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Land #9489, Add scanner for the Bleichenbacker oracle (AKA: ROBOT)

MS-2855/keylogger-mettle-extension
Jacob Robles 2018-02-08 12:55:02 -06:00
parent ca4ad1d0c4 51e098da35
commit c642d420c2
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 3EC9F18F2B12401C
4 changed files with 396 additions and 4 deletions
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72
documentation/modules/auxiliary/scanner/ssl/bleichenbacher_oracle.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
Some TLS implementations handle errors processing RSA key exchanges and encryption (PKCS #1 v1.5 messages) in a broken way that leads an adaptive chosen-chiphertext attack. Attackers cannot recover a server's private key, but they can decrypt and sign messages with it. A strong oracle occurs when the TLS server does not strictly check message formatting and needs less than a million requests on average to decode a given ciphertext. A weak oracle server strictly checks message formatting and often requires many more requests to perform the attack.
## Vulnerable Applications
* F5 BIG-IP 11.6.0-11.6.2 (fixed in 11.6.2 HF1), 12.0.0-12.1.2 HF1 (fixed in 12.1.2 HF2), or 13.0.0-13.0.0 HF2 (fixed in 13.0.0 HF3) (CVE 2017-6168)
* Citrix NetScaler Gateway 10.5 before build 67.13, 11.0 before build 71.22, 11.1 before build 56.19, and 12.0 before build 53.22 (CVE 2017-17382)
* Radware Alteon firmware 31.0.0.0-31.0.3.0 (CVE 2017-17427)
* Cisco ACE (CVE 2017-17428)
* Cisco ASA 5500 series (CVE 2017-12373)
* Bouncy Castle TLS < 1.0.3 configured to use the Java Cryptography Engine (CVE 2017-13098)
* Erlang < 20.1.7, < 19.3.6.4, < 18.3.4.7 (CVE 2017-1000385)
* WolfSSL < 3.12.2 (CVE 2017-13099)
* MatrixSSL 3.8.3 (CVE 2016-6883)
* Oracle Java <= 7u7, <= 6u35, <= 5u36, <= 1.4.2_38 (CVE 2012-5081)
* IBM Domino
* Palo Alto PAN-OS
(source: [https://robotattack.org/#patches](https://robotattack.org/#patches))
## Extra requirements
This module requires a working Python 3 install with the `cryptography` and `gmpy2` packages installed (e.g. via `pip3 install cryptography gmpy2`).
## Verification Steps
Perhaps the easiest way to reproduce is to install an older version of Erlang on Linux (the stock `erlang` package on Ubuntu 17.10 and before is unpatched), and run the [ssl_hello_world](https://github.com/ninenines/cowboy/tree/master/examples/ssl_hello_world) example from Cowboy (additionally requires `git` and `make`, be sure to use the 1.1.x branch for Erlang < 19).
```
msf4 > use auxiliary/scanner/ssl/robot
msf4 auxiliary(scanner/ssl/robot) > set RHOSTS 192.168.244.128
RHOSTS => 192.168.244.128
msf4 auxiliary(scanner/ssl/robot) > set RPORT 8443
RPORT => 8443
msf4 auxiliary(scanner/ssl/robot) > set VERBOSE true
VERBOSE => true
msf4 auxiliary(scanner/ssl/robot) > run
[*] Running for 192.168.244.128...
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Scanning host for Bleichenbacher oracle
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - RSA N: 0xcdb5b51a3102cc751cfd6493a8b8801aa8c235c711e6c6954beca8cf648f461a68c9fd3fa81ad7e41634b739a0a33a138917c4e300a2543f7d09cf83ae9fc5338f6be04a59768708a2fa6b98e9affe0c24a23f79cda03a3ca367d4e7660e9da1c09b17d999b79296c65194f18c392471c9a051be048cbeea347abbb1a42d8af5
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - RSA e: 0x10001
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Modulus size: 1024 bits, 128 bytes
[+] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Vulnerable: (strong) oracle found TLSv1.2 with standard message flow
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Result of good request: TLS alert 10 of length 7
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Result of bad request 1 (wrong first bytes): TLS alert 51 of length 7
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Result of bad request 2 (wrong 0x00 position): TLS alert 10 of length 7
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Result of bad request 3 (missing 0x00): TLS alert 51 of length 7
[*] 192.168.244.128:8443 - Result of bad request 4 (bad TLS version): TLS alert 10 of length 7
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf4 auxiliary(scanner/ssl/robot) >
```
## Options
The scanner takes the normal `RHOSTS` and `RPORT` options to specify the hosts to scan on the port on which to scan them. In addition, it takes two options for the TLS behaviour: `cipher_group` and `timeout`.
The `cipher_group` option:
Select the ciphers to use to negotiate: all TLS_RSA ciphers (`all`, the default), TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (`cbc`), or TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 (`gcm`).
```
set cipher_group gcm
```
The `timeout` option:
Set the interval to wait before considering the TLS connection timed out. The default is 5 seconds.
```
set timeout 10
```

31
lib/msf/core/modules/external/shim.rb vendored
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@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ class Msf::Modules::External::Shim
capture_server(mod)
when 'dos'
dos(mod)
when 'scanner.single'
single_scanner(mod)
when 'scanner.multi'
multi_scanner(mod)
else
@ -30,15 +32,26 @@ class Msf::Modules::External::Shim
render_template('common_metadata.erb', meta)
end
def self.mod_meta_common(mod, meta = {})
def self.mod_meta_common(mod, meta = {}, drop_rhost: true)
meta[:path] = mod.path.dump
meta[:name] = mod.meta['name'].dump
meta[:description] = mod.meta['description'].dump
meta[:authors] = mod.meta['authors'].map(&:dump).join(",\n ")
meta[:options] = mod.meta['options'].map do |n, o|
"Opt#{o['type'].camelize}.new(#{n.dump},
[#{o['required']}, #{o['description'].dump}, #{o['default'].inspect}])"
options = if drop_rhost
mod.meta['options'].reject {|n, o| n == 'rhost'}
else
mod.meta['options']
end
meta[:options] = options.map do |n, o|
if o['values']
"Opt#{o['type'].camelize}.new(#{n.dump},
[#{o['required']}, #{o['description'].dump}, #{o['default'].inspect}, #{o['values'].inspect}])"
else
"Opt#{o['type'].camelize}.new(#{n.dump},
[#{o['required']}, #{o['description'].dump}, #{o['default'].inspect}])"
end
end.join(",\n ")
meta
end
@ -71,6 +84,16 @@ class Msf::Modules::External::Shim
render_template('capture_server.erb', meta)
end
def self.single_scanner(mod)
meta = mod_meta_common(mod, drop_rhost: true)
meta[:date] = mod.meta['date'].dump
meta[:references] = mod.meta['references'].map do |r|
"[#{r['type'].upcase.dump}, #{r['ref'].dump}]"
end.join(",\n ")
render_template('single_scanner.erb', meta)
end
def self.multi_scanner(mod)
meta = mod_meta_common(mod)
meta[:date] = mod.meta['date'].dump

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lib/msf/core/modules/external/templates/single_scanner.erb vendored Normal file
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require 'msf/core/modules/external/bridge'
require 'msf/core/module/external'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner
include Msf::Module::External
def initialize
super({
<%= common_metadata meta %>
'References' =>
[
<%= meta[:references] %>
],
'DisclosureDate' => <%= meta[:date] %>,
})
register_options([
<%= meta[:options] %>
])
end
def run_host(ip)
print_status("Running for #{ip}...")
mod = Msf::Modules::External::Bridge.open(<%= meta[:path] %>)
rhost = datastore.delete('RHOST')
datastore['rhost'] = rhost
mod.run(datastore)
wait_status(mod)
end
end

266
modules/auxiliary/scanner/ssl/bleichenbacher_oracle.py Executable file
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# standard modules
import math
import time
import sys
import socket
import os
import ssl
# extra modules
import gmpy2
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from metasploit import module
metadata = {
'name': 'Scanner for Bleichenbacher Oracle in RSA PKCS #1 v1.5',
'description': '''
Some TLS implementations handle errors processing RSA key exchanges and
encryption (PKCS #1 v1.5 messages) in a broken way that leads an
adaptive chosen-chiphertext attack. Attackers cannot recover a server's
private key, but they can decrypt and sign messages with it. A strong
oracle occurs when the TLS server does not strictly check message
formatting and needs less than a million requests on average to decode
a given ciphertext. A weak oracle server strictly checks message
formatting and often requires many more requests to perform the attack.
