Commit Graph

14 Commits (e3d1a34c663cd7e9285d59d5c315f66703539280)

Author SHA1 Message Date
URI Assassin 35d3bbf74d
Fix up comment splats with the correct URI
See the complaint on #4039. This doesn't fix that particular
issue (it's somewhat unrelated), but does solve around
a file parsing problem reported by @void-in
2014-10-17 11:47:33 -05:00
HD Moore 583dab62b2 Introduce and use OS matching constants 2014-05-28 14:35:22 -05:00
HD Moore 7e227581a7 Rework OS fingerprinting to match Recog changes
This commit changes how os_name and os_flavor are handled
for client-side exploits, matching recent changes to the
server-side exploits and scanner fingerprints.

This commit also updates the client-side fingerprinting to
take into account Windows 8.1 and IE 9, 10, and 11.
2014-04-01 08:14:58 -07:00
jvazquez-r7 7f9f4ba4db Make gsubs compliant with the new indentation standard 2013-12-31 11:06:53 -06:00
jvazquez-r7 004c1bac78 Reduce number of modules available on BrowserAutopwn 2013-11-12 12:37:29 -06:00
Tod Beardsley c83262f4bd
Resplat another common boilerplate. 2013-10-15 14:07:48 -05:00
Tod Beardsley 23d058067a
Redo the boilerplate / splat
[SeeRM #8496]
2013-10-15 13:51:57 -05:00
Tab Assassin 41e4375e43 Retab modules 2013-08-30 16:28:54 -05:00
Tod Beardsley f58e279066 Cleanup on module names, descriptions. 2013-06-10 10:52:22 -05:00
sinn3r ea2895ac13 Change to AverageRanking
Just to play with the firing order for Browser Autopwn, this one
should fire as late as possible.
2013-06-07 12:08:51 -05:00
sinn3r 9c7b446532 Updates description about default browser setting 2013-06-07 11:58:31 -05:00
sinn3r f3421f2c3a Fix different landings 2013-06-07 10:26:04 -05:00
sinn3r e559824dc8 Remove whitespace 2013-06-06 20:08:50 -05:00
sinn3r d3e57ffc46 Add OSVDB-93754: Synactis PDF In-The-Box ConnectToSynactic Stack Buffer Overflow
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Synactis' PDF In-The-Box ActiveX
component, specifically PDF_IN_1.ocx.  When a long string of data is given
to the ConnectToSynactis function, which is meant to be used for the ldCmdLine
argument of a WinExec call, a strcpy routine can end up overwriting a TRegistry
class pointer saved on the stack, and results in arbitrary code execution under the
context of the user.
2013-06-06 20:05:08 -05:00