During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid
leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including
SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 46285
Tested myself on ixp4xx and mvebu, and (originally)
by Daniel on i.MX6. Also tested on a MIPS target,
to make sure the change to ASFLAGS does not break things.
Based on a patch submitted by Daniel Drown:
https://lists.openwrt.org/pipermail/openwrt-devel/2014-July/026639.html
Signed-off-by: Claudio Leite <leitec@staticky.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drown <dan-openwrt@drown.org>
SVN-Revision: 44618
This version includes this changes:
Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
Signed-off-by: Peter Wagner <tripolar@gmx.at>
SVN-Revision: 39853
1.0.1d had a rushed fix for CVE-2013-0169 which broke in certain
circumstances. 1.0.1e has the fix for TLS.
Also include a further patch from the 1.0.1 branch which fixes the
breakage this introduced for Cisco's outdated pre-standard version of
DTLS, as used by OpenConnect.
Update mirror URLs to reflect current reality.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 35600
Hauke Mehrtens
Jo-Philipp Wich
Steven Barth
John Crispin
Felix Fietkau
Florian Fainelli
Tim Yardley