openssl: add fixes for CVE-2009-1387 and CVE-2009-2409 (thx, puchu)

SVN-Revision: 19369
owl
Felix Fietkau 2010-01-28 19:27:57 +00:00
parent 0f34d88717
commit 7417cfdda3
2 changed files with 112 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
http://bugs.gentoo.org/270305
fix from upstream
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -585,30 +585,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
}
}
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
- if ( frag == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
- if (frag_len)
- {
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
goto err;
- }
- pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
- pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+ pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+ pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
- item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
- pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
- if ( item == NULL)
- goto err;
+ item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+ pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ }
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:

View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
http://bugs.gentoo.org/280591
fix from upstream
http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18260
--- a/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
@@ -64,9 +64,6 @@
void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
- EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4());
#endif
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
while (n >= 0)
{
ctx->error_depth=n;
- if (!xs->valid)
+
+ /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
+ * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
+ */
+ if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
{
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
{
@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
- /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
- * this is a waste of time. That check should
- * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
- * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
- * we don't verify again and again in SSL
- * handshakes and the like once the cert has
- * been declared trusted. */
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c
@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
- EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");