See #4400. This should be all of them, except for, of course, the module
that targets Redmine itself.
Note that this also updates the README.md with more current information
as well.
Rubocop replaces the default YAML library which makes development
testing difficult. It does not cause problems on Travis, but according
to reports, it does cause instability with many individual dev
environments.
While I would love to have a more solid source of this bug report, right
now this was an oral report from @shuckins-r7 (who I tend to believe a
lot).
There are still strong reservations about using Nokogiri to parse
untrusted XML data.
http://www.wireharbor.com/hidden-security-risks-of-xml-parsing-xxe-attack/
It is also believed that many desktop operating systems are still
shipping out-of-date and vulnerable libxml2 libraries, which become
exposed via Nokogiri. For example:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/18627075/nokogiri-1-6-0-still-pulls-in-wrong-version-of-libxml-on-os-x
While this isn't a problem for binary builds of Metasploit (Metasploit
Community, Express, or Pro) it can be a problem for development
versions or Kali's / Backtrack's version.
So, the compromise here is to allow for modules that don't directly
expose XML parsing. I can't say for sure that the various libxml2
vulnerabilities (current and future) aren't also exposed via
`Nokogiri::HTML` but I also can't come up with a reasonable demo.
Metasploit committers should still look at any module that relies on
Nokogiri very carefully, and suggest alternatives if there are any. But,
it's sometimes going to be required for complex HTML parsing.
tl;dr: Use REXML for XML parsing, and Nokogiri for HTML parsing if you
absolutely must.
It's often you want counts of just WARN and ERROR messages, and don't
want to spam yourself with INFO messages that you don't intend to
address anyway. This is most often the case with CI, such as with
https://travis-ci.org/todb-r7/metasploit-framework
This correct msftidy's disclosure date check to do the following:
1. If the module has a disclosure date, the check should kick in.
2. If the module is an exploit, and doesn't have a disclosure
date, then it will be flagged.
3. If the module is an auxiliary, and doesn't have a disclosure
date, then it will NOT be flgged (because not all aux modules
target bugs/vulns like exploits do).