CyberThreatIntel/Pakistan/APT/Gorgon/09-09-19/Malware analysis 09-09-19.md
2019-09-14 23:19:06 +02:00

8.9 KiB

[Update] New samples, same TTPs and accounts

Table of Contents

Malware analysis

The initial vector is an VBA macro from a Maldoc. This use two functions for obfuscated the main command.

alt text

Once this removed, we can see that use the only command is mshta for invoke the loader.

alt text

This web page use unescape (4 times) for use again mshta and redirect on the first pastebin.

alt text alt text alt text

The first pastebin use again the escape function (and like all at pastebin shares).The first command of the Visual Basic script is to kill the following process (Word, Excel, Publisher and Powerpoint).

alt text

The second command create a persistence using another mshta for initiate to close the hidden window.

alt text

The third command execute a loader with two new pastebins.

alt text

The first share is a script using an array and the getbytes function for obfuscate the payload on two layers.

alt text alt text

This executes a dll for load the second PE. This dll is the same than the last analysis and is used as protector ConfuserEx.

alt text

The second Pastebin content the data to split for the second PE.

alt text

The second PE load the old Delphi AZORult Stealer. We can confirm it in seeing quickly some features, here read the informations about the keyboard :

alt text

We can observe too that malware can research the current wallets.

alt text

This uses an XOR operation with a 3-byte key for encrypting data to sent to the C&C server.

alt text

This can get a screenshot of the computer too.

alt text

Cyber kill chain

The process graph resume the cyber kill chain used by the attacker.

alt text

Cyber Threat Intel

The TTPs are the same that the last analysis of the group, this time, this uses the old version of the AZORult (Delphi instead of C++).
The fact to have a pastebin at each step of the operation is interesting for see the rate of the success and see if the operation is probably discovered.
The two accounts used for the operation are the same that the last sample spotted and are linked as accounts of the APT group.

alt text alt text

The last interesting thing is that the sample is spotted the 10 September 2019, we can see that the pastebins are the last time edited on the 9 September and in going on the opendir of the panel, we can see multiple panels for theirs operations was implemented at the last moments and show that not prepared for a special event.

alt text

References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

List of all the references with MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
Enterprise tactics Technics used Ref URL
Execution Scheduled Task
Command-Line Interface
Scripting
Execution through API
Mshta
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170/
Persistence Scheduled Task
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060/
Privilege Escalation Scheduled Task https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
Defense Evasion Scripting
Mshta
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170/
Discovery Query Registry
System Information Discovery
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/

Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)

List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
Indicator Description
PO # 8872521.xlt 51a0e2aac8a0d7460e2a326a9c372f3d1ba3871e6f365f122f3d72cd271a5a3b
Scan001.xls 0ec07af14a5338805ed45bcc0a90b20811fd0c9b57ab0f5e1cfd97cd1696c1c2
bin2.exe c04d776b341acb3d02270a4f883c8b08a66b183779dea79c1b7e11f3906ce616
67.199.248.14 IP requested
172.217.22.97 IP requested
67.199.248.10 IP requested
67.199.248.11 IP requested
216.170.126.139 IP C2
bitly.com Domain requested
sxasxasxssaxxsasxasx.blogspot.com Domain requested
pastebin.com Domain requested
http[:]//216.170.126.139/Panel/10/index.php HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/BrH6UFRc HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//bitly.com/6xdfsSXsh6 HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/UZEbWMK9 HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/nhcP3XgH HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//bit.ly/loahsh78bhidasyiuasaaki HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/5y7H3LSz HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/TqsXJZaM HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/3MuLJLWZ HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/dkrjWec2 HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/j8mRken0 HTTP/HTTPS requests
http[:]//pastebin.com/raw/bgTGtxHc HTTP/HTTPS requests
This can be exported as JSON format Export in JSON
Original tweet: https://twitter.com/Rmy_Reserve/status/1171381881461338112
Ref previous analysis: Gorgon analysis (25-08-19)
Documents: