Update README.md
parent
05646d846c
commit
b8af2618a1
|
@ -277,7 +277,6 @@ Of course, this list is not exhaustive of what you can do to secure a teamserver
|
|||
* **Split assets among different service providers and regions** - Infrastructure assets should be spread across multiple service providers and geographic regions. Blue Team members may raise monitoring thresholds against providers identified as actively performing an attack and may even outright block a given service provider. Note: keep international privacy laws in mind if sending encrypted or sensitive data across borders.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Monitor logs** - All logs should be monitored throughout the engagement: SMTP logs, Apache logs, tcpdump on socat redirectors, iptables logs (specific to traffic forwarding or targeted filtering), weblogs, Cobalt Strike/Empire/MSF logs. Forward logs to a central location, such as with rsyslog, for easier monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
* [Log all terminal output with iTerm](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/lterm)
|
||||
[Log all terminal output with iTerm](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/lterm)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Fingerprint incident response** - If possible, try to passively or actively fingerprint IR actions before the assessment starts. For example, send a mediocre phishing email to the target (using unrelated infrastructure) and monitor traffic that infrastructure receives. IR team investigations can disclose a good deal of information about how the team operates and what infrastructure they use. If this can be determined ahead of the assessment, it can be filtered or redirected outright.
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue