mirror of https://github.com/hak5/openwrt.git
dnsmasq: bump to 2.79rc1
1721453 Remove special handling of A-for-A queries. 499d8dd Fix boundary for test introduced in 3e3f1029c9ec6c63e430ff51063a6301d4b2262 6f1cbfd Fix debian/readme typo. 55ecde7 Inotify: Ignore backup files created by editors 6b54d69 Make failure to chown() pidfile a warning. 246a31c Change ownership of pid file, to keep systemd happy. 83e4b73 Remove confusion between --user and --script-user. 6340ca7 Tweak heuristic for initial DNSSEC memory allocation. baf553d Default min-port to 1024 to avoid reserved ports. 486bcd5 Simplify and correct bindtodevice(). be9a74d Close Debian bug for CVE-2017-15107. ffcbc0f Example config typo fixes. a969ba6 Special case NSEC processing for root DS record, to avoid spurious BOGUS. f178172 Add homepage to Debian control file. cd7df61 Fix DNSSEC validation errors introduced in 4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6 c1a4e25 Try to be a little more clever at falling back to smaller DNS packet sizes. 4fe6744 DNSSEC fix for wildcard NSEC records. CVE-2017-15107 applies. 3bd4c47 Remove limit on length of command-line options. 98196c4 Typo fix. 22cd860 Allow more than one --bridge-interface option to refer to an interface. 3c973ad Use SIGINT (instead of overloading SIGHUP) to turn on DNSSEC time validation. faaf306 Spelling fixes. c7e6aea Change references to gPXE to iPXE. Development of EtherBoot gPXE was always development of iPXE core developer Michael Brown. e541245 Handle duplicate RRs in DNSSEC validation. 84a01be Bump year in Debian copyright notice. d1ced3a Update copyrights to 2018. a6cee69 Fix exit code from dhcp_release6. 0039920 Severely fix code formating of contrib/lease-tools/dhcp_release6.c 39d8550 Run Debian startup regex in "C" locale. ef3d137 Fix infinite retries in strict-order mode. 8c707e1 Make 373e91738929a3d416e6292e65824184ba8428a6 compile without DNSSEC. 373e917 Fix a6004d7f17687ac2455f724d0b57098c413f128d to cope with >256 RRs in answer section. 74f0f9a Commment language tweaks. ed6bdb0 Man page typos. c88af04 Modify doc.html to mention git-over-http is now available. ae0187d Fix trust-anchor regexp in Debian init script. 0c50e3d Bump version in Debian package. 075366a Open inotify socket only when used. 8e8b2d6 Release notes update. 087eb76 Always return a SERVFAIL response to DNS queries with RD=0. ebedcba Typo in printf format string added in 22dee512f3738f87539a79aeb52b9e670b3bd104 0954a97 Remove RSA/MD5 DNSSEC algorithm. b77efc1 Tidy DNSSEC algorithm table use. 3b0cb34 Fix manpage which said ZSK but meant KSK. aa6f832 Add a few DNS RRs to the table. ad9c6f0 Add support for Ed25519 DNSSEC signature algorithm. a6004d7 Fix caching logic for validated answers. c366717 Tidy up add_resource_record() buffer size checks. 22dee51 Log DNS server max packet size reduction. 6fd5d79 Fix logic on EDNS0 headers. 9d6918d Use IP[V6]_UNICAST_IF socket option instead of SO_BINDTODEVICE for DNS. a49c5c2 Fix search_servers() segfault with DNSSEC. 30858e3 Spaces in CNAME options break parsing. Refresh patches. Remove upstreamed patches: 250-Fix-infinite-retries-in-strict-order-mode.patch 260-dnssec-SIGINT.patch 270-dnssec-wildcards.patch Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>openwrt-18.06
Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant
Hans Dedecker
parent
47c5415023
commit
16245a5d8e
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@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
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PKG_VERSION:=2.78
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PKG_RELEASE:=10
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PKG_VERSION:=2.79rc1
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/
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PKG_HASH:=89949f438c74b0c7543f06689c319484bd126cc4b1f8c745c742ab397681252b
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/release-candidates/
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PKG_HASH:=57d17a3a6cf34af5dcbc5107c45b05671bda9d250718fe073ca12c5f61099985
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PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
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PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org>
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -462,17 +462,24 @@ static time_t timestamp_time;
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@@ -143,17 +143,24 @@ static time_t timestamp_time;
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int setup_timestamp(void)
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{
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struct stat statbuf;
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Steven Barth <steven@midlink.org>
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{
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/* time already OK, update timestamp, and do key checking from the start. */
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if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, NULL) == -1)
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@@ -493,7 +500,7 @@ int setup_timestamp(void)
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@@ -174,7 +181,7 @@ int setup_timestamp(void)
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close(fd);
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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
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int main (int argc, char **argv)
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{
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int bind_fallback = 0;
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@@ -911,6 +971,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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@@ -928,6 +988,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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set_dbus_listeners();
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#endif
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@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
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#ifdef HAVE_DHCP
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if (daemon->dhcp || daemon->relay4)
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{
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@@ -1041,6 +1102,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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@@ -1058,6 +1119,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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check_dbus_listeners();
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#endif
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@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
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mostly_clean :
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -1397,6 +1397,8 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
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@@ -1415,6 +1415,8 @@ void emit_dbus_signal(int action, struct
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# endif
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#endif
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@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
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From ef3d137a646fa8309e1ff5184e3e145eef40cc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 22:37:29 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix infinite retries in strict-order mode.
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If all configured dns servers return refused in
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response to a query; dnsmasq will end up in an infinite loop
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retransmitting the dns query resulting into high CPU load.
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Problem is caused by the dns refuse retransmission logic which does
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not check for the end of a dns server list iteration in strict mode.
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Having one configured dns server returning a refused reply easily
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triggers this problem in strict order mode. This was introduced in
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9396752c115b3ab733fa476b30da73237e12e7ba
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Thanks to Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com> for spotting this
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and the initial patch.
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---
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src/forward.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/forward.c
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+++ b/src/forward.c
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@@ -797,10 +797,20 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
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unsigned char *pheader;
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size_t plen;
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int is_sign;
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-
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+
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+ /* In strict order mode, there must be a server later in the chain
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+ left to send to, otherwise without the forwardall mechanism,
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+ code further on will cycle around the list forwever if they
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+ all return REFUSED. Note that server is always non-NULL before
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+ this executes. */
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+ if (option_bool(OPT_ORDER))
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+ for (server = forward->sentto->next; server; server = server->next)
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+ if (!(server->flags & (SERV_LITERAL_ADDRESS | SERV_HAS_DOMAIN | SERV_FOR_NODOTS | SERV_NO_ADDR | SERV_LOOP)))
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+ break;
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+
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/* recreate query from reply */
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pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)n, &plen, NULL, &is_sign, NULL);
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- if (!is_sign)
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+ if (!is_sign && server)
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{
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header->ancount = htons(0);
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header->nscount = htons(0);
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@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
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From 3c973ad92d317df736d5a8fde67baba6b102d91e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 21:05:37 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Use SIGINT (instead of overloading SIGHUP) to turn on DNSSEC
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time validation.
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---
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src/dnsmasq.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
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src/dnsmasq.h | 1 +
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src/helper.c | 3 ++-
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5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.c
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.c
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@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigact, NULL);
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sigaction(SIGALRM, &sigact, NULL);
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sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sigact, NULL);
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-
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+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sigact, NULL);
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+
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/* ignore SIGPIPE */
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sigact.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
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sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sigact, NULL);
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@@ -815,7 +816,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
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daemon->dnssec_no_time_check = option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_TIME);
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if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_TIME) && !daemon->back_to_the_future)
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- my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC signature timestamps not checked until first cache reload"));
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+ my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC signature timestamps not checked until receipt of SIGINT"));
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if (rc == 1)
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my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC signature timestamps not checked until system time valid"));
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@@ -1142,7 +1143,7 @@ static void sig_handler(int sig)
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{
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/* ignore anything other than TERM during startup
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and in helper proc. (helper ignore TERM too) */
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- if (sig == SIGTERM)
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+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGINT)
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exit(EC_MISC);
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}
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else if (pid != getpid())
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@@ -1168,6 +1169,15 @@ static void sig_handler(int sig)
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event = EVENT_DUMP;
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else if (sig == SIGUSR2)
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event = EVENT_REOPEN;
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+ else if (sig == SIGINT)
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+ {
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+ /* Handle SIGINT normally in debug mode, so
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+ ctrl-c continues to operate. */
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+ if (option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
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+ exit(EC_MISC);
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+ else
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+ event = EVENT_TIME;
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+ }
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else
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return;
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@@ -1295,14 +1305,7 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t
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{
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case EVENT_RELOAD:
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daemon->soa_sn++; /* Bump zone serial, as it may have changed. */
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-
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-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
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- if (daemon->dnssec_no_time_check && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_TIME))
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- {
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- my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("now checking DNSSEC signature timestamps"));
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- daemon->dnssec_no_time_check = 0;
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- }
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-#endif
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+
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/* fall through */
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case EVENT_INIT:
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@@ -1411,6 +1414,17 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t
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poll_resolv(0, 1, now);
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break;
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+ case EVENT_TIME:
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+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
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+ if (daemon->dnssec_no_time_check && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_TIME))
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+ {
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+ my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("now checking DNSSEC signature timestamps"));
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+ daemon->dnssec_no_time_check = 0;
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+ clear_cache_and_reload(now);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ break;
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+
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case EVENT_TERM:
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/* Knock all our children on the head. */
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for (i = 0; i < MAX_PROCS; i++)
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct event_desc {
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#define EVENT_NEWROUTE 23
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#define EVENT_TIME_ERR 24
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#define EVENT_SCRIPT_LOG 25
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+#define EVENT_TIME 26
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/* Exit codes. */
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#define EC_GOOD 0
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--- a/src/helper.c
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+++ b/src/helper.c
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@@ -97,13 +97,14 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_
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return pipefd[1];
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}
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- /* ignore SIGTERM, so that we can clean up when the main process gets hit
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+ /* ignore SIGTERM and SIGINT, so that we can clean up when the main process gets hit
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and SIGALRM so that we can use sleep() */
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sigact.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
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sigact.sa_flags = 0;
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sigemptyset(&sigact.sa_mask);
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sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigact, NULL);
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sigaction(SIGALRM, &sigact, NULL);
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+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sigact, NULL);
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if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG) && uid != 0)
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{
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@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
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From 4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 12:26:08 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC fix for wildcard NSEC records. CVE-2017-15107
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applies.