This module requires Python 3 with the gmpy2 and cryptography packages
to be present.
''',
'authors': [
'Hanno Böck', # Research and PoC
'Juraj Somorovsky', # Research and PoC
'Craig Young', # Research and PoC
'Daniel Bleichenbacher', # Original practical attack
'Adam Cammack <adam_cammack[AT]rapid7.com>' # Metasploit module
],
'date': '2009-06-17',
'references': [
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-6168'}, # F5 BIG-IP
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-17382'}, # Citrix NetScaler
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-17427'}, # Radware
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-17428'}, # Cisco ACE
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-12373'}, # Cisco ASA
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-13098'}, # Bouncy Castle
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-1000385'}, # Erlang
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2017-13099'}, # WolfSSL
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2016-6883'}, # MatrixSSL
{'type': 'cve', 'ref': '2012-5081'}, # Oracle Java
{'type': 'url', 'ref': 'https://robotattack.org'},
{'type': 'url', 'ref': 'https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1189'},
{'type': 'url', 'ref': 'https://github.com/robotattackorg/robot-detect'}, # Original PoC
{'type': 'aka', 'ref': 'ROBOT'},
{'type': 'aka', 'ref': 'Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack'}
],
'type': 'scanner.single',
'options': {
'rhost': {'type': 'address', 'description': 'The target address', 'required': True, 'default': None},
'rport': {'type': 'port', 'description': 'The target port', 'required': True, 'default': 443},
'cipher_group': {'type': 'enum', 'description': 'Use TLS_RSA ciphers with AES and 3DES ciphers, or only TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA or TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256', 'required': True, 'default': 'all', 'values': ['all', 'cbc', 'gcm']},
'timeout': {'type': 'int', 'description': 'The delay to wait for TLS responses', 'required': True, 'default': 5}
}}
cipher_handshakes = {
# This uses all TLS_RSA ciphers with AES and 3DES
'all': bytearray.fromhex("16030100610100005d03034f20d66cba6399e552fd735d75feb0eeae2ea2ebb357c9004e21d0c2574f837a000010009d003d0035009c003c002f000a00ff01000024000d0020001e060106020603050105020503040104020403030103020303020102020203"),
# This uses only TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
'cbc': bytearray.fromhex("1603010055010000510303ecce5dab6f55e5ecf9cccd985583e94df5ed652a07b1f5c7d9ba7310770adbcb000004002f00ff01000024000d0020001e060106020603050105020503040104020403030103020303020102020203"),
# This uses only TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 (0x009c)
'gcm': bytearray.fromhex("1603010055010000510303ecce5dab6f55e5ecf9cccd985583e94df5ed652a07b1f5c7d9ba7310770adbcb000004009c00ff01000024000d0020001e060106020603050105020503040104020403030103020303020102020203")
}
ch_def = cipher_handshakes['all']
ccs = bytearray.fromhex("000101")
enc = bytearray.fromhex("005091a3b6aaa2b64d126e5583b04c113259c4efa48e40a19b8e5f2542c3b1d30f8d80b7582b72f08b21dfcbff09d4b281676a0fb40d48c20c4f388617ff5c00808a96fbfe9bb6cc631101a6ba6b6bc696f0")
def get_rsa_from_server(target, timeout=5):
try:
s = socket.create_connection(target, timeout)
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.set_ciphers("RSA")
s = ctx.wrap_socket(s)
cert_raw = s.getpeercert(binary_form=True)
cert_dec = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_raw, default_backend())
return cert_dec.public_key().public_numbers().n, cert_dec.public_key().public_numbers().e
except Exception as e:
return (None, e)
def tls_connect(target, timeout=5, cipher_handshake=ch_def):
s = socket.create_connection(target, 3)
s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
s.settimeout(timeout)
s.sendall(cipher_handshake)
buf = bytearray()
i = 0
bend = 0
while True:
# we try to read twice
while i + 5 > bend:
buf += s.recv(4096)
bend = len(buf)
# this is the record size
psize = buf[i + 3] * 256 + buf[i + 4]
# if the size is 2, we received an alert
if (psize == 2):
return ("The server sends an Alert after ClientHello")
# try to read further record data
while i + psize + 5 > bend:
buf += s.recv(4096)
bend = len(buf)
# check whether we have already received a ClientHelloDone
if (buf[i + 5] == 0x0e) or (buf[bend - 4] == 0x0e):
break
i += psize + 5
return (s, buf[9:11])
def oracle(target, pms, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake=ch_def, messageflow=False, timeout=5):
try:
s, cke_version = tls_connect(target, timeout)
s.send(bytearray(b'\x16') + cke_version)
s.send(cke_2nd_prefix)
s.send(pms)
if not messageflow:
s.send(bytearray(b'\x14') + cke_version + ccs)
s.send(bytearray(b'\x16') + cke_version + enc)
try:
alert = s.recv(4096)
if len(alert) == 0:
return ("No data received from server")
if alert[0] == 0x15:
if len(alert) < 7:
return ("TLS alert was truncated (%s)" % (repr(alert)))
return ("TLS alert %i of length %i" % (alert[6], len(alert)))
else:
return "Received something other than an alert (%s)" % (alert[0:10])
except ConnectionResetError as e:
return "ConnectionResetError"
except socket.timeout:
return ("Timeout waiting for alert")
s.close()
except Exception as e:
return str(e)
def run(args):
target = (args['rhost'], int(args['rport']))
timeout = float(args['timeout'])
cipher_handshake = cipher_handshakes[args['cipher_group']]
module.log("{}:{} - Scanning host for Bleichenbacher oracle".format(*target), level='debug')
N, e = get_rsa_from_server(target, timeout)
if not N:
module.log("{}:{} - Cannot establish SSL connection: {}".format(*target, e), level='error')
return
modulus_bits = int(math.ceil(math.log(N, 2)))
modulus_bytes = (modulus_bits + 7) // 8
module.log("{}:{} - RSA N: {}".format(*target, hex(N)), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - RSA e: {}".format(*target, hex(e)), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - Modulus size: {} bits, {} bytes".format(*target, modulus_bits, modulus_bytes), level='debug')
cke_2nd_prefix = bytearray.fromhex("{0:0{1}x}".format(modulus_bytes + 6, 4) + "10" + "{0:0{1}x}".format(modulus_bytes + 2, 6) + "{0:0{1}x}".format(modulus_bytes, 4))
# pad_len is length in hex chars, so bytelen * 2
pad_len = (modulus_bytes - 48 - 3) * 2
rnd_pad = ("abcd" * (pad_len // 2 + 1))[:pad_len]
rnd_pms = "aa112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899"
pms_good_in = int("0002" + rnd_pad + "00" + "0303" + rnd_pms, 16)
# wrong first two bytes
pms_bad_in1 = int("4117" + rnd_pad + "00" + "0303" + rnd_pms, 16)
# 0x00 on a wrong position, also trigger older JSSE bug
pms_bad_in2 = int("0002" + rnd_pad + "11" + rnd_pms + "0011", 16)
# no 0x00 in the middle
pms_bad_in3 = int("0002" + rnd_pad + "11" + "1111" + rnd_pms, 16)
# wrong version number (according to Klima / Pokorny / Rosa paper)
pms_bad_in4 = int("0002" + rnd_pad + "00" + "0202" + rnd_pms, 16)
pms_good = int(gmpy2.powmod(pms_good_in, e, N)).to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder="big")
pms_bad1 = int(gmpy2.powmod(pms_bad_in1, e, N)).to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder="big")
pms_bad2 = int(gmpy2.powmod(pms_bad_in2, e, N)).to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder="big")
pms_bad3 = int(gmpy2.powmod(pms_bad_in3, e, N)).to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder="big")
pms_bad4 = int(gmpy2.powmod(pms_bad_in4, e, N)).to_bytes(modulus_bytes, byteorder="big")
oracle_good = oracle(target, pms_good, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=False, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad1 = oracle(target, pms_bad1, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=False, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad2 = oracle(target, pms_bad2, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=False, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad3 = oracle(target, pms_bad3, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=False, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad4 = oracle(target, pms_bad4, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=False, timeout=timeout)
