samba: fix some security problems

This fixes the following security problems: * CVE-2015-7560 * CVE-2015-5370 * CVE-2016-2110 * CVE-2016-2111 * CVE-2016-2112 * CVE-2016-2115 * CVE-2016-2118 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> SVN-Revision: 49175
2016-04-16 20:06:34 +00:00 · 2016-04-16 20:06:34 +00:00 · 1414f1647d
parent 894aed060e
commit 1414f1647d
21 changed files with 20105 additions and 46 deletions
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
@ -14,11 +14,9 @@ Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
 source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

-diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
-index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
 --- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c
 +++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
-@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_s
 	if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) {
 		const char *conn_rootdir;
 		size_t rootdir_len;
@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
 
 		conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
 		if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
-@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_s
 		}
 
 		rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
@ -39,5 +37,3 @@ index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
 			DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access "
 				"attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
 				"share path\n", fname));
-- 
-2.5.0
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
 source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

-diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
-index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
 --- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
 +++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALL
 	const char *username;
 	const char *password;
 	NTSTATUS status;
@ -28,7 +26,7 @@ index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
 
 	/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
 	servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
-@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALL
 	zero_sockaddr(&ss);
 
 	/* have to open a new connection */
@ -37,26 +35,6 @@ index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
 	if (c == NULL) {
 		d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n);
 		return NULL;
-- 
-2.5.0
-
-
-From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
- encryption in SMBC_server_internal()
-
-BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
-Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
---
- source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
-index 45be660..167f2c9 100644
 --- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
 +++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
@ -108,5 +86,3 @@ index 45be660..167f2c9 100644
                 if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
                         DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n",
                                  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
-- 
-2.5.0
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
 source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)

-diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
-index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
 --- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
 +++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
 #include "system/filesys.h"
 #include "ntioctl.h"
 
-@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle,  const char *fname, mod
+@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle
         SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1);
 }
 
@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
 static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle,  const char *fname)
 {
         SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1);
-@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2
 	SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d;
 	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data);
 	char *snapshot;
@ -79,7 +77,7 @@ index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
 
 	snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle);
 	if (snapdir == NULL) {
-@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2
 		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
 		return -1;
 	}
@ -93,5 +91,3 @@ index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
 
 	p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0);
 
-- 
-2.5.0
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/015-patch-cve-2015-7560.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/015-patch-cve-2015-7560.patch
@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From eb27f9b7bf9c1dc902d9545eecf805831bd4e46c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 11:18:12 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] CVE-2015-7560: s3: smbd: Add refuse_symlink() function
+ that can be used to prevent operations on a symlink.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11648
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/trans2.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/source3/smbd/trans2.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/trans2.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,34 @@ static char *store_file_unix_basic_info2
+ 				files_struct *fsp,
+ 				const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf);
+ 
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if an open file handle or pathname is a symlink.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS refuse_symlink(connection_struct *conn,
+			const files_struct *fsp,
+			const char *name)
+{
+	SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
+	const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst = NULL;
+
+	if (fsp) {
+		pst = &fsp->fsp_name->st;
+	} else {
+		int ret = vfs_stat_smb_fname(conn,
+				name,
+				&sbuf);
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
+		}
+		pst = &sbuf;
+	}
+	if (S_ISLNK(pst->st_ex_mode)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+ /********************************************************************
+  Roundup a value to the nearest allocation roundup size boundary.
+  Only do this for Windows clients.
+@@ -181,12 +209,22 @@ NTSTATUS get_ea_names_from_file(TALLOC_C
+ 	char **names, **tmp;
+ 	size_t num_names;
+ 	ssize_t sizeret = -1;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (pnames) {
+		*pnames = NULL;
+	}
+	*pnum_names = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!lp_ea_support(SNUM(conn))) {
+-		if (pnames) {
+-			*pnames = NULL;
+-		}
+-		*pnum_names = 0;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, fname);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		/*
+		 * Just return no EA's on a symlink.
+		 */
+ 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -236,10 +274,6 @@ NTSTATUS get_ea_names_from_file(TALLOC_C
+ 
+ 	if (sizeret == 0) {
+ 		TALLOC_FREE(names);
+-		if (pnames) {
+-			*pnames = NULL;
+-		}
+-		*pnum_names = 0;
+ 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -550,6 +584,7 @@ NTSTATUS set_ea(connection_struct *conn,
+ 		const struct smb_filename *smb_fname, struct ea_list *ea_list)
+ {
+ 	char *fname = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+ 
+ 	if (!lp_ea_support(SNUM(conn))) {
+ 		return NT_STATUS_EAS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+@@ -559,6 +594,12 @@ NTSTATUS set_ea(connection_struct *conn,
+ 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ 	}
+ 
+	status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, smb_fname->base_name);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+
+ 	/* For now setting EAs on streams isn't supported. */
+ 	fname = smb_fname->base_name;
+ 
+@@ -4931,6 +4972,13 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_do_qfilepathinfo(connectio
+ 				uint16 num_file_acls = 0;
+ 				uint16 num_def_acls = 0;
+ 
+				status = refuse_symlink(conn,
+						fsp,
+						smb_fname->base_name);
+				if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+					return status;
+				}
+
+ 				if (fsp && fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
+ 					file_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FD(fsp);
+ 				} else {
+@@ -6452,6 +6500,7 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_posix_acl(connec
+ 	uint16 num_def_acls;
+ 	bool valid_file_acls = True;
+ 	bool valid_def_acls = True;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+ 
+ 	if (total_data < SMB_POSIX_ACL_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+@@ -6479,6 +6528,11 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_posix_acl(connec
+ 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ 	}
+ 
+	status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, smb_fname->base_name);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return status;
+	}
+
+ 	DEBUG(10,("smb_set_posix_acl: file %s num_file_acls = %u, num_def_acls = %u\n",
+ 		smb_fname ? smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname) : fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
+ 		(unsigned int)num_file_acls,
+--- a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
+@@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ NTSTATUS set_sd(files_struct *fsp, struc
+ 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (S_ISLNK(fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode)) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("ACL set on symlink %s denied.\n",
+			fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+ 	if (psd->owner_sid == NULL) {
+ 		security_info_sent &= ~SECINFO_OWNER;
+ 	}
+@@ -1925,6 +1931,12 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_do_query_security_desc(con
+ 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (S_ISLNK(fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode)) {
+		DEBUG(10, ("ACL get on symlink %s denied.\n",
+			fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+ 	if (security_info_wanted & (SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER|
+ 			SECINFO_GROUP|SECINFO_SACL)) {
+ 		/* Don't return SECINFO_LABEL if anything else was
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/020-CVE-preparation-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/020-CVE-preparation-v3-6.patch
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/021-CVE-preparation-v3-6-addition.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/021-CVE-preparation-v3-6-addition.patch
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/022-CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/022-CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/023-CVE-2016-2110-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/023-CVE-2016-2110-v3-6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+From 202d69267c8550b850438877fb51c3d2c992949d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 08:46:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2110: s3:ntlmssp: set and use
+ ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
+@@ -176,17 +176,19 @@ void ntlmssp_want_feature_list(struct nt
+ 	 * also add  NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL here. JRA.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY", feature_list, True)) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ 	}
+ 	if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN", feature_list, True)) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ 	}
+ 	if(in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL", feature_list, True)) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+ 	}
+ 	if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE", feature_list, true)) {
+ 		ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = true;
+ 	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -199,17 +201,20 @@ void ntlmssp_want_feature(struct ntlmssp
+ {
+ 	/* As per JRA's comment above */
+ 	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ 	}
+ 	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+ 	}
+ 	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+ 	}
+ 	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE) {
+ 		ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = true;
+ 	}
+
+	ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -387,7 +392,12 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(s
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+-		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+		ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+		ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = false;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* generate the ntlmssp negotiate packet */
+@@ -422,6 +432,86 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(s
+ 	return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+ }
+ 
+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp3_handle_neg_flags(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+					  uint32_t flags)
+{
+	uint32_t missing_flags = ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
+
+	if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = true;
+	} else {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
+		ntlmssp_state->unicode = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2 (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY)
+	 * has priority over NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY
+	 */
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
+	}
+
+	if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET)) {
+		ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
+	}
+
+	missing_flags &= ~ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
+	if (missing_flags != 0) {
+		NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
+		DEBUG(1, ("%s: Got challenge flags[0x%08x] "
+			  "- possible downgrade detected! "
+			  "missing_flags[0x%08x] - %s\n",
+			  __func__,
+			  (unsigned)flags,
+			  (unsigned)missing_flags,
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		debug_ntlmssp_flags(missing_flags);
+		DEBUGADD(4, ("neg_flags[0x%08x]\n",
+			     (unsigned)ntlmssp_state->neg_flags));
+		debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
+
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+ /**
+  * Next state function for the Challenge Packet.  Generate an auth packet.
+  *
+@@ -448,6 +538,26 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge
+ 	DATA_BLOB encrypted_session_key = data_blob_null;
+ 	NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ 
+	if (!msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &reply, "CdBd",
+			 "NTLMSSP",
+			 &ntlmssp_command,
+			 &server_domain_blob,
+			 &chal_flags)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
+		dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
+
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+	data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
+
+	DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
+	debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
+
+	nt_status = ntlmssp3_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, chal_flags);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+ 	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ccache) {
+ 		struct wbcCredentialCacheParams params;
+ 		struct wbcCredentialCacheInfo *info = NULL;
+@@ -498,17 +608,6 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge
+ 
+ noccache:
+ 
+-	if (!msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &reply, "CdBd",
+-			 "NTLMSSP",
+-			 &ntlmssp_command,
+-			 &server_domain_blob,
+-			 &chal_flags)) {
