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samba36: add three CVE patches from 2015-12-16 

This is a patch for CVE-2015-5252, CVE-2015-5296 and CVE-2015-5299. A
patchset for these vulnerabilities was published on 16th December 2015.

Signed-off-by: Jan Čermák <jan.cermak@nic.cz>

SVN-Revision: 48133
lede-17.01
Felix Fietkau 2016-01-05 10:42:52 +00:00
parent 33beafa8d8
commit 44b6a5e549
4 changed files with 253 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=samba
PKG_VERSION:=3.6.25
PKG_RELEASE:=4
PKG_RELEASE:=5
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba \
http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/stable

43
package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 2e94b6ec10f1d15e24867bab3063bb85f173406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file
access outside the share).
Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
---
source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) {
const char *conn_rootdir;
size_t rootdir_len;
+ bool matched;
conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
}
rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
- if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
- rootdir_len) != 0) {
+ matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
+ rootdir_len) == 0);
+ if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' &&
+ resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) {
DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access "
"attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
"share path\n", fname));
--
2.5.0

112
package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 25139116756cc285a3a5534834cc276ef1b7baaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
encryption in do_connect()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
---
source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *username;
const char *password;
NTSTATUS status;
+ int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
+
+ if (force_encrypt) {
+ signing_state = Required;
+ }
/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
zero_sockaddr(&ss);
/* have to open a new connection */
- c = cli_initialise_ex(get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info));
+ c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state);
if (c == NULL) {
d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n);
return NULL;
--
2.5.0
From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
encryption in SMBC_server_internal()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
---
source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
index 45be660..167f2c9 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *username_used;
NTSTATUS status;
char *newserver, *newshare;
+ int signing_state = Undefined;
zero_sockaddr(&ss);
ZERO_STRUCT(c);
@@ -404,8 +405,12 @@ again:
zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
+ signing_state = Required;
+ }
+
/* have to open a new connection */
- if ((c = cli_initialise()) == NULL) {
+ if ((c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state)) == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
ipc_srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, "*IPC$",
pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
if (!ipc_srv) {
+ int signing_state = Undefined;
/* We didn't find a cached connection. Get the password */
if (!*pp_password || (*pp_password)[0] == '\0') {
@@ -771,6 +777,9 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) {
flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE;
}
+ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
+ signing_state = Required;
+ }
zero_sockaddr(&ss);
nt_status = cli_full_connection(&ipc_cli,
@@ -780,7 +789,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
*pp_workgroup,
*pp_password,
flags,
- Undefined);
+ signing_state);
if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
--
2.5.0

97
package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
From 8e49de7754f7171a58a1f94dee0f1138dbee3c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:54:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on
snapdir
Fix originally from <partha@exablox.com>
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
---
source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
+++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "smbd/smbd.h"
+#include "smbd/globals.h"
+#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
#include "system/filesys.h"
#include "ntioctl.h"
@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname, mod
SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1);
}
+static bool check_access_snapdir(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ struct smb_filename smb_fname;
+ int ret;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t access_granted = 0;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(smb_fname);
+ smb_fname.base_name = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
+ "%s",
+ path);
+ if (smb_fname.base_name == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_STAT(handle, &smb_fname);
+ if (ret != 0 || !S_ISDIR(smb_fname.st.st_ex_mode)) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ status = smbd_check_open_rights(handle->conn,
+ &smb_fname,
+ SEC_DIR_LIST,
+ &access_granted);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("user does not have list permission "
+ "on snapdir %s\n",
+ smb_fname.base_name));
+ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
+ return false;
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
+ return true;
+}
+
static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname)
{
SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1);
@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data);
char *snapshot;
+ bool ret;
snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle);
if (snapdir == NULL) {
@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return -1;
}
+ ret = check_access_snapdir(handle, snapdir);
+ if (!ret) {
+ DEBUG(0,("access denied on listing snapdir %s\n", snapdir));
+ errno = EACCES;
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0);
--
2.5.0