infosecn1nja
/
Red-Team-Infrastructure-Wiki
mirror of https://github.com/infosecn1nja/Red-Team-Infrastructure-Wiki.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Update README.md

master
Steve Borosh 2017-04-27 16:49:48 -04:00 committed by GitHub
parent 8b786dac9d
commit adbdc9581d
1 changed files with 1 additions and 5 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
README.md
View File

@ -276,10 +276,6 @@ Of course, this list is not exhaustive of what you can do to secure a teamserver
* **Split assets among different service providers and regions** - Infrastructure assets should be spread across multiple service providers and geographic regions. Blue Team members may raise monitoring thresholds against providers identified as actively performing an attack and may even outright block a given service provider. Note: keep international privacy laws in mind if sending encrypted or sensitive data across borders. * **Split assets among different service providers and regions** - Infrastructure assets should be spread across multiple service providers and geographic regions. Blue Team members may raise monitoring thresholds against providers identified as actively performing an attack and may even outright block a given service provider. Note: keep international privacy laws in mind if sending encrypted or sensitive data across borders.
* **Monitor logs** - All logs should be monitored throughout the engagement: SMTP logs, Apache logs, tcpdump on socat redirectors, iptables logs (specific to traffic forwarding or targeted filtering), weblogs, Cobalt Strike/Empire/MSF logs. Forward logs to a central location, such as with rsyslog, for easier monitoring. * **Monitor logs** - All logs should be monitored throughout the engagement: SMTP logs, Apache logs, tcpdump on socat redirectors, iptables logs (specific to traffic forwarding or targeted filtering), weblogs, Cobalt Strike/Empire/MSF logs. Forward logs to a central location, such as with rsyslog, for easier monitoring. Operator terminal data retention may come in handy for going over an historical command usaeage during an operation. @Killswitch_GUI created an easy-to-use program named iTerm that will log all bash terminal commands to a central location. [Log all terminal output with iTerm](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/lterm)
Operator terminal data retention may come in handy for going over an historical command usaeage during an operation. @Killswitch_GUI created an easy-to-use program named iTerm that will log all bash terminal commands to a central location.
[Log all terminal output with iTerm](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/lterm)
* **Fingerprint incident response** - If possible, try to passively or actively fingerprint IR actions before the assessment starts. For example, send a mediocre phishing email to the target (using unrelated infrastructure) and monitor traffic that infrastructure receives. IR team investigations can disclose a good deal of information about how the team operates and what infrastructure they use. If this can be determined ahead of the assessment, it can be filtered or redirected outright. * **Fingerprint incident response** - If possible, try to passively or actively fingerprint IR actions before the assessment starts. For example, send a mediocre phishing email to the target (using unrelated infrastructure) and monitor traffic that infrastructure receives. IR team investigations can disclose a good deal of information about how the team operates and what infrastructure they use. If this can be determined ahead of the assessment, it can be filtered or redirected outright.