+-		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
+-		dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
+-
+-		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+ 		struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *challenge = talloc(
+ 			talloc_tos(), struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE);
+@@ -525,13 +624,6 @@ noccache:
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
+-
+-	DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
+-	debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
+-
+-	ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, chal_flags, lp_client_lanman_auth());
+-
+ 	if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
+ 		if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) {
+ 			chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
+@@ -769,6 +861,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_start(TALLOC_CTX
+ 	ntlmssp_state->unicode = True;
+ 
+ 	ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = use_ntlmv2;
+	ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = lp_client_lanman_auth();
+ 
+ 	ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_INITIAL;
+ 
+@@ -780,6 +873,10 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_start(TALLOC_CTX
+ 		NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH |
+ 		NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
+ 
+	if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
+		ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = false;
+	}
+
+ 	ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, netbios_name);
+ 	if (!ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name) {
+ 		talloc_free(ntlmssp_state);
+--- a/libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h
+++ b/libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct ntlmssp_state
+ 	DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
+ 	DATA_BLOB session_key;
+ 
+	uint32_t required_flags;
+ 	uint32_t neg_flags; /* the current state of negotiation with the NTLMSSP partner */
+ 
+ 	/**
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/024-CVE-2016-2111-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/024-CVE-2016-2111-v3-6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,681 @@
+From ee105156fa151ebfd34b8febc2928e144b3b7b0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= <gd@samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 01:29:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/15] CVE-2016-2111: s3:rpc_server/netlogon: always go
+ through netr_creds_server_step_check()
+
+The ensures we apply the "server schannel = yes" restrictions.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11749
+
+Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+
+Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+@@ -1508,6 +1508,7 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
+ 	case NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation:
+ 	{
+ 		const char *wksname = nt_workstation;
+		const char *workgroup = lp_workgroup();
+ 
+ 		status = make_auth_context_fixed(talloc_tos(), &auth_context,
+ 						 logon->network->challenge);
+@@ -1532,6 +1533,14 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
+ 						     logon->network->nt.length)) {
+ 			status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ 		}
+
+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			status = NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(
+						user_info->client.account_name,
+						user_info->client.domain_name,
+						user_info->password.response.nt,
+						creds, workgroup);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	case NetlogonInteractiveInformation:
+@@ -1636,6 +1645,14 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
+ 						r->out.validation->sam3);
+ 		break;
+ 	case 6:
+		/* Only allow this if the pipe is protected. */
+		if (p->auth.auth_level < DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+			DEBUG(0,("netr_Validation6: client %s not using privacy for netlogon\n",
+				get_remote_machine_name()));
+			status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			break;
+		}
+
+ 		status = serverinfo_to_SamInfo6(server_info, pipe_session_key, 16,
+ 						r->out.validation->sam6);
+ 		break;
+@@ -2271,11 +2288,13 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_GetForestTrustInformation
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: check server name */
+ 
+-	status = schannel_check_creds_state(p->mem_ctx, lp_private_dir(),
+-					    r->in.computer_name,
+-					    r->in.credential,
+-					    r->out.return_authenticator,
+-					    &creds);
+	become_root();
+	status = netr_creds_server_step_check(p, p->mem_ctx,
+					      r->in.computer_name,
+					      r->in.credential,
+					      r->out.return_authenticator,
+					      &creds);
+	unbecome_root();
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		return status;
+ 	}
+@@ -2371,11 +2390,13 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerGetTrustInfo(struct
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: check server name */
+ 
+-	status = schannel_check_creds_state(p->mem_ctx, lp_private_dir(),
+-					    r->in.computer_name,
+-					    r->in.credential,
+-					    r->out.return_authenticator,
+-					    &creds);
+	become_root();
+	status = netr_creds_server_step_check(p, p->mem_ctx,
+					      r->in.computer_name,
+					      r->in.credential,
+					      r->out.return_authenticator,
+					      &creds);
+	unbecome_root();
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		return status;
+ 	}
+--- a/source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c
+@@ -1122,8 +1122,8 @@ static bool schan(struct torture_context
+ 		generate_random_buffer(chal.data, chal.length);
+ 		names_blob = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(
+ 			mem_ctx,
+-			cli_credentials_get_workstation(user_creds),
+-			cli_credentials_get_domain(user_creds));
+			cli_credentials_get_workstation(wks_creds),
+			cli_credentials_get_domain(wks_creds));
+ 		status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(
+ 			user_creds, mem_ctx, &flags, chal, names_blob,
+ 			&lm_resp, &nt_resp, NULL, NULL);
+--- a/libcli/auth/proto.h
+++ b/libcli/auth/proto.h
+@@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ct
+ 		      const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
+ 		      DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response, 
+ 		      DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key) ;
+NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char *account_name,
+			const char *account_domain,
+			const DATA_BLOB response,
+			const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
+			const char *workgroup);
+ 
+ /***********************************************************
+  encode a password buffer with a unicode password.  The buffer
+--- a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
+ #include "../libcli/auth/msrpc_parse.h"
+ #include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+ #include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+-#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
+ 
+ void SMBencrypt_hash(const uint8_t lm_hash[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
+ {
+@@ -522,6 +522,146 @@ bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ct
+ 				     lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, user_session_key);
+ }
+ 
+NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char *account_name,
+			const char *account_domain,
+			const DATA_BLOB response,
+			const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
+			const char *workgroup)
+{
+	TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
+	/* RespType + HiRespType */
+	static const char *magic = "\x01\x01";
+	int cmp;
+	struct NTLMv2_RESPONSE v2_resp;
+	enum ndr_err_code err;
+	const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_cn = NULL;
+	const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_dn = NULL;
+
+	if (response.length < 48) {
+		/*
+		 * NTLMv2_RESPONSE has at least 48 bytes.
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	cmp = memcmp(response.data + 16, magic, 2);
+	if (cmp != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * It doesn't look like a valid NTLMv2_RESPONSE
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+	err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&response, frame, &v2_resp,
+		(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
+		DEBUG(2,("Failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE "
+			 "length %u - %s - %s\n",
+			 (unsigned)response.length,
+			 ndr_map_error2string(err),
+			 nt_errstr(status)));
+		dump_data(2, response.data, response.length);
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (DEBUGLVL(10)) {
+		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NTLMv2_RESPONSE, &v2_resp);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the netbios computer name in the
+	 * NTLMv2_RESPONSE matches the computer name
+	 * in the secure channel credentials for workstation
+	 * trusts.
+	 *
+	 * And the netbios domain name matches our
+	 * workgroup.
+	 *
+	 * This prevents workstations from requesting
+	 * the session key of NTLMSSP sessions of clients
+	 * to other hosts.
+	 */
+	if (creds->secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_WKSTA) {
+		av_nb_cn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
+					       MsvAvNbComputerName);
+		av_nb_dn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
+					       MsvAvNbDomainName);
+	}
+
+	if (av_nb_cn != NULL) {
+		const char *v = NULL;
+		char *a = NULL;
+		size_t len;
+
+		v = av_nb_cn->Value.AvNbComputerName;
+
+		a = talloc_strdup(frame, creds->account_name);
+		if (a == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+		len = strlen(a);
+		if (len > 0 && a[len - 1] == '$') {
+			a[len - 1] = '\0';
+		}
+
+#ifdef SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL /* smbtorture4 for make test */
+		cmp = strcasecmp_m(a, v);
+#else /* smbd */
+		cmp = StrCaseCmp(a, v);
+#endif
+		if (cmp != 0) {
+			DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
+				 "NbComputerName[%s] rejected "
+				 "for user[%s\\%s] "
+				 "against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
+				 "in workgroup[%s]\n",
+				 __func__, v,
+				 account_domain,
+				 account_name,
+				 creds->computer_name,
+				 creds->account_name,
+				 workgroup));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+	if (av_nb_dn != NULL) {
+		const char *v = NULL;
+
+		v = av_nb_dn->Value.AvNbDomainName;
+
+#ifdef SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL /* smbtorture4 for make test */
+		cmp = strcasecmp_m(workgroup, v);
+#else /* smbd */
+		cmp = StrCaseCmp(workgroup, v);
+#endif
+		if (cmp != 0) {
+			DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
+				 "NbDomainName[%s] rejected "
+				 "for user[%s\\%s] "
+				 "against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
+				 "in workgroup[%s]\n",
+				 __func__, v,
+				 account_domain,
+				 account_name,
+				 creds->computer_name,
+				 creds->account_name,
