384 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
384 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
[12:52:34] -> *spewnum* damn you! :) fine, we'll just call them payloads, and then we'll break it up as Payload Stagers, Payload Stages, and
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Post-exploitation suites, does that sound coo?
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I. Introduction
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A. Who are we?
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1. spoonm
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2. skape
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3. Why do we do this hoodoo voodoo
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B. Exploit Technology
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1. Three Phases of Exploitation
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a. Pre-exploitation
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b. Exploitation
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c. Post-exploitation
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2. Pre-exploitation - Before the attack
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a. Find the bug
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b. Write exploits, payloads, tools
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3. Exploitation - Leveraging the vulnerability
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a. Find a target
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c. Gather info, setup tools, prepare listeners, etc
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b. Launch attack
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4. Post-Exploitation - Manipulating the target
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a. Command shell redirection
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b. Arbitrary command execution
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c. Pivoting payloads
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d. Advanced payload interaction
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B. Where do we stand?
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1. Pre-exploitation
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a. Robust and elegant encoders do exist
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i. SkyLined's alpha-numeric encoder
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ii. Spoonm's Shikata Ga Nai
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b. Payload encoders generally taken for granted
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NOTE: maybe expand a little bit more here...
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i. Most encoders are static with a variable key
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ii. IDS able to signature static decoder stubs
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c. NOP generation hasn't publically changed much
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i. PoC exploits generally use predictable nops, if any
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ii. ADMmutate easily signatured by most NIDS (Snort, Fnord)
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iii. Not considered very important to many researchers
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d. NIDS deployments are playing chase the tail
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i. The mouse always has the advantage; NIDS is reactive
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ii. Advanced nops and encoders push NIDS to its limits
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NOTE: maybe talk about how complex some things are to signature,
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for example, RPC, application level fragmentation, etc.
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2. Exploitation
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a. Techniques have become very mature
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i. Linux/BSD exploitation techniques largely unchanged
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ii. Win32 heap overflows now more reliable (oded/shok)
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iii. Win32 SEH overwrites make exploitation easy, even on XPSP2
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b. Exploitation topics have been beaten to death
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3. Post-exploitation
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a. Common payloads are limited
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i. Command shell interaction has poor automation support
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ii. Limited to the command set that the interpreter provides
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iii. Bounded by the utilities installed on the target machine
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iv. Restrictive environments (chroot) can hinder command execution
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v. HIPS vendors becoming more adept at detecting basic payloads
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- LoadLibraryA from the stack, etc (mcafee 8.0i)
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NOTE: I think it would be important here to talk even about the
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issues with "advantage" payloads, ala Core Impact and CANVAS.
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We should look into them more, but I have a hunch that they
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aren't that well writte, don't have that great of APIs
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exposed, and aren't very extensible for a 3rd party not
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on the team authoring the product. Even the "advanced" stuff
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I think has a lot of issues.
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b. Communication vectors largely unchanged
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i. Reverse and port-bind payloads still the most common
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ii. Findsock style payloads still unused by PoC exploits
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iii. Alternative communication vectors rarely discussed
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c. Pivoting technology exists
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i. Core ST described system call proxying in 2002
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ii. Metasploit's (2.3) meterpreter provides basic network pivoting
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C. What will we discuss?
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1. Pre-exploitation Research
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a. NOP generation
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i. Opty2
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b. Encoders
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i. Additive feedback encoders
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ii. Shikata Ga Nai
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2. Post-Exploitation Research
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a. Library Injection
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i. Facilitates things like Meterpreter and VNC injection
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b. VNC Injection
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i. Introduced at blackhat04 with the Metasploit 2.2 release
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c. Meterpreter & dN
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i. The cross-platform post-exploitation suite
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NOTE: dN is weak, but maybe talk about it from a different perspective,
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just about allowing the attacker to really orcistrate everything
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down even to the system call level. Definitely should talk a
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bunch about your ninjaness with meterp TLV stylies, and the
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channelized throwdown. (</thuggin>).
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3. Payload Research
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a. PassiveX
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i. Taking advantage of ActiveX controls
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ii. Taking advantage of soccer playing sisters.
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b. Ordinal Stagers
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i. Tiny network capable stagers
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c. Egghunt (maybe?)
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i. Small payload capable of locating a larger payload
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ii. Useful for exploits with limited space
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NOTE: Egghunt is cool, and we can just talk a bit about how we
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extracted the syscalls, and how all of our tools come together
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to do stuff like that really fast/easily. Oded mentioned he
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saw the page and thought it was cool, he wondered how you
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got the prototypes...
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II. Pre-exploitation
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A. OptyNop2
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1. Creation and benefits of multi-byte nopsleds
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B. Additive feedback encoders
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C. Shikata Ga Nai
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1. High permutation shellcode through simple dependency mappings
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III. Post-exploitation
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A. Library Injection
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1. Overview
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a. Paper published in 04/2004
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b. Provides advanced code execution
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c. Code can be written in any language that can compile down
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to a shared object.
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d. Allows developer to use all of the APIs exposed to a normal
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application.
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e. Detailed explanation can be found in included resources
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(include lib inject paper)
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2. Two types of library injection
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a. On-Disk
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i. Library is loaded from the target's harddrive or via a
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file share.
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ii. Can be detected by AV products due to fs access
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b. In-Memory
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i. Library is uploaded to the target and loaded from memory
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without touching the disk
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ii. Evades file system filter drivers, such as those
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provided by AV companies
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iii. Not touching the disk means no forensic trace
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iv. VirtualLock prevents swapping to disk, but requires admin
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3. In-memory library injection on Windows
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a. System calls used by the library loader are hooked
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i. NtCreateFile
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ii. NtMapViewOfSection
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iii. etc
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b. Unique image name is used to identify the image to image that
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is in memory
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c. System call hooks are removed so that future injectino can
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occur
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d. Alternative approaches
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i. Could do client-side relocations, but would need to handle
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import processing
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4. In-memory library injection on Linux/BSD
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a. No known public implementations
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b. Requires alternate approach
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i. Hooking API routines not always possible -- symtab not
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mapped into memory
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ii. libc symbol version mismatches lead to linking nightmares
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c. Client-side relocations seem most feasible
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i. Remote side maps a region of memory and sends the client
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the base address
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ii. Client processes relocations and transmits the relocated
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image as its mapped segment would appear
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iii. Requires locating rtld base so that PLT lookups will
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work
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B. VNC Injection
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1. Implements VNC as an injectable DLL
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a. Uses RealVNC as the code-base
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b. VNC communication uses the exploit connection
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c. No physical trace is left of the VNC server
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d. Can operate regardless of existing VNC installations
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2. Easy way to illustrate insecurities
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a. Suits understand mouse movement better than black box command
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prompts
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C. Meterpreter
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1. Generic post-exploitation suite
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a. Based on library injection
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b. Uses the established exploit connection
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i. Especially powerful with findsock payloads; no new connection
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c. Executes entirely from memory
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d. No new processes or file access required for the payload to
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succeed
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e. Detailed explanation can be found in included resources
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(include meterpreter paper)
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2. Extension system provides advanced automation support
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a. No need to hand write tedious assembly
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b. Existing native code can be ported to a meterpreter extension
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3. Architecture
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a. Design goals
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i. Very flexible protocol; should adapt to extension requirements
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ii. Exposure of a channelized communication system to extensions
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iii. Stealth operation
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iv. Should be portable to various operating systems
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v. Client from one platform should work with server on another
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platform
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b. Protocol
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i. Uses TLVs (Type-Length-Value) to support arbitrary data
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passing.
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ii. TLVs allow the packet parser to be oblivious to the structure
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of the value field
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iii. Type field is broken down into meta types
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4. Core interface
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a. Overview
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i. Minimal interface to support the loading of extensions
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ii. Implements the basic packet transmission and dispatching
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facilities
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iii. Exposes channel allocation and management to extensions
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b. Advanced features
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i. Migrating the server instance between processes
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5. The ``stdapi'' extension
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a. Overview
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i. Included in Metasploit 3.0
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ii. Provides access to some of the common subsystems of the
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target operating system
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iii. Allows for easy automation and implementation of robust
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post-exploitation scripts
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b. File System
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i. File and directory interaction
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ii. Files can be uploaded and downloaded between the
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attacker and the target
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c. Network
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i. Transparent network pivoting
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ii. Route table enumeration and manipulation
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iii. Local interface enumeration
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d. Process
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i. Process execution, optionally with channelized IO
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ii. Enumeration of running processes
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iii. Modification of arbitrary memory
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iv. Creation and modification of running threads
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v. Loading and interacting with shared object files
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e. Registry
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i. General registry API access
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ii. Opening, creating, and removing registry keys
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iii. Setting, querying, and deleting registry values
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iv. Enumeration of both keys and values
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f. User interface
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i. Disabling local user interaction via the keyboard
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and/or mouse (similar to VNC)
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ii. Idle timeout checking to see how long it's been
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since the user did something interactive
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6. The ``priv'' extension
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a. Still in development
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b. Exposes an interface to escalating local privileges
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through local vulnerabilities
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c. SAM dumping support similar to pwdump3
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D. dN
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1. Simple low-footprint post-exploitation tool
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2. Useful to scope out execution enviroment, then bootstrap other tools
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IV. Payload Research
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A. PassiveX
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1. Overview
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a. Post-exploitation payload
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b. A derivative of On-Disk library injection that uses
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ActiveX controls
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c. Supports arbitrary DLL injection in any language that can
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be compiled as an ActiveX control (C++, VB, etc)
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d. Detailed analysis can be found in included resources
