we can see all the precedents elements are added at the original picture (probably a meeting with members of government).

In same time, other pictures are released about decoy targets, with the ELA algorithm, we can see that the multiple compressions by the algorithms, the picture is very dark and the pictures are only modify for writing the indicators of interest.

Recently, in the same way for develop the feeling of fear, Israel government have claimed that Iran build precision missiles, this rest to prove it but the scheme of reflexion is the same, a war of fear and misinformation.

The drone attack, a result of the information campaign ?

We have got confirmation that the drones used for the operation are trapped with explosives for explode at the moment that the enemies recovers it, that indicate that the Israel know that in these regions the enemies is present and valuable targets can be attainable. In the comparing with the past, we can note that probably some operations of spying are active as survey by the fact of the ideology of "no injury" and use all the aims for avoid victims on the Israeli forces or civilians.

Finally ?

The APT-C-37 on the objectives and methods match but if this APT-C-37, we can show the great increase on the capacity to obfuscate and TTPs. If the Hamas is actor as trap for Israel, this wrong idea and give an opportunity to destabilize the guerrilla. And for Israel, this possible that use it for do a profiling campaign against the Hamas with the recent events in the last months.

References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

List of all the references with MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Enterprise tactics	Technics used	Ref URL
Execution	T1170 - Mshta T1064 - Scripting	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
Persistence	T1197 - BITS Jobs T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060
Defense Evasion	T1197 - BITS Jobs T1170 - Mshta T1064 - Scripting	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064
Discovery	T1012 - Query Registry	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012
Lateral Movement	T1105 - Remote File Copy	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105
C2	T1105 - Remote File Copy	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105

Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)

List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)

Indicator	Description
فضيحة جديدة لأحد قيادات حماس.exe	03d82852bbb28d1740e50206e7726c006b9b984a8309e2f203e65a67d7d3bcad
History.lnk	3853e0bf00d6dbfc574bc0564f0c90b93a66d644dd4dc8b8c00564f0b6edf581
ss.vbs	2e5f9bb1cef985eab15ad8d9072e51c71be2810fea789836b401b96bc898943b
news.docx	08fa35e25f4c7a6279a84b337d541989498d74f2c5e84cc4039d667fedc725c7
xyx.jse	32e216942f995f285947c7e7ee8cf438440c8a1e033bb27517f5e5361dafa8e8
adamnews.for.ug	Domain requested
israanews.zz.com.ve	Domain requested
mmksba.dyndns.org	Domain C2
webhoptest.webhop.info	Domain C2
mmksba.simple-url.com	Domain C2
85.17.26.65	IP requested
66.154.103.156	IP C2
37.48.111.5	IP C2
http[:]//israanews.zz.com.ve/hw.zip.zip	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//adamnews.for.ug/hwdownhww	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-ready	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-ready	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-ready	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-sending	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-sending	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-sending	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-recving	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-recving	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-recving	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-enum-driver	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-enum-driver	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-enum-driver	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-enum-faf	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-enum-faf	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-enum-faf	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//webhoptest.webhop.info:4433/is-enum-process	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.simple-url.com:4422/is-enum-process	HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//mmksba.dyndns.org:4455/is-enum-process	HTTP/HTTPS requests

This can be exported as JSON format Export in JSON

Links

Original tweet: https://twitter.com/Timele9527/status/1166188375109296128

Links Anyrun:

• فضيحة جديدة لأحد قيادات حماس.zip (A new scandal of one of the leaders of Hamas.zip)
• xyx.jse
• 7d989a9a3faef377f2556e090014f96ba3bf8a8299ba256d30fab41710499a7c

Documents:

• Evaluating ELA
• Analysis of APT-C-37
• Now You See Me - H-worm by Houdini
• Pulse alienvault about IP C2 in March 2019