+				 workgroup));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+ /***********************************************************
+  encode a password buffer with a unicode password.  The buffer
+  is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
+--- a/libcli/auth/wscript_build
+++ b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('MSRPC_PARSE',
+ 
+ bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('LIBCLI_AUTH',
+ 	source='credentials.c session.c smbencrypt.c smbdes.c',
+-	public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE',
+	public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE NDR_NTLMSSP',
+ 	public_headers='credentials.h:domain_credentials.h'
+ 	)
+ 
+--- a/source3/Makefile.in
+++ b/source3/Makefile.in
+@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ GROUPDB_OBJ = groupdb/mapping.o groupdb/
+ PROFILE_OBJ = profile/profile.o
+ PROFILES_OBJ = utils/profiles.o \
+ 	       $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+	       $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
+ 	       $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+                $(LIB_OBJ) $(LIB_DUMMY_OBJ) \
+                $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
+@@ -995,10 +996,10 @@ SWAT_OBJ = $(SWAT_OBJ1) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(P
+ STATUS_OBJ = utils/status.o utils/status_profile.o \
+ 	     $(LOCKING_OBJ) $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+              $(PROFILE_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
+-	     $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
+	     $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
+ 
+ SMBCONTROL_OBJ = utils/smbcontrol.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+-	$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(PRINTBASE_OBJ)
+	$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(PRINTBASE_OBJ)
+ 
+ SMBTREE_OBJ = utils/smbtree.o $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+              $(PROFILE_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) \
+@@ -1012,11 +1013,11 @@ SMBTREE_OBJ = utils/smbtree.o $(PARAM_OB
+ 
+ TESTPARM_OBJ = utils/testparm.o \
+                $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
+-	       $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
+	       $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
+ 
+ SMBTA_UTIL_OBJ = utils/smbta-util.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
+ 	$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+-	$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
+	$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
+ 
+ TEST_LP_LOAD_OBJ = param/test_lp_load.o \
+ 		   $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+@@ -1146,6 +1147,7 @@ SMBCONFTORT_OBJ = $(SMBCONFTORT_OBJ0) \
+ 		  $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+ 		  $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+ 		  $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+		  $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
+ 		  $(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
+ 
+ PTHREADPOOLTEST_OBJ = lib/pthreadpool/pthreadpool.o \
+@@ -1229,7 +1231,7 @@ CUPS_OBJ = client/smbspool.o $(PARAM_OBJ
+ 	  $(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
+ 
+ NMBLOOKUP_OBJ = utils/nmblookup.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ) \
+-               $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
+               $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
+ 
+ SMBTORTURE_OBJ1 = torture/torture.o torture/nbio.o torture/scanner.o torture/utable.o \
+ 		torture/denytest.o torture/mangle_test.o \
+@@ -1253,6 +1255,7 @@ MASKTEST_OBJ = torture/masktest.o $(PARA
+ 		 $(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
+ 
+ MSGTEST_OBJ = torture/msgtest.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+		 $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
+                  $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+ 		 $(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
+ 
+@@ -1269,7 +1272,7 @@ PDBTEST_OBJ = torture/pdbtest.o $(PARAM_
+ 
+ VFSTEST_OBJ = torture/cmd_vfs.o torture/vfstest.o $(SMBD_OBJ_BASE) $(READLINE_OBJ)
+ 
+-SMBICONV_OBJ = $(PARAM_OBJ) torture/smbiconv.o $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
+SMBICONV_OBJ = $(PARAM_OBJ) torture/smbiconv.o $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
+ 
+ LOG2PCAP_OBJ = utils/log2pcaphex.o
+ 
+@@ -1297,17 +1300,17 @@ SMBCQUOTAS_OBJ = utils/smbcquotas.o $(LI
+ EVTLOGADM_OBJ0	= utils/eventlogadm.o
+ 
+ EVTLOGADM_OBJ	= $(EVTLOGADM_OBJ0) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+-		$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIB_EVENTLOG_OBJ) \
+		$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(LIB_EVENTLOG_OBJ) \
+ 		librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_eventlog.o \
+ 		librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.o
+ 
+ SHARESEC_OBJ0 = utils/sharesec.o
+ SHARESEC_OBJ  = $(SHARESEC_OBJ0) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+-		$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+		$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
+                 $(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
+ 
+ TALLOCTORT_OBJ = @tallocdir@/testsuite.o @tallocdir@/testsuite_main.o \
+-		$(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
+		$(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
+ 
+ REPLACETORT_OBJ = @libreplacedir@/test/testsuite.o \
+ 		@libreplacedir@/test/getifaddrs.o \
+@@ -1323,7 +1326,7 @@ SMBFILTER_OBJ = utils/smbfilter.o $(PARA
+ 		 $(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
+ 
+ WINBIND_WINS_NSS_OBJ = ../nsswitch/wins.o $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+-	$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ)
+	$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ)
+ 
+ PAM_SMBPASS_OBJ_0 = pam_smbpass/pam_smb_auth.o pam_smbpass/pam_smb_passwd.o \
+ 		pam_smbpass/pam_smb_acct.o pam_smbpass/support.o ../lib/util/asn1.o
+@@ -1531,12 +1534,14 @@ RPC_OPEN_TCP_OBJ = torture/rpc_open_tcp.
+ DBWRAP_TOOL_OBJ = utils/dbwrap_tool.o \
+ 		  $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+ 		  $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+-		  $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
+		  $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+		  $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
+ 
+ DBWRAP_TORTURE_OBJ = utils/dbwrap_torture.o \
+ 		     $(PARAM_OBJ) \
+ 		     $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
+ 		     $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
+		     $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
+ 		     $(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
+ 
+ SPLIT_TOKENS_OBJ = utils/split_tokens.o \
+--- a/source4/torture/raw/samba3misc.c
+++ b/source4/torture/raw/samba3misc.c
+@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
+ 	bool ret = true;
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ 	bool nt_status_support;
+	bool client_ntlmv2_auth;
+ 
+ 	if (!(mem_ctx = talloc_init("torture_samba3_badpath"))) {
+ 		d_printf("talloc_init failed\n");
+@@ -347,20 +348,17 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	nt_status_support = lpcfg_nt_status_support(torture->lp_ctx);
+	client_ntlmv2_auth = lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(torture->lp_ctx);
+ 
+-	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes")) {
+-		printf("Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "yes"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n");
+ 
+ 	if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_nt, torture, 0)) {
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no")) {
+-		printf("Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support = no'\n");
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "no"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = no'\n");
+ 
+ 	if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_dos, torture, 1)) {
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -373,6 +371,12 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	smbcli_deltree(cli_nt->tree, dirname);
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support",
+						       nt_status_support ? "yes":"no"),
+			    ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support' back to where it was\n");
+	torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth",
+						       client_ntlmv2_auth ? "yes":"no"),
+			    ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth' back to where it was\n");
+ 
+ 	status = smbcli_mkdir(cli_nt->tree, dirname);
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+--- a/source4/torture/basic/base.c
+++ b/source4/torture/basic/base.c
+@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ static bool torture_chkpath_test(struct
+ static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(struct torture_context *tctx)
+ {
+ 	bool nt_status_support;
+	bool client_ntlmv2_auth;
+ 	struct smbcli_state *cli_nt = NULL, *cli_dos = NULL;
+ 	bool result = false;
+ 	int fnum;
+@@ -1485,18 +1486,27 @@ static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(st
+ 	NTSTATUS status;
+ 
+ 	nt_status_support = lpcfg_nt_status_support(tctx->lp_ctx);
+	client_ntlmv2_auth = lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(tctx->lp_ctx);
+ 
+ 	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes")) {
+ 		torture_comment(tctx, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "yes")) {
+		torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_nt, tctx, 0)) {
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no")) {
+-		torture_comment(tctx, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
+		torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'nt status support = no'\n");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "no")) {
+		torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = no'\n");
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1506,7 +1516,12 @@ static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(st
+ 
+ 	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support",
+ 			    nt_status_support ? "yes":"no")) {
+-		torture_comment(tctx, "Could not reset 'nt status support = yes'");
+		torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not reset 'nt status support'");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth",
+			       client_ntlmv2_auth ? "yes":"no")) {
+		torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not reset 'client ntlmv2 auth'");
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+--- a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
+@@ -2077,6 +2077,17 @@ NTSTATUS cli_session_setup(struct cli_st
+ 		NTSTATUS status;
+ 
+ 		/* otherwise do a NT1 style session setup */
+		if (lp_client_ntlmv2_auth() && lp_client_use_spnego()) {
+			/*
+			 * Don't send an NTLMv2 response without NTLMSSP
+			 * if we want to use spnego support
+			 */
+			DEBUG(1, ("Server does not support EXTENDED_SECURITY "
+				  " but 'client use spnego = yes"
+				  " and 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+
+ 		status = cli_session_setup_nt1(cli, user, pass, passlen,
+ 					       ntpass, ntpasslen, workgroup);
+ 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientusespnego.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientusespnego.xml
+@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
+     supporting servers (including WindowsXP, Windows2000 and Samba
+     3.0) to agree upon an authentication
+     mechanism.  This enables Kerberos authentication in particular.</para>
+
+    <para>When <smbconfoption name="client NTLMv2 auth"/> is also set to
+    <constant>yes</constant> extended security (SPNEGO) is required
+    in order to use NTLMv2 only within NTLMSSP. This behavior was
+    introduced with the patches for CVE-2016-2111.</para>
+ </description>
+ 
+ <value type="default">yes</value>
+--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientntlmv2auth.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientntlmv2auth.xml
+@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
+     NTLMv2 by default, and some sites (particularly those following
+     'best practice' security polices) only allow NTLMv2 responses, and
+     not the weaker LM or NTLM.</para>
+
+    <para>When <smbconfoption name="client use spnego"/> is also set to
+    <constant>yes</constant> extended security (SPNEGO) is required
+    in order to use NTLMv2 only within NTLMSSP. This behavior was
+    introduced with the patches for CVE-2016-2111.</para>
+ </description>
+ <value type="default">yes</value>
+ </samba:parameter>
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/rawntlmv2auth.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<samba:parameter name="raw NTLMv2 auth"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="boolean"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+    <para>This parameter determines whether or not <citerefentry><refentrytitle>smbd</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> will allow SMB1 clients without
+    extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.</para>
+
+    <para>If this option, <command moreinfo="none">lanman auth</command>
+    and <command moreinfo="none">ntlm auth</command> are all disabled,
+    then only clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted.
+    That means NTLMv2 is only supported within NTLMSSP.</para>
+</description>
+
+<related>lanman auth</related>
+<related>ntlm auth</related>
+<value type="default">no</value>
+</samba:parameter>
+--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
+@@ -1489,6 +1489,7 @@ bool lp_map_untrusted_to_domain(void);
+ int lp_restrict_anonymous(void);
+ bool lp_lanman_auth(void);
+ bool lp_ntlm_auth(void);
+bool lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth(void);
+ bool lp_client_plaintext_auth(void);
+ bool lp_client_lanman_auth(void);
+ bool lp_client_ntlmv2_auth(void);
+--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
+@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ struct global {
+ 	bool bAllowTrustedDomains;
+ 	bool bLanmanAuth;
+ 	bool bNTLMAuth;
+	bool bRawNTLMv2Auth;
+ 	bool bUseSpnego;
+ 	bool bClientLanManAuth;
+ 	bool bClientNTLMv2Auth;
+@@ -1383,6 +1384,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
+ 		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+		.label		= "raw NTLMv2 auth",
+		.type		= P_BOOL,
+		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+		.ptr		= &Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth,
+		.special	= NULL,
+		.enum_list	= NULL,
+		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+	},
+	{
+ 		.label		= "client NTLMv2 auth",
+ 		.type		= P_BOOL,
+ 		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+@@ -5337,6 +5347,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
+ 	Globals.bClientPlaintextAuth = False;	/* Do NOT use a plaintext password even if is requested by the server */
+ 	Globals.bLanmanAuth = False;	/* Do NOT use the LanMan hash, even if it is supplied */
+ 	Globals.bNTLMAuth = True;	/* Do use NTLMv1 if it is supplied by the client (otherwise NTLMv2) */
+	Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth = false;	/* Allow NTLMv2 without NTLMSSP */
+ 	Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
+ 	/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
+ 
+@@ -5819,6 +5830,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_map_untrusted_to_domai
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_restrict_anonymous, &Globals.restrict_anonymous)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_lanman_auth, &Globals.bLanmanAuth)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_ntlm_auth, &Globals.bNTLMAuth)
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth, &Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_plaintext_auth, &Globals.bClientPlaintextAuth)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_lanman_auth, &Globals.bClientLanManAuth)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_ntlmv2_auth, &Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth)
+--- a/source3/auth/auth_util.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_util.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include "../lib/util/util_pw.h"
+ #include "lib/winbind_util.h"
+ #include "passdb.h"
+#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
+ 
+ #undef DBGC_CLASS
+ #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+@@ -367,6 +368,19 @@ NTSTATUS make_user_info_for_reply_enc(st
+                                       const char *client_domain, 
+                                       DATA_BLOB lm_resp, DATA_BLOB nt_resp)
+ {
+	bool allow_raw = lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth();
+
+	if (!allow_raw && nt_resp.length >= 48) {
+		/*
+		 * NTLMv2_RESPONSE has at least 48 bytes
+		 * and should only be supported via NTLMSSP.
+		 */
+		DEBUG(2,("Rejecting raw NTLMv2 authentication with "
+			 "user [%s\\%s]\n",
+			 client_domain, smb_name));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+ 	return make_user_info_map(user_info, smb_name, 
+ 				  client_domain, 
+ 				  get_remote_machine_name(), 
+--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ sub setup_dc($$)
+ 	domain master = yes
+ 	domain logons = yes
+ 	lanman auth = yes
+	raw NTLMv2 auth = yes
+ ";
+ 
+ 	my $vars = $self->provision($path,
+@@ -230,6 +231,7 @@ sub setup_secserver($$$)
+ 	my $secserver_options = "
+ 	security = server
+         password server = $s3dcvars->{SERVER_IP}
+	client ntlmv2 auth = no
+ ";
+ 
+ 	my $ret = $self->provision($prefix,
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/025-CVE-2016-2112-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/025-CVE-2016-2112-v3-6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+From 126e3e992bed7174d60ee19212db9b717647ab2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 16:55:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2016-2112: s3:ntlmssp: Implement missing
+ ntlmssp_have_feature()
+
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/include/proto.h  |  1 +
+ source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
+@@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_password(struct ntl
+ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_domain(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, const char *domain) ;
+ void ntlmssp_want_feature_list(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, char *feature_list);
+ void ntlmssp_want_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, uint32_t feature);
+bool ntlmssp_have_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, uint32_t feature);
+ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_update(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+ 			const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out) ;
+ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,36 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_domain(struct ntlms
+ 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ 
+bool ntlmssp_have_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
+			  uint32_t feature)
+{
+	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length == 0) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length == 0) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
+		if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length > 0) {
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+ /**
+  * Request features for the NTLMSSP negotiation
+  *
+--- a/source3/libads/sasl.c
+++ b/source3/libads/sasl.c
+@@ -261,6 +261,37 @@ static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_ntlmss
+ 	/* we have a reference conter on ntlmssp_state, if we are signing
+ 	   then the state will be kept by the signing engine */
+ 
+	if (ads->ldap.wrap_type >= ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SEAL) {
+		bool ok;
+
+		ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
+					  NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL);
+		if (!ok) {
+			DEBUG(0,("The ntlmssp feature sealing request, but unavailable\n"));
+			TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
+			return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
+		}
+
+		ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
+					  NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		if (!ok) {
+			DEBUG(0,("The ntlmssp feature signing request, but unavailable\n"));
+			TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
+			return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
+		}
+
+	} else if (ads->ldap.wrap_type >= ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SIGN) {
+		bool ok;
+
+		ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
+					  NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN);
+		if (!ok) {
+			DEBUG(0,("The gensec feature signing request, but unavailable\n"));
+			TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
+			return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	if (ads->ldap.wrap_type > ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN) {
+ 		ads->ldap.out.max_unwrapped = ADS_SASL_WRAPPING_OUT_MAX_WRAPPED - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
+ 		ads->ldap.out.sig_size = NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
+--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/ldap/clientldapsaslwrapping.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/ldap/clientldapsaslwrapping.xml
+@@ -34,11 +34,9 @@
+ 	</para>
+ 
+ 	<para>
+-	The default value is <emphasis>plain</emphasis> which is not irritable 
+-	to KRB5 clock skew errors. That implies synchronizing the time
+-	with the KDC in the case of using <emphasis>sign</emphasis> or 
+-	<emphasis>seal</emphasis>.
+	The default value is <emphasis>sign</emphasis>. That implies synchronizing the time
+	with the KDC in the case of using <emphasis>Kerberos</emphasis>.
+ 	</para>
+ </description>
+-<value type="default">plain</value>
+<value type="default">sign</value>
+ </samba:parameter>
+--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
+@@ -5392,6 +5392,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
+ 	Globals.ldap_debug_level = 0;
