CyberThreatIntel/cybercriminal groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Malware Analysis 04-10-2019.md

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# Analysis of the new TA505 campaign
## Table of Contents
* [Malware analysis](#Malware-analysis)
* [Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)](#IOC)
* [References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix](#Ref-MITRE-ATTACK)
* [Links](#Links)
+ [Original Tweet](#Original-Tweet)
+ [Link Anyrun](#Links-Anyrun)
## Malware analysis <a name="Malware-analysis"></a>
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###### The inital vector is a malicious excel file who used a XLM macro (macro v4). This use an function for launch the payload when the excel windows is active (selected as primary window). As first action, this execute the module 1.
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Autoopen.PNG)
###### The function call in Module 1 create a Wscript object for change the current directory, show the fake message and push debug messages.
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Module1-1.PNG)
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Module2-1.PNG)
###### The userform execute the extract and execute a different PE instead of the architecture of the victim (x86 and x64).
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/userform.PNG)
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Module3.PNG)
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Module1-2.PNG)
###### As anti-forensic technique, this delete the files by call of kill functions.
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Module2-2.PNG)
###### We can note that a function is unused and seem to be a rest of the development of the macro.
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![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/Test.PNG)
###### The implant executed push all in memory with a call of VirtualAlloc function.
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/implant/pushmemory.PNG)
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/implant/virt.PNG)
###### Once this, this check the system informations, the process executed on the computer and try to detect if this run in a sandbox (low size of the disk).
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/implant/getinfos.PNG)
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/implant/detectsize.PNG)
###### This send the informations to the C2 and wait the next instruction of the group.
![alt text](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/Images/implant/connect.PNG)
###### We can list the informations send in the following variables :
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|Variables|Description|
|:-------------:|:-------------|
|&D=|Name of the computer|
|&U=|Name of the user|
|&OS=|Version of the OS|
|&PR=|List of process (separed by %7C)|
###### And is presented this way (extracted from sandbox):
``&D=User-PC&U=admin&OS=6.1&PR=Dwm.exe%7CEXCEL.EXE%7CExplorer.EXE%7Ctaskhost.exe%7Cwindanr.exe%7C``
###### That interesting to note that the group get only the process for see if the victim have security messures (AV, endpoint...) before launch the next step, that can be in the logic of the lastest analysis of the group to used clop ransomware.
The change currently the trust certificate for bypass the security messures, we can observed on the analysis of [VK_Intel](https://twitter.com/vk_intel) :
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1162810558774747137](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1162810558774747137)
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1157761784582983685](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1157761784582983685)
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1157742218549039105](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1157742218549039105)
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1155381658746589185](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1155381658746589185)
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1145041163839266823](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1145041163839266823)
* [https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1136069755222335490](https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1136069755222335490)
###
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## Cyber kill chain <a name="Cyber-kill-chain"></a>
###### The process graphs resume all the cyber kill chains used by the attacker.
![alt text]()
