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1961948585
Unauthenticated EAPOL-Key decryption in wpa_supplicant Published: August 8, 2018 Identifiers: - CVE-2018-14526 Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/ Vulnerability A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes EAPOL-Key frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify the frame in a way that makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key Data field without requiring a valid MIC value in the frame, i.e., without the frame being authenticated. This has a potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN style of EAPOL-Key construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the pairwise cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be used with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is expected to be used and with that pairwise cipher, this vulnerability is not applicable in practice. When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key Key Data field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and due to the RC4 design, this makes it possible for an attacker to modify the plaintext version of the Key Data field with bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents. This can be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of the keys) which would prevent the station from accepting received group-addressed frames. Furthermore, this might be abused by making wpa_supplicant act as a decryption oracle to try to recover some of the Key Data payload (GTK/IGTK) to get knowledge of the group encryption keys. Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple attempts (128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt results in disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way handshake. These failures can result in the AP/network getting disabled temporarily or even permanently (requiring user action to re-enable) which may make it impractical to perform the attack to recover the keys before the AP has already changes the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing at minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet while hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK rekeying when using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical attack would need large number of impacted stations to be trying to connect to the same AP to be able to recover sufficient information from the GTK to be able to determine the key before it gets changed. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant versions. Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Possible mitigation steps - Remove TKIP as an allowed pairwise cipher in RSN/WPA2 networks. This can be done also on the AP side. - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant and rebuild: WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data This patch is available from https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> |
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README
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This is the buildsystem for the OpenWrt Linux distribution.
To build your own firmware you need a Linux, BSD or MacOSX system (case
sensitive filesystem required). Cygwin is unsupported because of the lack
of a case sensitive file system.
You need gcc, binutils, bzip2, flex, python, perl, make, find, grep, diff,
unzip, gawk, getopt, subversion, libz-dev and libc headers installed.
1. Run "./scripts/feeds update -a" to obtain all the latest package definitions
defined in feeds.conf / feeds.conf.default
2. Run "./scripts/feeds install -a" to install symlinks for all obtained
packages into package/feeds/
3. Run "make menuconfig" to select your preferred configuration for the
toolchain, target system & firmware packages.
4. Run "make" to build your firmware. This will download all sources, build
the cross-compile toolchain and then cross-compile the Linux kernel & all
chosen applications for your target system.
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