+ 	Globals.ldap_debug_threshold = 10;
+ 
+	Globals.client_ldap_sasl_wrapping = ADS_AUTH_SASL_SIGN;
+
+ 	/* This is what we tell the afs client. in reality we set the token 
+ 	 * to never expire, though, when this runs out the afs client will 
+ 	 * forget the token. Set to 0 to get NEVERDATE.*/
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/026-CVE-2016-2115-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/026-CVE-2016-2115-v3-6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+From 513bd34e4523e49e742487be32a7239111486a12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2016 03:43:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] CVE-2016-2115: docs-xml: add "client ipc signing" option
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11756
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+---
+ docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml    |  3 +++
+ source3/include/proto.h                           |  1 +
+ source3/param/loadparm.c                          | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml
+
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+<samba:parameter name="client ipc signing"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="enum"
+                 enumlist="enum_smb_signing_vals"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+    <para>This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use SMB signing for IPC$
+    connections as DCERPC transport inside of winbind. Possible values
+    are <emphasis>auto</emphasis>, <emphasis>mandatory</emphasis>
+    and <emphasis>disabled</emphasis>.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and if set
+    to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.</para>
+
+    <para>Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
+    always enforce signing.</para>
+</description>
+
+<related>client signing</related>
+
+<value type="default">mandatory</value>
+</samba:parameter>
+--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml
+@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
+     <para>When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced. 
+     When set to mandatory, SMB signing is required and if set 
+ 	to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.
+
+    <para>IPC$ connections for DCERPC e.g. in winbindd, are handled by the
+    <smbconfoption name="client ipc signing"/> option.</para>
+ </para>
+ </description>
+ 
+--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
+@@ -1690,9 +1690,11 @@ int lp_winbind_cache_time(void);
+ int lp_winbind_reconnect_delay(void);
+ int lp_winbind_max_clients(void);
+ const char **lp_winbind_nss_info(void);
+bool lp_winbind_sealed_pipes(void);
+ int lp_algorithmic_rid_base(void);
+ int lp_name_cache_timeout(void);
+ int lp_client_signing(void);
+int lp_client_ipc_signing(void);
+ int lp_server_signing(void);
+ int lp_client_ldap_sasl_wrapping(void);
+ char *lp_parm_talloc_string(int snum, const char *type, const char *option, const char *def);
+--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct global {
+ 	int  winbind_expand_groups;
+ 	bool bWinbindRefreshTickets;
+ 	bool bWinbindOfflineLogon;
+	bool bWinbindSealedPipes;
+ 	bool bWinbindNormalizeNames;
+ 	bool bWinbindRpcOnly;
+ 	bool bCreateKrb5Conf;
+@@ -366,6 +367,7 @@ struct global {
+ 	int restrict_anonymous;
+ 	int name_cache_timeout;
+ 	int client_signing;
+	int client_ipc_signing;
+ 	int server_signing;
+ 	int client_ldap_sasl_wrapping;
+ 	int iUsershareMaxShares;
+@@ -2319,6 +2321,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
+ 		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+		.label		= "client ipc signing",
+		.type		= P_ENUM,
+		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+		.ptr		= &Globals.client_ipc_signing,
+		.special	= NULL,
+		.enum_list	= enum_smb_signing_vals,
+		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+	},
+	{
+ 		.label		= "server signing",
+ 		.type		= P_ENUM,
+ 		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+@@ -4765,6 +4776,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
+ 		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+		.label		= "winbind sealed pipes",
+		.type		= P_BOOL,
+		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+		.ptr		= &Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes,
+		.special	= NULL,
+		.enum_list	= NULL,
+		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+	},
+	{
+ 		.label		= "winbind normalize names",
+ 		.type		= P_BOOL,
+ 		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+@@ -5458,6 +5478,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
+ 	Globals.szWinbindNssInfo = str_list_make_v3(NULL, "template", NULL);
+ 	Globals.bWinbindRefreshTickets = False;
+ 	Globals.bWinbindOfflineLogon = False;
+	Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes = True;
+ 
+ 	Globals.iIdmapCacheTime = 86400 * 7; /* a week by default */
+ 	Globals.iIdmapNegativeCacheTime = 120; /* 2 minutes by default */
+@@ -5470,6 +5491,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
+ 	Globals.bClientUseSpnego = True;
+ 
+ 	Globals.client_signing = Auto;
+	Globals.client_ipc_signing = Required;
+ 	Globals.server_signing = False;
+ 
+ 	Globals.bDeferSharingViolations = True;
+@@ -5736,6 +5758,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_nested_groups,
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_winbind_expand_groups, &Globals.winbind_expand_groups)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_refresh_tickets, &Globals.bWinbindRefreshTickets)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_offline_logon, &Globals.bWinbindOfflineLogon)
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_sealed_pipes, &Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_normalize_names, &Globals.bWinbindNormalizeNames)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_rpc_only, &Globals.bWinbindRpcOnly)
+ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_create_krb5_conf, &Globals.bCreateKrb5Conf)
+@@ -6071,6 +6094,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_LIST(lp_winbind_nss_info, &Glo
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_algorithmic_rid_base, &Globals.AlgorithmicRidBase)
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_name_cache_timeout, &Globals.name_cache_timeout)
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_signing, &Globals.client_signing)
+FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_ipc_signing, &Globals.client_ipc_signing)
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_server_signing, &Globals.server_signing)
+ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_ldap_sasl_wrapping, &Globals.client_ldap_sasl_wrapping)
+ 
+@@ -9700,6 +9724,20 @@ static bool lp_load_ex(const char *pszFn
+ 		lp_do_parameter(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM, "wins server", "127.0.0.1");
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (!lp_is_in_client()) {
+		switch (lp_client_ipc_signing()) {
+		case Required:
+			lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "mandatory");
+			break;
+		case Auto:
+			lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "auto");
+			break;
+		case False:
+			lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "disabled");
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	init_iconv();
+ 
+ 	bAllowIncludeRegistry = true;
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c
+@@ -2480,7 +2480,7 @@ static bool spoolss_connect_to_client(st
+ 		"", /* username */
+ 		"", /* domain */
+ 		"", /* password */
+-		0, lp_client_signing());
+		0, False);
+ 
+ 	if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK( ret ) ) {
+ 		DEBUG(2,("spoolss_connect_to_client: connection to [%s] failed!\n",
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/winbind/winbindsealedpipes.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<samba:parameter name="winbind sealed pipes"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="boolean"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+	<para>This option controls whether any requests from winbindd to domain controllers
+		pipe will be sealed. Disabling sealing can be useful for debugging
+		purposes.</para>
+
+	<para>The behavior can be controlled per netbios domain
+	by using 'winbind sealed pipes:NETBIOSDOMAIN = no' as option.</para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">yes</value>
+</samba:parameter>
+--- a/source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c
+++ b/source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c
+@@ -2384,6 +2384,15 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_sam(struct winbindd_
+ 	TALLOC_FREE(conn->samr_pipe);
+ 
+  anonymous:
+	if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
+		status = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
+		DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make SAMR connection to domain %s "
+			  "without connection level security, "
+			  "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
+			  "to proceed: %s\n",
+			  domain->name, nt_errstr(status)));
+		goto done;
+	}
+ 
+ 	/* Finally fall back to anonymous. */
+ 	status = cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth(conn->cli, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
+@@ -2610,6 +2619,16 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_lsa(struct winbindd_
+ 
+  anonymous:
+ 
+	if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
+		result = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
+		DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make LSA connection to domain %s "
+			  "without connection level security, "
+			  "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
+			  "to proceed: %s\n",
+			  domain->name, nt_errstr(result)));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+ 	result = cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth(conn->cli,
+ 					  &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id,
+ 					  &conn->lsa_pipe);
+@@ -2749,7 +2768,18 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_netlogon(struct winb
+ 
+  no_schannel:
+ 	if ((lp_client_schannel() == False) ||
+-			((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) {
+		((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) {
+		if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
+			result = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
+			DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make connection to domain %s "
+				  "without connection level security, "
+				  "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
+				  "to proceed: %s\n",
+				  domain->name, nt_errstr(result)));
+			TALLOC_FREE(netlogon_pipe);
+			invalidate_cm_connection(conn);
+			return result;
+		}
+ 		/*
+ 		 * NetSamLogonEx only works for schannel
+ 		 */
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/027-CVE-2016-2118-v3-6.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/027-CVE-2016-2118-v3-6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+From d68424b5ef92f5810760f90e9eeb664572a61e4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:49:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3: rpcclient: change the default auth