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## References MITRE ATT&CK Matrix <a name="Ref-MITRE-ATTACK"></a>
###### List of all the references with MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
|Enterprise tactics|Technics used|Ref URL|
| :---------------: |:-------------| :------------- |
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|Execution|Execution through Module Load|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129/|
|Discovery|Query Registry|https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012/|
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## Indicators Of Compromise (IOC) <a name="IOC"></a>
###### List of all the Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
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|Indicator|Description|
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| ------------- |:-------------:|
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|104.19.197.151|IP Requested|
|104.19.199.151|IP Requested|
|147.135.204.64|IP C2|
|18.194.14.44|IP Requested|
|183.111.138.244|IP Requested|
|185.33.87.27|IP Requested|
|192.99.211.205|IP C2|
|3ee37a570cc968ca2ad5a99f920c9332|D8EA1BAE84345D1A432E872811E9ECBCF84DE0BA6CB36053039A839DFBB7097C|
|44a20233b3c3b1defcd7484d241c5be6|09A887F08C7F252E642805DDFF5F1FDC390F675E603C994C3C06C055C55B0637|
|53b2c9d906fc9075fa375295c5bdcf5b|0776289CAC9F64211D5E5DDF14973157160DDCFBE2979D2E40638C4E03238558|
|89c3a79864a0f0fa5a6cd3f87e8bd3271d1265b4d632bb32bb6be02425b4fe78|89C3A79864A0F0FA5A6CD3F87E8BD3271D1265B4D632BB32BB6BE02425B4FE78|
|C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\{97B34601-5B4A-40AF-8963-D8C75594998B} - 1.dll|0AF713AB3D6D17CD6B96D78FAC2677FE3B5B0051CF8B673478BD767E7553C238|
|C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\module_p1.dll|57D29E8BA4D1C0ECAD75F2B9EEBEF757D872169C3270DABAF326D9057019CF68|
|C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\module_p2.dll|C16D2A23A27C1E9EAE34D01613C4BAB0FE4871F1D8A72D5C5B40E43B0F24D95C|
|c6d17efb69bd4a7ac8f9dc11f810c30b|77D8E6C621EA96AF5A677397FE367DC60689D7F4F40B0A60A198F1D117A9A47A|
|Cheque.xls|375159A45823FF4EAFBA0C364209EB7C35B353E3C64B69978C136CF41B67D570|
|chogoon.com|Domain Requested|
|doc 6172.xls|564CF47E84589D5E130E0502B403DF4E9648B9AFEA47372D0F9B8FD91FF6505C|
|ed0cde28ce66713974e339715bdde62b|CBAAB49338F8F2A9F56575702D9943A3DAFD78EF7812FABFF3B2E2899A460A12|
|f46e2c2925e6196fae3112fd0bcbb8c2|AD5910E44A63C0FC02376277D28D306A236CB87BCC0FA08B3569069BB5D58A6B|
|hxxps://chogoon[.]com/srt/gedp4|HTTP/HTTPS requests|
|hxxps://windows-wsus-en[.]com/version|HTTP/HTTPS requests|
|Invoice 7173.xls|BAEE4D4F8838CD7107977D960E4478279E9F321D21CB15126C38AA8204629561|
|J_280586|D8EA1BAE84345D1A432E872811E9ECBCF84DE0BA6CB36053039A839DFBB7097C|
|LET 7833.xls|544154ED4B0495EBD44210AC6EAC4B5D7B9C9BE36B61D21482616433BE1915DD|
|Letter 7711.xls|E7379BB7A4B46E2378D5722FD2C8F4AE31A2AE15D5A9006609EE3E8D26199D89|
|office365-update-eu.com|Domain C2|
|Receipt 0787.xls|564CF47E84589D5E130E0502B403DF4E9648B9AFEA47372D0F9B8FD91FF6505C|
|Receipt 4685 YJLJ.xls|564CF47E84589D5E130E0502B403DF4E9648B9AFEA47372D0F9B8FD91FF6505C|
|sample1.xls|6118EC7C0F06B45368DBD85B8F83958FC1F02F85E743F9CD82A1B877FBCCC140|
|sample4.XLS|566745CE483F3DC1744C757DD7348CE0844BAF5DB8CDF28F242CCD86B91496C0|
|windows-wsus-en.com|Domain C2|
|Xerox Scan_84676113847687.XLS|8741346FB8D6C2F4CA80FA2B176F162AF620F86C5FFC895C84346BE22BDAA976|
|Xerox.csv|566745CE483F3DC1744C757DD7348CE0844BAF5DB8CDF28F242CCD86B91496C0|
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###### This can be exported as JSON format [Export in JSON](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel/master/cybercriminal%20groups/TA505/04-10-2019/IOC_TA505_07-10-19.json)
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## Links <a name="Links"></a>
###### Original tweet:
* [https://twitter.com/James_inthe_box/status/1179077549302829056](https://twitter.com/James_inthe_box/status/1179077549302829056) <a name="Original-Tweet"></a>
* [https://twitter.com/KorbenD_Intel/status/1179858006584037377](https://twitter.com/KorbenD_Intel/status/1179858006584037377)
* [https://twitter.com/58_158_177_102/status/1177498806016823296](https://twitter.com/58_158_177_102/status/1177498806016823296)
###### Links Anyrun: <a name="Links-Anyrun"></a>
###### Samples :
* [Letter 7711.xls](https://app.any.run/tasks/d3699368-76cb-4c9f-b5c5-c4e25eb2e318)
* [REP 7072.xls](https://app.any.run/tasks/ae70ad41-d5d7-4dca-98d2-b72bfbae45fa)