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(include passivex paper)
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2. Payload Implementation
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a. Disables iexplore Internet zone restrictions on
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ActiveX controls
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i. Modifies four registry values that are stored per-user
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b. Launches a hidden iexplore at a URL with an embedded
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OCX
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i. The OCX does not have to be signed
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ii. No user interaction is required
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iii. OCX is automatically downloaded, registered, and loaded
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into the browser's context
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3. Sample HTTP tunneling ActiveX control
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a. HTTP GET/POST used to build tunnel to attacker
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i. Uses the WININET API
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ii. Outbound traffic from target machine encapsulated in POST
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request
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iii. Inbound traffic from attacker encapsulated in GET response
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iv. Proxy configuration automatically inherited
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v. Requires HTTP server capable of performing encap/decap on the
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HTTP packets
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b. Streaming connection through HTTP tunnel can be created
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i. socketpair doesn't exist natively on win32 but can be simulated
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with a local listener
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ii. Streaming abstraction allows advanced payloads to transparently
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use the HTTP transport (Meterpreter, VNC)
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iii. Local listener less covert, but highly beneficial
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4. Pros
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a. Bypasses restrictive outbound filters
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b. Re-uses proxy configuration
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c. Looks like normal user traffic
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d. Allows full access to the win32 API like all forms of
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library injection
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5. Cons
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a. Touches the disk
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b. Requires administrative access
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i. Internet Explorer prohibits the downloading of
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ActiveX controls as non-admin
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B. Windows Ordinal Stagers
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1. Overview
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a. Technique from Oded's lightning talk from core04
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b. Uses static ordinals to locate winsock symbol addresses
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c. Compatible with all versions of Windows
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d. 92 byte reverse stager, 93 byte findsock stager
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e. Detailed explanation can be found in included resources
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(include spoonm ordinal paper)
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2. Reverse Ordinal Stager
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a. Walks InitOrderModuleList searching for ws2_32
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b. Uses static ordinals to index the export table
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c. Creates fd with socket
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d. Chains connect and recv frames
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e. Returns into buffer read in from file descriptor
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C. Egghunting
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1. Overview
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a. Small stub payload that can search for a larger payload
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b. Useful for exploits that have limited payload space but can
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stash more payload elsewhere in memory
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c. Example exploits include the IE object type vulnerability.
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d. Goal is to safely search target address space for the larger
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payload.
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e. Larger payload is located by searching for an egg that is prepended
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to it.
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f. Detailed analysis can be found in included resources
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(include egghunt paper)
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2. Two primary methods of egghunting on Windows
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a. SEH
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1. 60 bytes in size, searches for an 8 byte egg, compatible with all
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versions of Windows (including 9x)
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2. Installs a custom exception handler
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3. Begins walking the address space
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i. When a bad address is encounter, the current pointer is
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incremented by PAGE_SIZE
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ii. When a mismatch of the egg is encountered, the current pointer
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is incremented by one
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4. Each address is compared against the 8-byte egg
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i. Bad addresses will throw exceptions which will be handled
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by the custom exception handler
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5. When the egg is found, jump past the egg into the larger payload
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b. System call
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1. Very small stub (32 bytes), searches for an 8 byte egg, only
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compatible with NT+
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2. Uses a non-intrusive system call (NtDisplayString) to search validate
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addresses
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i. Same page walking logic as SEH is used
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3. When the egg is found, jump past the egg into the larger payload
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3. One primary method of egghunting on Linux
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a. System call
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1. 30 bytes in size, searches for an 8 byte egg
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2. System call technique applies to other UNIX variants as well
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3. Uses the sigaction system call to validate 16 bytes at once
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4. Pros
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i. Very small
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5. Cons
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i. Corner cases may cause it to be unstable
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V. The Complete Picture - Metasploit 3.0
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A. The power of pre-exploitation prepartion
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1. Abstract NOP generation
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2. Abstract payload encoding
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3. Abstract exploit connection handlers
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i. Bind handler
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ii. Reverse handler
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iii. Findsock handler
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B. The power of exploit generalization
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1. Standardized exploit creation interface
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i. Robust target definitions
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ii. Detailed exploit implementation information
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iii. Entirely payload independent, no hardcoding paylaods
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C. The power of post-exploitation automation
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1. Complicated tasks made simple with scripting
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i. Want to download a targets entire harddrive?
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ii. Want to disable local user interaction?
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iii. Want to upload and play an mp3 on the target?
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iv. Want to 'be' on the target's network?
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2. Standard interface means cross platform support
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VI. Conclusion - where do we go from here?
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A. Future Post-exploitation research
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1. Mesh network support
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2. Expansion of the stdapi described in this document
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included resources:
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http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/egghunt-shellcode.pdf
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http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/meterpreter.pdf
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http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/remote-library-injection.pdf
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http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/passivex.pdf [not released yet]
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http://www.metasploit.com/users/spoonm/ordinals.txt
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cited material:
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STRIDE:
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http://www.ics.forth.gr/carv/acs/ACS/Activities/papers/stride-IFIP-SEC05.pdf
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syscall proxy:
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http://www.coresecurity.com/files/files/11/SyscallProxying.pdf
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