+ level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
+
+ncacn_ip_tcp:server should get the same protection as ncacn_np:server
+if authentication and smb signing is used.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit dab41dee8a4fb27dbf3913b0e44a4cc726e3ac98)
+---
+ source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
+++ b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
+@@ -1062,10 +1062,9 @@ out_free:
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (pipe_default_auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+-		/* If neither Integrity or Privacy are requested then
+-		 * Use just Connect level */
+		/* If nothing is requested then default to integrity */
+ 		if (pipe_default_auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE) {
+-			pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
+			pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+@@ -593,15 +593,15 @@ struct composite_context *dcerpc_pipe_au
+ 
+ 	/* Perform an authenticated DCE-RPC bind
+ 	 */
+-	if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_SIGN|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
+	if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_CONNECT|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
+ 		/*
+ 		  we are doing an authenticated connection,
+-		  but not using sign or seal. We must force
+-		  the CONNECT dcerpc auth type as a NONE auth
+-		  type doesn't allow authentication
+-		  information to be passed.
+		  which needs to use [connect], [sign] or [seal].
+		  If nothing is specified, we default to [sign] now.
+		  This give roughly the same protection as
+		  ncacn_np with smb signing.
+ 		*/
+-		conn->flags |= DCERPC_CONNECT;
+		conn->flags |= DCERPC_SIGN;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (s->binding->flags & DCERPC_AUTH_SPNEGO) {
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<samba:parameter name="allow dcerpc auth level connect"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="boolean"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+	<para>This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to
+	be used with DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication,
+	but no per message integrity nor privacy protection.</para>
+
+	<para>The behavior can be controlled per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
+	winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = no' as option.</para>
+
+	<para>This option yields precedence to the implentation specific restrictions.
+	E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+	While others like samr and lsarpc have a hardcoded default of <constant>no</constant>.
+	</para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">no</value>
+<value type="example">yes</value>
+
+</samba:parameter>
+--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
+@@ -1821,6 +1821,7 @@ char* lp_perfcount_module(void);
+ void lp_set_passdb_backend(const char *backend);
+ void widelinks_warning(int snum);
+ char *lp_ncalrpc_dir(void);
+bool lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect(void);
+ 
+ /* The following definitions come from param/loadparm_server_role.c  */
+ 
+--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
+@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ struct global {
+ 	bool bUseMmap;
+ 	bool bHostnameLookups;
+ 	bool bUnixExtensions;
+	bool bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect;
+ 	bool bDisableNetbios;
+ 	char * szDedicatedKeytabFile;
+ 	int  iKerberosMethod;
+@@ -2303,6 +2304,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
+ 		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+ 	},
+ 	{
+		.label		= "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+		.type		= P_BOOL,
+		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+		.ptr		= &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect,
+		.special	= NULL,
+		.enum_list	= NULL,
+		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+	},
+	{
+ 		.label		= "use spnego",
+ 		.type		= P_BOOL,
+ 		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+@@ -5371,6 +5381,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
+ 	Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
+ 	/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
+ 
+	Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = false; /* we don't allow this by default */
+
+ 	Globals.map_to_guest = 0;	/* By Default, "Never" */
+ 	Globals.oplock_break_wait_time = 0;	/* By Default, 0 msecs. */
+ 	Globals.enhanced_browsing = true;
+@@ -5745,6 +5757,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_username_map_cache_
+ 
+ FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_check_password_script, &Globals.szCheckPasswordScript)
+ 
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect, &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect)
+ FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_wins_hook, &Globals.szWINSHook)
+ FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_homedir, &Globals.szTemplateHomedir)
+ FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_shell, &Globals.szTemplateShell)
+--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ typedef struct pipe_rpc_fns {
+ 	uint32 context_id;
+ 	struct ndr_syntax_id syntax;
+ 
+	/*
+	 * shall we allow "connect" auth level for this interface ?
+	 */
+	bool allow_connect;
+ } PIPE_RPC_FNS;
+ 
+ /*
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@
+ #include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
+ #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+ #include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_epmapper.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_echo.h"
+ 
+ #undef DBGC_CLASS
+ #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
+@@ -340,6 +345,8 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 			   uint32 context_id)
+ {
+ 	struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
+	const char *interface_name = NULL;
+	bool ok;
+ 
+ 	DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
+ 		 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
+@@ -390,12 +397,57 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 		return False;
+ 	}
+ 
+	interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+						   abstract);
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
+ 	context_fns->next = context_fns->prev = NULL;
+ 	context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_num_cmds(abstract);
+ 	context_fns->cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_cmds(abstract);
+ 	context_fns->context_id = context_id;
+ 	context_fns->syntax = *abstract;
+ 
+	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
+	/*
+	 * for the samr and the lsarpc interfaces we don't allow "connect"
+	 * auth_level by default.
+	 */
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * for the epmapper and echo interfaces we allow "connect"
+	 * auth_level by default.
+	 */
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_epmapper.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_rpcecho.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
+	 * using a parametric option like:
+	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
+	 * e.g.
+	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:samr = yes
+	 */
+	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_parm_bool(-1,
+		"allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+		interface_name, context_fns->allow_connect);
+
+ 	/* add to the list of open contexts */
+ 
+ 	DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns );
+@@ -1736,6 +1788,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ 	bool ret = False;
+ 	PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns;
+	const char *interface_name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!p->pipe_bound) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not bound!\n"));
+@@ -1757,8 +1810,36 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+	interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+						   &pipe_fns->syntax);
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
+ 	DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n",
+-		  get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &pipe_fns->syntax)));
+		  interface_name));
+
+	switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (!pipe_fns->allow_connect) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("%s: restrict auth_level_connect access "
+				  "to [%s] with auth[type=0x%x,level=0x%x] "
+				  "on [%s] from [%s]\n",
+				  __func__, interface_name,
+				  p->auth.auth_type,
+				  p->auth.auth_level,
+				  derpc_transport_string_by_transport(p->transport),
+				  p->client_id->name));
+
+			setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return true;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
+--- a/source3/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/source3/selftest/knownfail
+@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ samba3.posix_s3.nbt.dgram.*netlogon2
+ samba3.*rap.sam.*.useradd # Not provided by Samba 3
+ samba3.*rap.sam.*.userdelete # Not provided by Samba 3
+ samba3.*rap.basic.*.netsessiongetinfo # Not provided by Samba 3
+samba3.blackbox.rpcclient.over.ncacn_np.with.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
+samba3.posix_s3.rpc.lsa.lookupsids.*ncacn_ip_tcp.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
+--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
+@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ if sub.returncode == 0:
+             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
+         elif t == "raw.samba3posixtimedlock":
+             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --option=torture:localdir=$SELFTEST_PREFIX/dc/share')
+        elif t == "rpc.samr.passwords.validate":
+            plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", 'ncacn_np:$SERVER_IP[seal] -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ')
+         else:
+             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
+ 
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
+@@ -6628,6 +6628,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ValidatePassword(struct p
+ 	struct samr_GetDomPwInfo pw;
+ 	struct samr_PwInfo dom_pw_info;
+ 
+	if (p->auth.auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+		p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+ 	if (r->in.level < 1 || r->in.level > 3) {
+ 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
+ 	}
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/110-multicall.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/110-multicall.patch
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 
 BIN_PROGS1 = bin/smbclient@EXEEXT@ bin/net@EXEEXT@ bin/smbspool@EXEEXT@ \
 	bin/testparm@EXEEXT@ bin/smbstatus@EXEEXT@ bin/smbget@EXEEXT@ \
-@@ -1777,6 +1777,42 @@ bin/.dummy:
+@@ -1799,6 +1799,42 @@ bin/.dummy:
 	  dir=bin $(MAKEDIR); fi
 	@: >> $@ || : > $@ # what a fancy emoticon!
 