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It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards,
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but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid
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starting at the wildcard name, *.<domain> NOT the name expanded
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from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an
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attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence
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in a domain which includes a wildcard for NSEC.
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---
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src/dnssec.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
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2 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -424,15 +424,17 @@ static void from_wire(char *name)
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static int count_labels(char *name)
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{
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int i;
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-
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+ char *p;
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+
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if (*name == 0)
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return 0;
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- for (i = 0; *name; name++)
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- if (*name == '.')
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+ for (p = name, i = 0; *p; p++)
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+ if (*p == '.')
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i++;
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- return i+1;
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+ /* Don't count empty first label. */
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+ return *name == '.' ? i : i+1;
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}
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/* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
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@@ -1412,8 +1414,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, c
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}
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}
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-static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
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- char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
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+static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count,
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+ char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
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{
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int i, rc, rdlen;
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unsigned char *p, *psave;
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@@ -1426,6 +1428,9 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(stru
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/* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
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for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
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{
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+ char *workspace1 = workspace1_in;
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+ int sig_labels, name_labels;
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+
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p = nsecs[i];
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
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return 0;
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@@ -1434,7 +1439,27 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(stru
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psave = p;
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
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return 0;
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-
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+
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+ /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
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+ as name for computation. */
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+ sig_labels = *labels[i];
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+ name_labels = count_labels(workspace1);
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+
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+ if (sig_labels < name_labels)
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+ {
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+ int k;
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+ for (k = name_labels - sig_labels; k != 0; k--)
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+ {
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+ while (*workspace1 != '.' && *workspace1 != 0)
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+ workspace1++;
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+ if (k != 1 && *workspace1 == '.')
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+ workspace1++;
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+ }
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+
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+ workspace1--;
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+ *workspace1 = '*';
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+ }
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+
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rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
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if (rc == 0)
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@@ -1832,24 +1857,26 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(str
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static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *nons)
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{
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- static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
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- static int nsecset_sz = 0;
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+ static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL;
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+ static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0;
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int type_found = 0;
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- unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
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+ unsigned char *auth_start, *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
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int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
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/* Move to NS section */
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if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
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return 0;
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+
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+ auth_start = p;
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for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
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{
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unsigned char *pstart = p;
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- if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
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+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
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return 0;
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-
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+
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GETSHORT(type, p);
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GETSHORT(class, p);
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p += 4; /* TTL */
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@@ -1866,7 +1893,69 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dn
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if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found))
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return 0;
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- nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
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+ if (type == T_NSEC)
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+ {
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+ /* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to
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+ extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs
|
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+ are the result of wildcard expansion.
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||||
+ Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet
|
||||
+ so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value
|
||||
+ is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one.
|
||||
+ If there are no SIGs, that's an error */
|
||||
+ unsigned char *p1 = auth_start;
|
||||
+ int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ GETSHORT(type1, p1);
|
||||
+ GETSHORT(class1, p1);
|
||||
+ p1 += 4; /* TTL */
|
||||
+ GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ int type_covered;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *psav = p1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (rdlen1 < 18)
|
||||
+ return 0; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (type_covered == T_NSEC)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ p1++; /* algo */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */
|
||||
+ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
|
||||
+ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1;
|
||||
+ else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ p1 = psav;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Must have found at least one sig. */
|
||||
+ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
|
||||
@@ -1874,7 +1963,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (type_found == T_NSEC)
|
||||
- return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
|
||||
+ return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
|
||||
else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
|
||||
return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons);
|
||||
else
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue