[SeeRM #823], where Stephen was asking for SSL compression for
Meterpreter -- this isn't that, but it's at least now possible for other
Metasploit functionality.
If MSF can not match the visible IP address of a Meterpreter session
to an interface--it will attempt to find an IP address associated
with a default route and use it as the session's address.
This commit fixes the logic associated with this process. The old
logic only considers one IP address per Interface, even though an
Interface may have multiple addresses/masks associated with it.
This flaw led to situations where MSF would favor an IPv6 link-local
address over the IPv4 address associated with the default route,
solely because the IPv4 address was not the first value in the
addresses array.
[FixRM #7259]
So Metasploit uses the term "exploit" to describe something, a module
or an action, that results popping a shell. A check normally doesn't
pop a shell, so avoid that language.
An example of the biggest confusion module developers face is not
actually knowing the difference between Detected vs Appears vs
Vulnerable. For example: a module might flag something as a
vulnerable by simply doing a banner check, but this is often
unreliable because either 1) that banner can be fooled, or 2)
the patch does not actually update the banner. More reasons may
apply. Just because the banner LOOKS vulnearble doesn't mean it is.
Added targets for 8 specific targets that I've tested: Cisco WAP4410N,
Honeywell WAP-PL2 IP Camera, Netgear DG834, Netgear DG834G, Netgear
DG834PN, Netgear DGN1000, Netgear DSG835, Netgear WPNT834
Added functionality to the CmdStagerEcho mix-in to support encoding via
octal instead of hex based on the :enc_type option. This is because many
devices would not output hex encoded values properly.
Added options on a per-target basis for the PackFormat (endian pack()
values for communication), UploadPath (because /tmp wasn't always
writable), and PayloadEncode (previously mentioned octal encoding
option)
Note for some reason, some devices communicate over one endianness, but
then require a payload for the other endianess. I'm not sure what's
causing this, but if those specific combinations are not used, the
exploit fails. More research may be required for this.
Migrated the Sercomm module to use the CmdStager mixin to provide
uploading of the ELF binary.
Modified the CmdStagerEcho mixin to allow bypass of the "-en " since in
this case, the device messed up when it was used, and would actually
write the "-en " to the file, from some flaky busybox version of "echo".
This avoids zalgo. Also optionally checks the return value
of the compiled Function in XSS to allow you to use send()
or an explicit return, which is maybe more natural for
synchronous xss payloads.
When running a http/https listener the address:port that was being
shown in the output was that which was passed to the victim as part
of the stager and not the actual listener address:port.
This commit fixes this so that the display is correct.
This commit completes our quest to (optionally) decouple the stage's
callback parameters from the interface/port our handler binds to.
LPORT is now patched into the stage over ReverseListenerBindPort.
This commit removes the now unused bind_address function from
reverse_http.rb. This function returns an array of hosts the handler
should attempt to bind to (e.g., [LHOST value, any])
Other handlers (e.g., reverse_tcp.rb) loop through these values until
they're able to start a server with that bind address.
The HTTP server doesn't work this way. It's setup to try one address
and that's it. It makes sense to have the HTTP server always bind to
0.0.0.0 by default as future modules run by the user may register
resources with the same HTTP server.
This commit returns the HTTP/S handler to its former semantic glory.
By default the HTTP/S handler will bind to :: or 0.0.0.0. If the
user specifies a ReverseListenerBindAddress then, instead, the
server will bind to that address.
The previous commit to change the URL to always reference LHOST
should go with this too. LHOST is always my intent of where the
stage should call home too. ReverseListenerBindAddress would make
sense as my intent as to where I want to bind to. The two options
shouldn't take on each other's meanings.
Redmine #8726 documents a change where the reverse HTTP/S
tries to bind LHOST and if it can not it does a hard stop
If it's expected that users will use ReverseListenerBind-
-Address then this commit addresses #8726 by patching the
HTTP/S stage with the host provided by the user in LHOST.
Currently ReverseListenerBindAddress (if used) is patched
into the stage. This makes for a broken HTTP/S session if
the user sets this option to 0.0.0.0.
With this commit--users can provide any LHOST they like
and set ReverseListenerBindAddress to 0.0.0.0 and things
will work.
This commit does not attempt to bring the HTTP/S handler
back to the old behavior of falling back to 0.0.0.0 when
it can't bind LHOST. I'd welcome the old behavior but I
leave it to you to decide what makes sense. :)
The getenv call in sys/config was renamed to getenvs and now uses
the splat operator so that arrays don't have to be passed in. A
new function called getenv was added which takes a single argument
and returns a single value back (for ease of use).
[SeeRM #8729] - This meterpreter command allows the attacker to observe the target at real-time
by turning their webcam live. There is also a HTML-based player provided, which does not require
a plugin or anything, just open it with a browser. The HTML-based player also allows the attacker
to put livestream on the web (evil? yeah, kind of.)