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/111-owrt_smbpasswd.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/111-owrt_smbpasswd.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 --- a/source3/Makefile.in
 +++ b/source3/Makefile.in
-@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ TEST_LP_LOAD_OBJ = param/test_lp_load.o
+@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ TEST_LP_LOAD_OBJ = param/test_lp_load.o
 
 PASSWD_UTIL_OBJ = utils/passwd_util.o
 
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 		$(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) $(PASSDB_OBJ) \
 		$(GROUPDB_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(KRBCLIENT_OBJ) \
 		$(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(SMBLDAP_OBJ) \
-@@ -1791,7 +1791,7 @@ nmbd/nmbd_multicall.o: nmbd/nmbd.c nmbd/
+@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ nmbd/nmbd_multicall.o: nmbd/nmbd.c nmbd/
 		echo "$(COMPILE_CC_PATH)" 1>&2;\
 		$(COMPILE_CC_PATH) >/dev/null 2>&1
 
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 	@echo Compiling $<.c
 	@$(COMPILE_CC_PATH) -Dmain=smbpasswd_main && exit 0;\
 		echo "The following command failed:" 1>&2;\
-@@ -1800,7 +1800,7 @@ utils/smbpasswd_multicall.o: utils/smbpa
+@@ -1822,7 +1822,7 @@ utils/smbpasswd_multicall.o: utils/smbpa
 
 SMBD_MULTI_O = $(patsubst smbd/server.o,smbd/server_multicall.o,$(SMBD_OBJ))
 NMBD_MULTI_O = $(patsubst nmbd/nmbd.o,nmbd/nmbd_multicall.o,$(filter-out $(LIB_DUMMY_OBJ),$(NMBD_OBJ)))
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/120-add_missing_ifdef.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/120-add_missing_ifdef.patch
@ -24,3 +24,18 @@
 	epmapper_commands,
 	shutdown_commands,
  	test_commands,
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -433,10 +433,12 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+ 	}
+#ifdef DEVELOPER
+ 	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_rpcecho.syntax_id);
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+ 	}
+#endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
+ 	 * using a parametric option like:
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/210-remove_ad_support.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/210-remove_ad_support.patch
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
 #endif
 --- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
 +++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
-@@ -2904,12 +2904,14 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth_transp
+@@ -3391,12 +3391,14 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth_transp
 	status = rpc_pipe_bind(result, auth);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		int lvl = 0;
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/250-remove_domain_logon.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/250-remove_domain_logon.patch
@ -183,3 +183,31 @@
 
         /*
 	 * Force a log file check.
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -421,10 +421,12 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ 	}
+#ifdef NETLOGON_SUPPORT
+ 	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ 	}
+#endif
+ 	/*
+ 	 * for the epmapper and echo interfaces we allow "connect"
+ 	 * auth_level by default.
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -2221,6 +2221,10 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_two_trigg
+ 				      struct schannel_state);
+ 	struct tevent_req *subreq;
+ 
+#ifndef NETLOGON_SUPPORT
+	tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
+	return;
+#endif
+ 	if (schannel_auth == NULL ||
+ 	    !ndr_syntax_id_equal(&state->cli->abstract_syntax,
+ 				 &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id)) {
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/260-remove_samr.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/260-remove_samr.patch
@ -142,3 +142,21 @@
 	if (!str1 || !str2 || !UserName || !p) {
 		return False;
 	}
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 	context_fns->syntax = *abstract;
+ 
+ 	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
+#ifdef SAMR_SUPPORT
+ 	/*
+ 	 * for the samr and the lsarpc interfaces we don't allow "connect"
+ 	 * auth_level by default.
+@@ -417,6 +418,7 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ 	}
+#endif
+ 	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/290-remove_lsa.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/290-remove_lsa.patch
@ -71,3 +71,18 @@
 }
 
 size_t num_pipe_handles(struct pipes_struct *p)
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -419,10 +419,12 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif
+#ifdef LSA_SUPPORT
+ 	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
+ 	if (ok) {
+ 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+ 	}
+#endif
+ #ifdef NETLOGON_SUPPORT
+ 	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
+ 	if (ok) {
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/310-remove_error_strings.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/310-remove_error_strings.patch
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 }
 --- a/librpc/ndr/libndr.h
 +++ b/librpc/ndr/libndr.h
-@@ -604,4 +604,20 @@ _PUBLIC_ enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_enum
+@@ -663,4 +663,20 @@ _PUBLIC_ enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_enum
 
 _PUBLIC_ void ndr_print_bool(struct ndr_print *ndr, const char *name, const bool b);
 
@ -251,3 +251,87 @@
 	print "	       return;";
 	print "       }";
 	print "";
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -445,7 +445,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -466,7 +465,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -486,7 +484,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -508,7 +505,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -526,7 +522,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -570,7 +565,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_curren
+ 				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+ 				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+ 				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+-			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -991,7 +991,6 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pip
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+ 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+-		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 		goto err_exit;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1325,7 +1324,6 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_st
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+ 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+-		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 		goto err;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1483,7 +1481,6 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struc
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+ 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+-		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 		goto err_exit;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -2057,7 +2054,6 @@ static bool process_request_pdu(struct p
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ 		DEBUG(1, ("process_request_pdu: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+ 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+-		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ 		set_incoming_fault(p);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/330-librpc_default_print.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/330-librpc_default_print.patch
@ -8844,7 +8844,7 @@
 +done
 --- a/librpc/ndr/libndr.h
 +++ b/librpc/ndr/libndr.h
-@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ _PUBLIC_ enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_enum
+@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ _PUBLIC_ enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_enum
 _PUBLIC_ enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_enum_uint1632(struct ndr_push *ndr, int ndr_flags, uint16_t v);
 
 _PUBLIC_ void ndr_print_bool(struct ndr_print *ndr, const char *name, const bool b);