if (oracle_good == oracle_bad1 == oracle_bad2 == oracle_bad3 == oracle_bad4):
module.log("{}:{} - Identical results ({}), retrying with changed messageflow".format(*target, oracle_good), level='info')
oracle_good = oracle(target, pms_good, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=True, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad1 = oracle(target, pms_bad1, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=True, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad2 = oracle(target, pms_bad2, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=True, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad3 = oracle(target, pms_bad3, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=True, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad4 = oracle(target, pms_bad4, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=True, timeout=timeout)
if (oracle_good == oracle_bad1 == oracle_bad2 == oracle_bad3 == oracle_bad4):
module.log("{}:{} - Identical results ({}), no working oracle found".format(*target, oracle_good), level='info')
return
else:
flow = True
else:
flow = False
# Re-checking all oracles to avoid unreliable results
oracle_good_verify = oracle(target, pms_good, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=flow, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad_verify1 = oracle(target, pms_bad1, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=flow, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad_verify2 = oracle(target, pms_bad2, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=flow, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad_verify3 = oracle(target, pms_bad3, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=flow, timeout=timeout)
oracle_bad_verify4 = oracle(target, pms_bad4, cke_2nd_prefix, cipher_handshake, messageflow=flow, timeout=timeout)
if (oracle_good != oracle_good_verify) or (oracle_bad1 != oracle_bad_verify1) or (oracle_bad2 != oracle_bad_verify2) or (oracle_bad3 != oracle_bad_verify3) or (oracle_bad4 != oracle_bad_verify4):
module.log("{}:{} - Getting inconsistent results, skipping".format(*target), level='warning')
return
# If the response to the invalid PKCS#1 request (oracle_bad1) is equal to both
# requests starting with 0002, we have a weak oracle. This is because the only
# case where we can distinguish valid from invalid requests is when we send
# correctly formatted PKCS#1 message with 0x00 on a correct position. This
# makes our oracle weak
if (oracle_bad1 == oracle_bad2 == oracle_bad3):
oracle_strength = "weak"
else:
oracle_strength = "strong"
if flow:
flowt = "shortened"
else:
flowt = "standard"
s, cke_version = tls_connect(target, timeout, cipher_handshake)
s.close()
if cke_version[0] == 3 and cke_version[1] == 0:
tlsver = "SSLv3"
elif cke_version[0] == 3 and cke_version[1] == 1:
tlsver = "TLSv1.0"
elif cke_version[0] == 3 and cke_version[1] == 2:
tlsver = "TLSv1.1"
elif cke_version[0] == 3 and cke_version[1] == 3:
tlsver = "TLSv1.2"
else:
tlsver = "TLS raw version %i/%i" % (cke_version[0], cke_version[1])
module.report_vuln(target[0], 'Bleichenbacher Oracle', port=target[1])
module.log("{}:{} - Vulnerable: ({}) oracle found {} with {} message flow".format(*target, oracle_strength, tlsver, flowt), level='good')
module.log("{}:{} - Result of good request: {}".format(*target, oracle_good), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - Result of bad request 1 (wrong first bytes): {}".format(*target, oracle_bad1), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - Result of bad request 2 (wrong 0x00 position): {}".format(*target, oracle_bad2), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - Result of bad request 3 (missing 0x00): {}".format(*target, oracle_bad3), level='debug')
module.log("{}:{} - Result of bad request 4 (bad TLS version): {}".format(*target, oracle_bad4), level='debug')
if __name__ == "__main__":
module.run(metadata, run)