Update Malware analysis 27-08-19.md
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## Malware analysis <a name="Malware-analysis"></a>
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## Malware analysis <a name="Malware-analysis"></a>
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### Initial vector <a name="Initial-vector"></a>
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### Initial vector <a name="Initial-vector"></a>
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###### The initial vector is an INP file (format used for the software InPage) with the exploit cve-2017-12824, we can see here the 0x7E and 0x72 represent a class of type in the stream for use an ole stream for launch the first binairy file.
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###### The initial vector is an INP file (format used for the software InPage) with the exploit cve-2017-12824, we can see here the 0x7E and 0x72 represent a class of type in the stream for use, an ole stream for launch the first binary file.
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###### We can see on the string on the dll, what extract the file in the temp folder in the create a thread for the second PE. file.
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###### We can see on the strings on the dll, what extract the file in the temp folder and create a thread for the second PE file.
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###### On the entrypoint of the second PE, we can see the first action is to check the environnement in using the anti-forensic technic by the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function.
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###### On the entrypoint of the second PE, we can see the first action is to check the environment in using the anti-forensic technique by the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function.
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###### Before go on the others function, we can see that the PE get the name of the user and create their pesistence by an RunOnce key in the registry.
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###### Before go on the others function. We can see that the PE get the name of the user and create their persistence by an RunOnce key in the registry. (\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce Putty explorer.exe CurrentUser C:\file.exe)
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###### After this, this use the CreateToolhelp32snapshot function for get a snapshot of all the process an parsed it until this fall on the explorer process
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###### After this, this uses the CreateToolhelp32snapshot function for getting a snapshot of all the process an parsed it until this fall on the explorer process.
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###### We can note this check with the IsProcessorFeaturePresent function, for check if and raise an exception for close the program.
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###### We can note this check with the IsProcessorFeaturePresent function, for check if and raise an exception for close the program.
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###### Once the check, this inject it and create a process for communicate with the C2 and wait to loader the next malware.
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###### Once the check, this injects with a Process Hollowing for create a process for communicate with the C2 and wait to loader the next malware.
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###### At the date of the submission in VT, the C2 is down and the next step can't be analysed.
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###### At the date of the submission in VT, the C2 is down and the next step can't be analysed.
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## Cyber kill chain <a name="Cyber-kill-chain"></a>
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## Cyber kill chain <a name="Cyber-kill-chain"></a>
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###### The process graph resume the cyber kill chain used by the attacker.
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###### The process graph resume the cyber kill chain used by the attacker.
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![alt text]()
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![alt text]()
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## Cyber Threat Intel <a name="Cyber-Threat-Intel"></a>
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## Cyber Threat Intel <a name="Cyber-Threat-Intel"></a>
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###### Firstly, we can observe that the payload seem be with the Professional version of Inpage (2.21). Inpage is currently used in Pakistan which is consistent with the fact that Patchwork is an Indian APT.
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###### Firstly, we can observe that the payload seems be with the Professional version of Inpage (2.21). Inpage is currently used in Pakistan which is consistent with the fact that Patchwork is an Indian APT.
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###### Secondly, we can note the same pdb path what the 360TI analysis.
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###### The C2 is hosted on Amazon CloudFront :
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###### The C2 is hosted on Amazon CloudFront :
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|IP|Hostname|Route|ASN|Organization|Country|City|Region|Coordinates|
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|IP|Hostname|Route|ASN|Organization|Country|City|Region|Coordinates|
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|:---------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|
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|:---------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|:-------------:|
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|99.84.194.39|server-99-84-194-39.lax3.r.cloudfront.net|99.84.194.0/23|AS16509|Amazon.com, Inc.|United States| Seattle| Washington|47.5400,-122.3030|
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|99.84.194.39|server-99-84-194-39.lax3.r.cloudfront.net|99.84.194.0/23|AS16509|Amazon.com, Inc.|United States| Seattle| Washington|47.5400,-122.3030|
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###### This payload is linked at one of recent events:
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###### This payload is linked at one of the recent events :
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* A Delegation of Pakistan Naval Academy visits Azerbaijan (5 April 2019)
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* A Delegation of Pakistan Naval Academy visits Azerbaijan (5 April 2019)
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* The visit of Pakistan Air Force Academy delegation in Azerbaijan (20 June 2019)
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* The visit of Pakistan Air Force Academy delegation in Azerbaijan (20 June 2019)
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@ -49,23 +50,24 @@
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|Enterprise tactics|Technics used|Ref URL|
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|Enterprise tactics|Technics used|Ref URL|
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| :---------------: |:-------------| :------------- |
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|Execution|T1064 - Scripting|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064|
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|Persistence|T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060|
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|Defense Evasion|T1093 - Process Hollowing|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093|
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|Discovery|T1087 - Account Discovery|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087|
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##### Note: INP exploit hasn't a current category, the most near category found matching with it is Scripting.
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## Indicators Of Compromise (IOC) <a name="IOC"></a>
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## Indicators Of Compromise (IOC) <a name="IOC"></a>
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###### List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
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###### List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
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| Indicator | Description|
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| Indicator | Description|
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| ------------- |:-------------:|
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| ------------- |:-------------:|
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|Azerbaijan delegation to pakistan.inp|c0eeddccddbf23844c5e479a3dcc30713b697fa83d7c13feb79ecff6603c1181|
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||Domain requested|
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|bin1.dll|078e316440a540ed8095d12f154770118e28ca67a32c0fcc514564982f79eaa2|
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||IP requested|
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|bin2.exe|67923d0e9717aec0930ed0e4a3f84b5ba00dee9fc64774be452cee5aa782fbac|
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||HTTP/HTTPS requests||
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|go.affec.tv|Domain requested|
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||IP C2|
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|99.84.194.39|IP C2|
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||Domain C2|
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|go.affec.tv|Domain C2|
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###### This can be exported as JSON format [Export in JSON]()
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###### This can be exported as JSON format [Export in JSON](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/Indian/APT/Patchwork/27-08-19/IOC_Patchwork_09-09-19.json)
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## Links <a name="Links"></a>
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## Links <a name="Links"></a>
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###### Original tweet: [https://twitter.com/_jsoo_/status/1166353584923041798](https://twitter.com/_jsoo_/status/1166353584923041798) <a name="Original-Tweet"></a>
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###### Original tweet: [https://twitter.com/_jsoo_/status/1166353584923041798](https://twitter.com/_jsoo_/status/1166353584923041798) <a name="Original-Tweet"></a>
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