This module exploits a logic error in OpenSSL by impersonating the
server and sending a specially-crafted chain of certificates, resulting
in certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed on the
client, allowing it to use a valid leaf certificate as a CA certificate
to sign a fake certificate. The SSL/TLS session is then proxied to the
server allowing the session to continue normally and application data
transmitted between the peers to be saved. This module requires an
active man-in-the-middle attack.
This module exploits an incomplete internal state distinction in Java
Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) by impersonating the server and finishing
the handshake before the peers have authenticated themselves and
instantiated negotiated security parameters, resulting in a plaintext
SSL/TLS session with the client. This plaintext SSL/TLS session is then
proxied to the server using a second SSL/TLS session from the proxy to
the server (or an alternate fake server) allowing the session to
continue normally and plaintext application data transmitted between the
peers to be saved. This module requires an active man-in-the-middle
attack.
See the complaint on #4039. This doesn't fix that particular
issue (it's somewhat unrelated), but does solve around
a file parsing problem reported by @void-in
This module exploits a code injection in specially crafted environment
variables in Bash, specifically targeting dhclient network configuration
scripts through the HOSTNAME, DOMAINNAME, and URL DHCP options.
I used the protocol version from the record layer thinking I was using
the protocol version from the handshake. This commit fix this and uses
the protocol version from the handshake instead of from the record layer
as in https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/10335282, which is how it should
have been initially.
Thanks to @wvu-r7 for finding this out!
If encrypted, use the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; otherwise, use the
first cipher suite sent by the client. This complements the last commit
and makes this module work with SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, and TLSv1.2
when NEGOTIATE_TLS is not enabled (see
https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/10335282).
Use the protocol version sent by the client. This should be the latest
version supported by the client, which may also be the only acceptable.
This makes this module work with SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, and TLSv1.2
when NEGOTIATE_TLS is not enabled (see
https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/10335282).
This commit changes how os_name and os_flavor are handled
for client-side exploits, matching recent changes to the
server-side exploits and scanner fingerprints.
This commit also updates the client-side fingerprinting to
take into account Windows 8.1 and IE 9, 10, and 11.
This does change some of the meaning of the required-ness of the
directories. Before, if you wanted to serve files, but not receive any,
you would just fail to set a OUTPUTPATH.
Now, since both are required, users are required to both send and
recieve. This seems okay, you can always just set two different
locations and point the one you don't want at /dev/null or something.
Otherwise you will tend to listen on your default ipv6 'any' address and
bound to udp6 port 69, assuming you haven't bothered to disable your
automatically-enabled ipv6 stack.
This is almost never correct.
* Allows responding to AAAA requests in addition to the existing A
support
* Prevents problems when recvfrom returns a mapped address like
"::ffff:192.0.2.1"
Also:
* Fix a few typos
* capture: Don't shadow a method name (arp) with a local variable
* capture: Handle the case where our UDP send hits an ENETUNREACH
wchen-r7
Ramon de C Valle
HD Moore
root
jvazquez-r7
Christian Mehlmauer
Tod Beardsley
William Vu
James Lee
Jon Hart
Fatih Ozavci
Joe Vennix
URI Assassin
Ramon de C Valle
Tom Sellers
joev
Rich Lundeen
kn0
Meatballs