Otherwise, we risk getting our connections killed by particularly
aggressive DPI devices (IPS, firewalls, etc)
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 5e203851d5c9dce1fe984b106ce3031a3653e54b
Author: Tod Beardsley <tod_beardsley@rapid7.com>
Date: Wed Oct 15 10:19:04 2014 -0500
Whoops missed one
commit 477b15a08e06e74d725f1c45486b37e4b403e3c2
Author: Tod Beardsley <tod_beardsley@rapid7.com>
Date: Wed Oct 15 10:16:59 2014 -0500
Other datastore options also want TLS1 as default
commit 8d397bd9b500ff6a8462170b4c39849228494795
Author: Tod Beardsley <tod_beardsley@rapid7.com>
Date: Wed Oct 15 10:12:06 2014 -0500
TCP datastore opts default to TLS1
Old encryption is old. See also: POODLE
As I am using a exploit that does a check on the Server HTTP headers to identify the target I saw an error message that reads like this:
>The target server fingerprint "" does not match "(?-mix:(Jetty|JBoss))", use 'set FingerprintCheck false' to disable this check.
Then, while using a HTTP proxy to analyse the requests I am presented with an error that tells me to set another internal option to override a default behaviour. Although it should be pretty clear to everyone using the metasploit framework, I think it is more convenient if all error messages have the same format/way to present suggestions, in this case, presenting the full command the user needs to introduce in order to carry on with the execution of the exploit.
I needed this to run a custom JS check for the Android
webview vuln when the exploit is served straight
through BES. The check already existed when using BAP,
so I tried to preserve that syntax, and also added a
:vuln_test_error as an optional error message.
This commit also does some mild refactoring of un-
useful behavior in BES.