* Unset default username and password
* Register SSL as a DefaultOption instead of redefining it
* Use the HttpClient mixin `ssl` instead of datastore.
* Unless is better than if !
* Try to store loot even if you can't cleanup the site ID.
There was a disaster of a merge at 6f37cf22eb that is particularly
difficult to untangle (it was a bad merge from a long-running local
branch).
What this commit does is simulate a hard reset, by doing thing:
git checkout -b reset-hard-ohmu
git reset --hard 593363c5f9
git checkout upstream-master
git checkout -b revert-via-diff
git diff --no-prefix upstream-master..reset-hard-ohmy > patch
patch -p0 < patch
Since there was one binary change, also did this:
git checkout upstream-master data/exploits/CVE-2012-1535/Main.swf
Now we have one commit that puts everything back. It screws up
file-level history a little, but it's at least at a point where we can
move on with our lives. Sorry.
This module exploits a mass assignment vulnerability in the 'create'
action of 'users' controller of Foreman and Red Hat OpenStack/Satellite
(Foreman 1.2.0-RC1 and earlier) by creating an arbitrary administrator
account.
msf auxiliary(jboss_seam_exec) > run
[*] Found right index at [0] - getRuntime
[*] Index [1]
[*] Index [2]
[*] Index [3]
[*] Index [4]
[*] Index [5]
[*] Found right index at [6] - exec
[*] Index [7]
[*] Index [8]
[*] Index [9]
[*] Index [10]
[*] Index [11]
[*] Index [12]
[*] Index [13]
[*] Index [14]
[*] Index [15]
[*] Index [16]
[*] Index [17]
[*] Index [18]
[*] Index [19]
[*] Index [20]
[*] Index [21]
[*] Index [22]
[*] Index [23]
[*] Index [24]
[*] Target appears VULNERABLE!
[*] Sending remote command:pwd
[*] Exploited successfully
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed