diff --git a/package/network/services/ppp/Makefile b/package/network/services/ppp/Makefile index 64f60d00fa..beeaa53c22 100644 --- a/package/network/services/ppp/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/ppp/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk PKG_NAME:=ppp PKG_VERSION:=2.4.7 -PKG_RELEASE:=13 +PKG_RELEASE:=12 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://download.samba.org/pub/ppp/ diff --git a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/700-radius-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-rc_mksid.patch b/package/network/services/ppp/patches/700-radius-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-rc_mksid.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1c5722e6dd..0000000000 --- a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/700-radius-Prevent-buffer-overflow-in-rc_mksid.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -From 858976b1fc3107f1261aae337831959b511b83c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Mackerras -Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2020 12:01:32 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] radius: Prevent buffer overflow in rc_mksid() - -On some systems getpid() can return a value greater than 65535. -Increase the size of buf[] to allow for this, and use slprintf() -to make sure we never overflow it. - -Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras ---- - pppd/plugins/radius/util.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c b/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c -index 6f976a712951..740131e8377c 100644 ---- a/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c -+++ b/pppd/plugins/radius/util.c -@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ void rc_mdelay(int msecs) - char * - rc_mksid (void) - { -- static char buf[15]; -+ static char buf[32]; - static unsigned short int cnt = 0; -- sprintf (buf, "%08lX%04X%02hX", -+ slprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08lX%04X%02hX", - (unsigned long int) time (NULL), - (unsigned int) getpid (), - cnt & 0xFF); diff --git a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/701-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch b/package/network/services/ppp/patches/701-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c2ca9729ec..0000000000 --- a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/701-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -From 8d7970b8f3db727fe798b65f3377fe6787575426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Mackerras -Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 15:53:28 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] pppd: Fix bounds check in EAP code - -Given that we have just checked vallen < len, it can never be the case -that vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname). This fixes the check so we -actually avoid overflowing the rhostname array. - -Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel -Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras ---- - pppd/eap.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pppd/eap.c b/pppd/eap.c -index 94407f56a336..1b93db01aebd 100644 ---- a/pppd/eap.c -+++ b/pppd/eap.c -@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ int len; - } - - /* Not so likely to happen. */ -- if (vallen >= len + sizeof (rhostname)) { -+ if (len - vallen >= sizeof (rhostname)) { - dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); - BCOPY(inp + vallen, rhostname, sizeof (rhostname) - 1); - rhostname[sizeof (rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; -@@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ int len; - } - - /* Not so likely to happen. */ -- if (vallen >= len + sizeof (rhostname)) { -+ if (len - vallen >= sizeof (rhostname)) { - dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); - BCOPY(inp + vallen, rhostname, sizeof (rhostname) - 1); - rhostname[sizeof (rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; diff --git a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/702-pppd-Ignore-received-EAP-messages-when-not-doing-EAP.patch b/package/network/services/ppp/patches/702-pppd-Ignore-received-EAP-messages-when-not-doing-EAP.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7286d81a56..0000000000 --- a/package/network/services/ppp/patches/702-pppd-Ignore-received-EAP-messages-when-not-doing-EAP.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -From 8d45443bb5c9372b4c6a362ba2f443d41c5636af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Mackerras -Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2020 16:31:42 +1100 -Subject: [PATCH] pppd: Ignore received EAP messages when not doing EAP - -This adds some basic checks to the subroutines of eap_input to check -that we have requested or agreed to doing EAP authentication before -doing any processing on the received packet. The motivation is to -make it harder for a malicious peer to disrupt the operation of pppd -by sending unsolicited EAP packets. Note that eap_success() already -has a check that the EAP client state is reasonable, and does nothing -(apart from possibly printing a debug message) if not. - -Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras ---- - pppd/eap.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/pppd/eap.c b/pppd/eap.c -index 1b93db01aebd..082e95343120 100644 ---- a/pppd/eap.c -+++ b/pppd/eap.c -@@ -1328,6 +1328,12 @@ int len; - int fd; - #endif /* USE_SRP */ - -+ /* -+ * Ignore requests if we're not open -+ */ -+ if (esp->es_client.ea_state <= eapClosed) -+ return; -+ - /* - * Note: we update es_client.ea_id *only if* a Response - * message is being generated. Otherwise, we leave it the -@@ -1736,6 +1742,12 @@ int len; - u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; - #endif /* USE_SRP */ - -+ /* -+ * Ignore responses if we're not open -+ */ -+ if (esp->es_server.ea_state <= eapClosed) -+ return; -+ - if (esp->es_server.ea_id != id) { - dbglog("EAP: discarding Response %d; expected ID %d", id, - esp->es_server.ea_id); -@@ -2047,6 +2059,12 @@ u_char *inp; - int id; - int len; - { -+ /* -+ * Ignore failure messages if we're not open -+ */ -+ if (esp->es_client.ea_state <= eapClosed) -+ return; -+ - if (!eap_client_active(esp)) { - dbglog("EAP unexpected failure message in state %s (%d)", - eap_state_name(esp->es_client.ea_state),