metasploit-framework/dev/bh/outline.txt

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04/19/2005
I. Introduction
A. Who are we?
1. spoonm
2. skape
B. Exploit Technology
1. Three Phases of Exploitation
a. Pre-exploitation
b. Exploitation
c. Post-exploitation
2. Pre-exploitation - Preparing the payload
a. NOP generation
b. Payload encoders
c. Connection handler initialization
3. Exploitation - Leveraging the vulnerability
a. Stack overflows
c. Heap overflows
b. SEH overwrites
d. Arbitrary pointer overwrites
4. Post-Exploitation - Manipulating the target
a. Command shell redirection
b. Arbitrary command execution
c. Pivoting payloads
d. Advanced payload interaction
B. Where do we stand?
1. Pre-exploitation
a. Robust and elegant encoders do exist
i. SkyLined's alpha-numeric encoder
ii. Spoonm's Shikata Ga Nai
b. Payload encoders generally taken for granted
i. Most encoders are static with a variable key
ii. IDS able to signature static decoder stubs
c. NOP generation hasn't publically changed much
i. PoC exploits generally use predictable nops, if any
ii. ADMmutate easily signatured by most NIDS (Snort, Fnord)
iii. Not considered very important to many researchers
d. NIDS deployments are playing chase the tail
i. The mouse always has the advantages; NIDS is reactive
ii. Advanced nops and encoders push NIDS to its limits
2. Exploitation
a. Techniques have become very mature
i. Linux/BSD exploitation techniques largely unchanged
ii. Win32 heap overflows now more reliable (oded/shok)
iii. Win32 SEH overwrites make exploitation easy, even on XPSP2
b. Exploitation topics have been beaten to death
3. Post-exploitation
a. Common payloads are limited
i. Command shell interaction has poor automation support
ii. Limited to the command set that the interpreter provides
iii. Bounded by the utilities installed on the target machine
iv. Restrictive environments (chroot) can hinder command execution
v. HIPS vendors becoming more adept at detecting basic payloads
- LoadLibraryA from the stack, etc (mcafee 8.0i)
b. Communication vectors largely unchanged
i. Reverse and port-bind payloads still the most common
ii. Findsock style payloads still unused PoC exploits
iii. Alternative communication vectors rarely discussed
b. Pivoting technology exists
i. Core ST described system call proxying in 2002
ii. Metasploit's (2.3) meterpreter provides basic network pivoting
C. What will we discuss?
1. Pre-exploitation Research
a. NOP generation
i. Opty2
b. Encoders
i. Additive feedback encoders
ii. Shikata Ga Nai
2. Post-Exploitation Research
a. Library Injection
i. Facilitates things like Meterpreter and VNC injection
b. VNC Injection
i. Introduced at blackhat04 with the Metasploit 2.2 release
c. Meterpreter & dN
i. The cross-platform post-exploitation suite
3. Payload Research
a. PassiveX
i. Taking advantage of ActiveX controls
b. Ordinal Stagers
i. Tiny network capable stagers
c. Egghunt (maybe?)
i. Small payload capable of locating a larger payload
ii. Useful for exploits with limited space
II. Pre-exploitation
A. Opty2
1. spoonfu
B. Additive feedback encoders
C. Shikata Ga Nai
1. spoonfu
III. Post-exploitation
A. Library Injection
1. Provides advanced code execution
a. Code can be written in any language that can compile down
to a shared object.
b. Allows developer to use all of the APIs exposed to a normal
application.
2. Two types of library injection
a. On-Disk
i. Library is loaded from the target's harddrive or via a
file share.
ii. Can be detected by AV products due to fs access
b. In-Memory
i. Library is uploaded to the target and loaded from memory
without touching the disk
ii. Evades file system filter drivers, such as those
provided by AV companies
iii. Not touching the disk means no forensic trace
iv. VirtualLock prevents swapping to disk, but requires admin
B. VNC Injection
1. Implements VNC as an injectable DLL
a. Uses RealVNC as the code-base
b. VNC communication uses the exploit connection
c. No physical trace is left of the VNC server
d. Can operate regardless of existing VNC installations
2. Easy way to illustrate insecurities
a. Suits understand mouse movement better than black box command
prompts
C. Meterpreter
1. Generic post-exploitation suite
a. Based on library injection
b. Uses the established exploit connection
i. Especially powerful with findsock payloads; no new connection
c. Executes entirely from memory
d. No new processes or file access required for the payload to
succeed
2. Extension system provides advanced automation support
a. No need to hand write tedious assembly
b. Existing native code can be ported to a meterpreter extension
3. Architecture
a. Design goals
i. Very flexible protocol; should adapt to extension requirements
ii. Exposure of a channelized communication system to extensions
iii. Stealth operation
iv. Should be portable to various operating systems
v. Client from one platform should work with server on another
platform
b. Protocol
i. Uses TLVs (Type-Length-Value) to support arbitrary data
passing.
ii. TLVs allow the packet parser to be oblivious to the structure
of the value field
iii. Type field is broken down into meta types
4. Core interface
a. Overview
i. Minimal interface to support the loading of extensions
ii. Implements the basic packet transmission and dispatching
facilities
iii. Exposes channel allocation and management to extensions
b. Advanced features
i. Migrating the server instance between processes
5. The ``stdapi'' extension
a. Overview
i. Included in Metasploit 3.0
ii. Provides access to some of the common facilities of the
target operating system
iii. Allows for easy automation and implementation of robust
post-exploitation scripts
b. File System
i. File and directory interaction
ii. Files can be uploaded and downloaded between the
attacker and the target
c. Network
i. Transparent network pivoting
ii. Route table enumeration and manipulation
iii. Local interface enumeration
d. Process
i. Process execution, optionally with channelized IO
ii. Enumeration of running processes
iii. Modification of arbitrary memory
iv. Creation and modification of running threads
v. Loading and interacting with shared object files
e. Registry
i. General registry API access
ii. Opening, creating, and removing registry keys
iii. Setting, querying, and deleting registry values
iv. Enumeration of both keys and values
f. User interface
i. Disabling local user interaction via the keyboard
and/or mouse (similar to VNC)
ii. Idle timeout checking to see how long it's been
since the user did something interactive
6. The ``priv'' extension
a. Still in development
b. Exposes an interface to escalating local privileges
through local vulnerabilities
c. SAM dumping support similar to pwdump3
D. dN
1. spoonfu
E. PassiveX
1. Overview
a. Post-exploitation payload
b. A derivative of On-Disk library injection that uses
ActiveX controls
c. Supports arbitrary DLL injection in any language that can
be compiled as an ActiveX control (C++, VB, etc)
2. Payload Implementation
a. Disables iexplore Internet zone restrictions on
ActiveX controls
i. Modifies four registry values that are stored per-user
b. Launches a hidden iexplore at a URL with an embedded
OCX
i. The OCX does not have to be signed
ii. No user interaction is required
iii. OCX is automatically downloaded, registered, and loaded
into the browser's context
3. Sample HTTP tunneling ActiveX control
a. HTTP GET/POST used to build tunnel to attacker
i. Uses the WININET API
ii. Outbound traffic from target machine encapsulated in POST
request
iii. Inbound traffic from attacker encapsulated in GET response
iv. Proxy configuration automatically inherited
v. Requires HTTP server capable of performing encap/decap on the
HTTP packets
b. Streaming connection through HTTP tunnel can be created
i. socketpair doesn't exist natively on win32 but can be simulated
with a local listener
ii. Streaming abstraction allows advanced payloads to transparently
use the HTTP transport (Meterpreter, VNC)
4. Pros
a. Bypasses restrictive outbound filters
b. Re-uses proxy configuration
c. Looks like normal user traffic
d. Allows full access to the win32 API like all forms of
library injection
5. Cons
a. Touches the disk
b. Requires administrative access
i. Internet Explorer prohibits the downloading of
ActiveX controls as non-admin
IV. The Complete Picture
A. Show how powerful msf3 is here
V. Conclusion - where do we go from here?
cite:
STRIDE:
http://www.ics.forth.gr/carv/acs/ACS/Activities/papers/stride-IFIP-SEC05.pdf
syscall proxy:
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/files/11/SyscallProxying.pdf