ch0ic3/CyberThreatIntel

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Update analysis.md

2019-11-06 15:01:12 +01:00

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Raw Blame History

A Look into the Lazarus Group's Operations in October 2019

Table of Contents

Malware analysis
Cyber kill chain
Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
Links

Malware analysis

The next analysis try to kept the recents events and a logicial improvement and technics of the group, this can go back in the past for compare it.

CES 2020 incident (NukeSped)

We can see that the document target specifily the south korean exhibitors with the follow tittle "Application form for American Las Vegas CES 2020"

This initial vector of the infection begin by a current exploit in HWP (CVE-2015-6585) to execute an EPS script, this download and execute the next stage of the infection.

This execute fisrtly a common trick RtlCaptureContext for have ability to register a top-level exception handler and avoid debbuging.

Once this done, the malware execute a series of actions like list the disks, process, files and push it in differents files as temp file in waiting to send the data to C2.

This push the list of C2 address to contact, the languages to understand and begin the contact with the C2 in giving the host info.

List of the languages used :

RFC4646/ISO 639 Ref	Lang
Az-Arab	Azerbaijani in Arabic script
de-CH	Swiss German
en-US	English as used in the United States

Interesting to see that not only south korea language is choisen and show that the group target all exhibitors (more a hundred exhibitors only for South Korea). This think possibly that the group manage the event give hardware specifily for the shows to the customers, that explains why this to don't include specific language like South Korea. If the target is interesting for the group, this can execute command and others tools in the computer infected.

We can see in the list of all the domains used that this all as different cloud providers and are legit website hijacked by vulnerable wordpress.

IP	ASN	Organization	Route	City	Coordinates	Country
64.151.229.52	AS26753	In2net Network Inc.	64.151.192.0/18	Toronto	43.6861,-79.4025	Canada
185.136.207.217	AS203377	LAB internet ve Bilisim Hizmetleri	185.136.207.0/24	Eskiehir	39.7767,30.5206	Turkey
83.169.17.240	AS8972	Europe GmbH	83.169.16.0/21	Köln	50.9541,6.9103	Germany

We can confirmed it by the Whois records and by the certificats push on the websites know at all the sites have between up early August 2019 at September 2019.

HAL incident (JakyllHyde)

The document specifically target the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited company (HAL) that the national aeronautics in India. This use false announcements for recruitment for target probably interesting profile or internal employees in asking for their opinion about announcements.

The attack vector is an maldoc which use a macro for drop and execute the implant. The first bloc is a declaration of function for load the future extracted dll.

The next bloc have multiple functions like decode from the base 64 in binary and string, verify the path of folder/file, create a folder and extract the correct payload from the form in maldoc according to the OS.

The following bloc have extraction functions (drop the lure) and for get the name of the lure and the dll.

We can see the autoopen function for execute the macro at the opening of the document and the data of the malware in base 64.

The backdoor begins to do the reconnaissance actions like list the process

Cyber kill chain

The process graphs resume all the cyber kill chains used by the attacker.

References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

List of all the references with MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Enterprise tactics	Technics used	Ref URL

Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)

List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)

Indicator	Description

This can be exported as JSON format Export in JSON

Links

Original tweet:

Links Anyrun:

External analysis:

Ressources :

List of South Korea exhibitors in CES2020